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Preface
(Bazyli Czyżewski1)
This book has been prepared by a team of researchers from six renowned 
academic centres in the field of agricultural economics in Poland2, under a National 
Science Centre research grant titled “Political rents in the European Union’s 
agriculture – comparative analysis basing on the UE27”. It aims not only to extend 
the paradigm of sustainable development and the concept of political rent, but also 
to present the results of empirical studies carried out using data from 27 EU member 
states for the years 1995-2014 (some of the analyses also go back to the 1950s) 
together with Polish case studies. Viewing the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
from the standpoint of the theory of rent seeking is a relatively uncommon approach, 
particularly as the authors draw attention to the need to predefine the concept of 
political rent received by farmers in a situation where they are supplying public 
goods. The book can thus be said to some extent to fill a gap in existing research at 
the boundary between agricultural and political economy. The approach proposed 
by the authors may be all the more interesting since it presents issues of agricultural 
policy and political rents in agriculture from the point of view of a new EU member 
country, while the existing literature on the topic is dominated by analyses carried 
out by researchers from the old EU-15 members.
The book is divided into four parts, forming a logical sequence. Part 1 is of 
a theoretical nature, and presents an original conceptual approach to sustainable 
agriculture, land rent and political rents. These concepts are then tested empirically 
in the subsequent parts of the book, which adopt, respectively, an international, 
national and regional perspective. The research goal is to develop the theory of rent 
seeking and adapt it to the paradigm of sustainable agriculture and, more broadly, to 
that of sustainable development in general. The deliberations of the authors of the 
individual chapters, taken as a whole, serve to verify several research hypotheses:
1) the conceptual approach to political rents in agriculture is incomplete, 
because it does not take account of the process of creation of public goods in 
agriculture and the need to apply correction to the market in that sector;
2) political rents in sustainable agriculture fulfil a new role, which goes beyond 
the rent-seeking concept;
1 Poznań University of Economics and Business; b.czyzewski@ue.poznan.pl .
2 Cracow University of Economics, Poznań University of Economics and Business, Poznań 
University of Life Sciences, Warsaw University of Life Sciences (SGGW), West Pomeranian 
University of Technology Szczecin, and the University of Zielona Góra.
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3) despite the existence of a Common Agricultural Policy, the political rents 
received by EU farmers are highly differentiated at national and regional 
level – there exist national models of rent seeking;
4) the European Agricultural Model is not a universal development model for 
EU agriculture given the existing large disproportions in rent seeking between 
countries.
To introduce the reader to the topics addressed in the various parts of the book and 
the logical relationships between them, a brief summary of each of them is given 
below.
***
Part 1: the paradigm of sustainable agriculture, land rent vs. political 
rent 
The first part of the book presents the theoretical foundations for the paradigm 
of sustainable agriculture and some key concepts related to it, namely land rent and 
political rent. In Chapter 1.1 the authors draw attention to three key questions in the 
theory of sustainable agriculture: the intrinsic utility of land, and the absolute and 
relative deprivation of farmers. The question of intrinsic utility of land, affecting the 
balance of inputs and outputs, is highly inspiring. Rents of well-being of the natural 
environment remain an unknown factor in the value of land. We may assume that the 
basic relation of capitalism is defined by the ratio of capital (assets) to income. How, 
though, should one approach land as a natural resource, and in particular the virgin 
land which the human species inherited? Land, though treated as an asset, is not a 
capital accumulated by people. It has an intrinsic value, which has been improved 
over centuries of use. This value, in the historical process of intersectoral flows, 
has been capitalised to varying degrees, altering the aforementioned relationship 
of capital to income. As regards the second question: at the root of the absolute 
deprivation of farmers lies the immobility of the land factor relative to the other 
factors of production – labour and capital. As a result, the economic surplus 
created on farms is partly captured in the supply chain by commodity purchasers, 
processors, sellers, and finally consumers. The authors refer to this process by the 
original term “surplus drainage”. Particularly notable, however, is the fact of the 
relative deprivation of farmers, quite common in many highly developed European 
countries, whose theoretical causes are not entirely clear. It is appropriate in this 
regard to consider the question of how the sense of relative deprivation is related to 
the land capital that farmers have accumulated. 
Chapter 1.2 describes the evolution of the 18th-century land rent into 
contemporary political rent. The contemporary significance of the category of land 
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rent is not reflected in the body of research work on that topic. The authors take the 
view that in the present era of transformations in the agricultural model of developed 
countries, there is a need for a new concept of land rent. The neoclassical theory of 
rent is insufficient to describe the reality, because it reduces the sources of land rent 
to the inelasticity of supply of land and the discounting of rental prices. Under the 
paradigm of sustainable agriculture, however, the land rent discounted in average 
land prices is significantly higher than the value of the rental price. Why is this? It 
is suggested that, at present, the reason for the existence of land rent is more and 
more often the intrinsic utilities of the land, which cause the expected productivity 
of capital in agriculture to be higher than in related sectors. These expectations are 
linked to a large degree to the political rents received by agriculture, and hence to the 
phenomenon of rent seeking, but this is not the whole story. 
We thus come to the concept of political rent as explained in Chapter 1.3. The 
methodological individualism that characterises the neoclassical approach often neglects 
the benefits and costs resulting from collective actions. For this reason, contemporary 
agricultural policy is also a topic of interest to political economists and the public 
choice theory. The author of this chapter attempts to explain the basic concepts of rent-
seeking activities and the interest group theory, which might be useful in explaining the 
high level of support for agricultural commodity producers in Europe. This chapter is 
purely descriptive, and its main objective is to review the basic concepts of the public 
choice theory with regard to agricultural policy. Hence it explains the mechanisms of 
rent-seeking behaviour and its consequences, reveals the idea behind the interest group 
theory, which may be useful in analysing lobbying activity in agricultural policy, and 
seeks empirical evidence in the contemporary subject literature.
***
Part 2: sustainable development of agriculture and political rents – 
international perspective
In view of the growing population and limited land resources used for agricultural 
purposes, global agriculture is required to perform the function of producing food 
while at the same time minimising its impact on the natural environment. In Chapter 
2.1 an assessment is made of the sustainability of agriculture in the European Union 
compared with agriculture worldwide. Account is taken of issues relating to economic, 
social and environmental balance, against a background of resource-related and 
structural conditions. The essence of sustainable agriculture should be its durability, 
which is dependent on its environmental friendliness, social acceptance and economic 
effectiveness. In addition to these assumptions, it should be noted that, alongside the 
neoclassical allocation effectiveness, adaptive effectiveness is also important for the 
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sustainable development of agriculture. Adaptive effectiveness comes to light in the 
long term, and is linked to the flexibility of institutional structures. It is manifested 
as the ability to accumulate knowledge and to instigate supranational forms of 
cooperation. According to FAO estimates, given the expected growth in the global 
population to 9 billion by 2050, it will be necessary to increase agricultural output by 
at least 60% (FAO 2015). In this context it may be asked, on the one hand, whether 
contemporary agriculture is capable of ensuring a secure supply of food at present and 
in the future, and on the other, whether this objective is compatible with its sustainable 
development. One can find the answers to these questions in the different strategies 
and policies for a bioeconomy, which began with the publication of a bioeconomic 
policy agenda by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 
2009 (OECD 2009). Since that time, many documents have been produced indicating 
strategic directions for action to develop a bioeconomy, at regional as well as national 
and international level. In Chapter 2.2 an assessment is made of the European Union’s 
bioeconomic strategy, based on EU programming documents. Attention is drawn to 
the differing understandings of the concept of a bioeconomy that are found in the 
literature and in programming documents, at both national and EU level.
The aforementioned “adaptive effectiveness” is also manifested in the evolution 
of the institutional measures applied under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). The aims and principles of the CAP were formulated in the 1950s. Since 
that time, the changing internal and external conditions under which farming 
activity takes place have led to successive reforms of the policy. The change in the 
priorities of EU agricultural policy is reflected in the instruments applied, which 
have evolved from price-market intervention into direct support for the incomes 
of agricultural producers and for the development of rural areas supplying public 
goods. An interventionist agricultural policy distorts the market, among other things 
through higher prices obtained by agricultural producers in the EU. Differences in 
prices can be considered a symptom of political rents, which are perceived as a 
cost of maintaining the viability of the European agriculture. This aspect of political 
rents in EU agriculture is analysed in Chapter 2.3. The study is based on a set of 
synthetic indicators of support for agricultural producers (NRA) developed by the 
World Bank, analysed on a dynamic basis against the background of the evolution 
of the CAP instruments. The authors address the questions of whether the CAP now 
has less of a distortive effect on world prices (causes less destabilisation of global 
agricultural markets) than it did in the past; whether this means that agricultural 
producers in Europe are losing competitive advantage with respect to other parts of 
the world and to what extent this applies to particular EU members, having regard to 
the division between the “old” EU-15 and the “new” EU-12; and whether this poses 
a threat to the viability of European agriculture. 
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An alternative to the NRA support index is the PSE (Producer Support Estimate) 
measure calculated by the OECD (OECD 2010). This indicator, however, is computed 
and published for the EU as a whole, blurring differences in the political rents 
obtained by individual member states. This is of particular significance for the new 
countries of the EU-12, where since their accession in 2004 the level of support has 
been identified with the EU level, although in reality even the process of transition to 
full direct payments was not complete until 2013. A dilemma arises, of importance 
for both economic theory and practice, of whether the huge variety of institutional 
measures applied at national level can be represented by means of a single model of 
transfers of economic surplus to agriculture. After all, in evaluating the mechanisms 
of support, account should be taken of macroeconomic conditions, the significance 
of public goods, the power of interest groups, and the elasticity of the supply side 
in agriculture and the whole of agribusiness in a given country. For this reason, 
the authors of Chapter 2.4 computed their own indicator, the Farm Receipts Gap 
Estimate (FRGE), for individual EU countries based on the assumptions adopted 
for the computation of the aforementioned PSE index. This indicator, apart from the 
price gap reflected by the NRA, also takes account of changes in revenue caused by 
fluctuations in the supply of agricultural raw materials. A study was conducted of the 
financial system of support for agriculture in fourteen EU countries – Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, the UK and Italy – between 1995 and 2012. However, 
neither the NRA nor the FRGE is an ideal measure of political rents, because they are 
based on highly restrictive assumptions, including perfect competition, absence of 
transaction costs and absence of public goods, which are at variance with the concept 
of political rent described in the first part of the book. If it is possible to compute 
what part of the political rent compensates for market imperfections in agriculture 
and the supply of public goods by farms, then the aforementioned indicators should 
be adjusted accordingly. This matter is taken up in the next part of the book.
***
Part 3: towards valuing political rents – national perspective
The authors promote the viewpoint that in analysing the political rents of 
farmers, defined as in Chapter 1.23, account must be taken of three processes: long-
term flows of surplus from agriculture to other sectors due to the flexibility of 
3 As economic rents, that is, surplus income in excess of the alternative cost of production 
factors, obtained by way of political decisions. These rents result from restrictions on the free 
operation of the market mechanism (Krueger, 1974) and cause the wastage of resources and loss 
of well-being.
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agricultural prices, payments for public goods, and taxation of agriculture. Long-term 
depreciation of agriculture through a price mechanism (i.e. the constant exacerbation 
of the price scissors effect, or price gap, in agriculture) gives rise to a number of 
adverse social and environmental effects. This process must therefore be offset by 
the retransfer of income to agriculture under agricultural policy. As regards public 
goods, there does not exist any more effective way of ensuring the constancy of their 
supply than through subsidies (institutional valuation). Naturally, the subsidisation 
of agriculture needs to be analysed in net terms, taking account of the taxes paid by 
farmers. Considering the issues in that order, we come on to the complex question of 
the measurement of political rents paid to agriculture in EU countries.
Agriculture is a sector of the economy in which cyclical economic fluctuations 
are particularly marked. These are linked on the one hand to features of land as a 
production factor, and on the other to the low price and income elasticity of demand 
for food products in conditions of forced consumption. Therefore, in the long term, 
there is a “drainage” of added value from agriculture to the processing sector, 
chiefly through a price mechanism, as losses from a period of downturn are not 
compensated by rents in the period of upturn. In Chapter 3.1 the authors construct 
a synthetic indicator of the economic situation in agriculture based on the values of 
flows of economic rents in agribusiness (from and to agriculture) linked to changes 
in sectoral prices and inflation, in the form of an input-output table. The developed 
indicator was tested in relation to the EU-27 countries, in order to evaluate the 
production decisions of farms in conditions of flexible prices of products sold in 
different phases of the economic cycle in agriculture. The drawing of conclusions 
about the economic cycle based on flows of economic rents is an atypical approach, 
but one that helps identify the causes of fluctuations in productive activity on farms 
and enables their scale to be compared between countries.
In Chapter 3.2 the authors review the literature with regard to the concept of the 
supply of public goods by agriculture. They then make a division of CAP subsidies 
according to their function, indicating those which are intended to finance public 
goods. They use cluster analysis to identify EU regions which differ significantly in 
terms of the structure of budgetary subsidies to agriculture. It is considered to what 
extent this is a permanent division, and whether convergence is taking place between 
regions as regards the support structure.
European agriculture receives subsidies on the one hand, but on the other it is 
burdened by various taxes. Taxes levied on agriculture in the EU include taxes on 
income, assets, and consumption. The systems are quite similar to each other in 
terms of types of taxes, the rules for determining the basis for their calculation, the 
rates applied, and tax preferences. In Chapter 3.3 a comparison and evaluation is 
made of the tax systems applicable to agriculture in selected EU countries, based on 
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a synthetic valuation measure. Valuation was performed with respect to the structure 
of the tax systems applied in agriculture, in particular the number of different taxes 
included in the system. A valuation was then made of the methods of determining the 
income tax base in the analysed countries. What was primarily evaluated here were 
the differences in treatment of the supplementation of farm income by income from 
other sources, and the various types of allowed deductions from the tax base. The 
next step involved an evaluation of tax rates, and finally of the preferences applied 
in the analysed countries’ tax systems with respect to agriculture. By summing the 
values of the features of the tax systems applied to agriculture, a synthetic indicator 
is obtained. The convention is adopted that a lower value of the indicator implies a 
more preferential tax system, while a higher value implies more restrictive taxation 
of agriculture. The analysis enabled the identification of a group of countries in 
which agriculture is taxed more preferentially. 
The foregoing considerations of flows of surplus in agribusiness, payments 
for public goods and taxes in EU agriculture are brought together in Chapter 3.4, 
which discusses whether the concept of political rent in terms of the theory of rent 
seeking is conceptually appropriate to contemporary agricultural policy in the EU. 
By definition, political rent is inextricably linked to the wastage of resources and to 
exclusive benefits provided to selected social groups at the expense of others. It is 
generally believed that agricultural interventionism under the Common Agricultural 
Policy represents the payment of political rents to farmers. The authors attempt to 
show that the concept of political rent within the rent-seeking theory is not valid 
for agricultural policy. It is not justified to identify the whole of the subsidies 
paid to agriculture in the EU as a “political rent”, since political rents cannot be 
taken to include payments for the supply of public goods or those transfers which 
compensate for market imperfections. A methodology is proposed for valuing these 
items, filling the gap existing in the literature on political economy. The authors 
perform comparative analyses with the aim of calculating the “pure political rent”, 
based on input-output matrices for representative farms according to the EU-FADN 
typology for the period 2007-2012 and all EU-27 countries. 
***
Part 4: how to measure and how to support sustainability in 
agribusiness – regional perspective
The fourth part of the book contains four case studies. The authors begin by 
raising the question of what sustainability means and how to measure it in practice, 
particularly on a local scale (4.1). Sustainability should be perceived as enjoyment of 
any good or service that contributes to well-being, including things freely provided 
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by nature like forest products and beautiful sunsets. Sustainability is usually 
measured based on a very broad view of capital (the UNECE methodology), i.e. 
including five equally important individual stocks: financial capital (stocks, bonds 
and currency deposits), produced capital (machinery, buildings, telecommunications 
and other types of infrastructure), natural capital (natural resources, land and 
ecosystems providing services like waste absorption), human capital (an educated 
and healthy workforce), and social capital in the form of functioning social networks 
and institutions. However, at the regional level these indicators usually do not tell us 
much about how well a system is progressing in terms of the goal of sustainability, as 
it is difficult to reflect the specific regional situation. According to some researchers, 
measuring sustainable development at the national level, based on national-level data, 
may fail to capture critical issues at the regional level. Therefore, although a general 
approach might be followed, it is necessary to design certain individual indicators 
that are adequate to the problems of a particular region. In Chapter 4.2 the author 
combines the aforementioned UNECE individual stocks into three equally important 
components: an economic component, natural capital, and a spatial component. 
However, in choosing the indicators, the INSURE methodology was also taken into 
account, with values fitting within the framework of the triple bottom line (people, 
planet, profit). Hence an original methodology was adopted for measuring the level 
of sustainability, applied to a case study of the Wielkopolska region in Poland.
There are different approaches to quantifying “sustainable capital stocks” in 
agribusiness. Intellectual capital in agribusiness is often referred to as a wealth or 
asset of an organisation, and is perceived as a factor driving the global economy of 
the future and at the same time as a key to success in the 21st century. It is therefore 
extremely important to research the intellectual capital of an enterprise, in terms 
of both the transformations taking place in organisations and the identification of 
non-material assets of individual firms. Many ways of measuring intellectual capital 
have been proposed in the literature, and these are considered in detail by the author 
of Chapter 4.2. They include market capitalisation methods (MCM), methods based 
on return on assets (ROA), methods involving the measurement of direct intellectual 
capital (DIC), and scorecard methods (SC). Chapter 4.2 describes the concept of 
intellectual capital and selected methods for measuring it, from both theoretical 
and practical perspectives. It presents the historical context of the problem and 
a description of the importance of action taken to measure intellectual capital by 
certain business groupings, namely KSG Agro SA, Industrial Milk Company SA and 
Kernel Holding SA. The development of common uniform analytical models will 
make it possible to improve the quality of capital management and also to improve 
competitiveness.
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Having shown how it is possible in practice to measure both the sustainability 
of agribusiness on a regional scale and its key components (intellectual capital), we 
investigated the question of how this process is supported by economic policy. This 
subject is taken up in Chapters 4.3 and 4.4. We identified two channels of support 
for the sustainable development of agriculture: through land value, and through the 
income of farms supplying public goods. The first case study concerns the problem 
of to what extent agricultural policy currently causes variation in land prices and 
is capitalised in the value of agricultural land. A fundamental problem is that it 
is hard to quantify all non-agricultural amenities associated with land and to find 
comparable measures for them. It is thus necessary to seek appropriate aggregates 
for environmental and urban utilities. The authors attempted to fill the gaps in the 
subject literature by means of a wide-ranging study of the drivers of agricultural 
land value in Wielkopolska, a leading agricultural region of Poland. The aim of the 
research is to determine how payments for public goods are capitalised in the value 
of land.
Another channel of support for sustainability is through the incomes of farms 
supplying public goods. This applies in particular to farms offering agrotourism 
services. Rural areas are undergoing an evolution in terms of the functions that they 
perform. While in the 1980s the productive function (agriculture) was still dominant, 
at present touristic and recreational functions are becoming increasingly important. 
Consequently, there is a growing interest in the development of agrotouristic 
activity both among farms and among local authorities in Poland. Such action is also 
supported via instruments of the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Public goods, 
which increase the value of the landscape and the quality of life in rural areas, should 
provide a stimulus to create agrotourism farms based on their value. They thus make 
it possible to better utilise the labour factor and to diversify economic activity, while 
at the same time increasing the income of local authorities. Support for the process of 
supplying public goods is thus seen as the creation of attractive employment in rural 
areas for workers with qualifications in agriculture, horticulture, food processing 
and services for the food industry. It is therefore a source of benefits both for private 
entities functioning on the basis of public goods, and for whole communities, which 
obtain additional income in various forms (at the primary, secondary and final stages 
of the division of municipal income). Whether this happens in reality is shown by the 
case study in Chapter 4.4, where the authors attempt to model the impact of the links 
between naturally occurring public goods and the incomes of agrotourism farms and 
local authorities.

Part 1.
The Paradigm of Sustainable 
Agriculture – Land Rent Versus 
Political Rent
1.1. Research challenges for agricultural economics 
in the new paradigm
(Andrzej Czyżewski, Bazyli Czyżewski4) 
Introduction
In contrast to the economics of labour and capital, agricultural economics has to 
deal with the land factor and its distinctive feature of immobility, which refers to the 
impossibility of transferring soil to non-agricultural uses. We make the assumption 
that a research procedure should provide not only description and comparison, but 
also valuation and recommendation. Economics, according to Tomáš Sedláček, can be 
divided into good and bad (Sedláček 2012). We agree with that view. Much depends, 
however, on the institution that puts into practice the ideas of the governors elected 
by the governed. Consequently, we treat agricultural economics not as economics in 
a pure sense, usually limited to description and explanation. The general laws of the 
discipline of economics, determining the state that is and that should be, are in this 
case not entirely adequate to our needs. Economics develops through the creation 
of new paradigms with differing systems and hierarchies of values, going beyond 
the hitherto existing fields, schemes and investigative methods. In every paradigm 
there are laid foundation stones on which new concepts are built. In contemporary 
economics there are several of these. Here we intend to introduce those which, in our 
view, will play a leading role in the coming decades. Today these are at best noticed, 
and in some cases “extracted”, but closer knowledge of their nature and relationships 
is still obscured by a fog of enthralling mystery. This exerts an attraction, despite the 
risk of committing the sin of immodesty in the face of the unknown. We select three 
issues for consideration:
• the contemporary reinterpretation of economic rents in the food economy, 
taking account of the question of the intrinsic value of land;
• the problem of absolute and relative deprivation – that is, the impoverishment 
of farmers;
• the need to change the industrial-technological model of development 
currently dominant in agriculture into one of sustainable development.
4 Poznań University of Economics and Business; a.czyzewski@ue.poznan.pl, b.czyzewski@
ue.poznan.pl .
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The foundation stones of the paradigm of sustainable agriculture
In expanding on the aforementioned questions, we wish to note that the 
problem of the intrinsic value of land, affecting the balance of intersectoral flows of 
agricultural raw materials and food products, is a highly inspirational one. The rents 
of the welfare of the natural environment remain a mysterious factor in the value of 
land. We follow Thomas Piketty in assuming that the basic relation of capitalism 
is defined by the ratio of capital to current income, and that this ratio is regulated 
by the rate of return on capital and by the relationship of the rate of saving to the 
rate of increase in income. We must conclude, then, that a basic condition for the 
development of capital is financial and material accumulation (Piketty 2015). How, 
though, should we approach land as a natural resource, and in particular the virgin 
lands that the human species has inherited? Land, counted as an asset, is not, after 
all, a capital accumulated by people. It has an intrinsic value, which over centuries of 
use has been improved – through drainage, irrigation, ploughing, clearing, enclosure, 
and the like – but the root of which lies beyond our knowledge. There would be 
nothing unusual in this, except for the fact that it is this value, in the historical 
process of intersectoral flows, which is, to varying degrees, capitalised, bringing 
about significant change in the aforementioned relationship between capital and 
income. The point is, however, that the origin of these processes goes back to “pure”, 
intrinsic values, the measure of which also changes over time. The question arises: 
what is the contribution of these values to the growth in the ratio of capital to income 
and its dynamics, and what economic consequences does that relationship have in 
the contemporary world? Is it possible at all to compute the intrinsic value of land 
in market prices, and what would be the sense, economically speaking, in doing so? 
This is the mystery associated with land. It is certain that such a value exists. The 
distinguished scientist Professor R. Manteuffel originated this line of thought in his 
Philosophy of Agriculture (Manteuffel 1987).
As to the second question – at the root of the absolute deprivation of farmers 
(and their farms) lies the immobility of the land factor, in contrast to the other factors 
of production: labour and capital. Land as an asset does not move to other uses. The 
process of the formation of intermediate and final demand involves only its rent, 
and that to a highly inadequate degree, in view of the absence of the internalisation 
of many costs, such as the maintenance of the welfare of the natural environment. 
This has been pointed out, for example, by A. Woś, in his last work dealing with the 
valuation of resources and production factors of agriculture (Woś 2006). The facts 
discussed here imply that the economic surplus created on farms does not fulfil 
the criterion of optimum allocation in a Pareto sense in the table of intersectoral 
flows. In the supply chain this surplus is partly captured by purchasers, processors, 
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vendors, and finally consumers. According to empirical research conducted in 
Poland and Europe based on a sample of FADN farms, that deprivation certainly 
arises over a closed economic cycle, the phenomenon being markedly more intense 
in the downward phase of the cycle than in the upward phase (Czyżewski B. 2013; 
Czyżewski 2016). A consequence of this state of affairs is the need for that part of 
the generated economic surplus which has flowed away from its original creators 
to be restored by way of a mechanism for redistribution of the income of taxpayers 
– formerly through both the market and the central budget, today chiefly through 
the budget, including in the form of subsidies provided for various reasons and 
grants supporting farmers’ income. This provides compensation for the market’s 
discrimination against agriculture, and is an important justification for agricultural 
policy as currently implemented, including the European Union’s Common 
Agricultural Policy. Without such redistribution, farmers’ income would be placed in 
increasing disparity with other sectors of the economy. Detailed research has shown 
that the more economically developed a country is, the more common this becomes 
(Czyżewski, Kułyk 2010). According to Polish experience, however, the budgetary 
compensation for the deprivation of farmers’ income is insufficient. The disparity 
between agricultural income and average household incomes still persists, although 
it has been significantly reduced by Poland’s membership of the EU (Goraj 2009). 
It should be noted, however, that in the “old” EU-15 member states the level of this 
disparity averages around zero, while in countries such as Japan and the United 
States it is clearly positive (Czyżewski, Kułyk 2010).
Of particular note, however, is the fact that relative deprivation of farmers is 
fairly common in many highly developed European countries, where the level of 
agricultural incomes is much higher than in Poland, but is still noticeably lower 
than the level of average household incomes in those countries. It should be noted 
that agricultural incomes in many highly developed EU countries, without financial 
support from a budgetary redistribution mechanism, would be insufficient to pay 
the current costs of agricultural production. Here, however, we would like to 
share a reflection concerning the need, in explaining that mechanism, to include 
an evaluation of the relation of the capital accumulated by farmers, including 
accumulated assets (houses, farm buildings, equipment, machinery, and finally 
land), to incomes. It should be borne in mind that in highly developed economies the 
ratio of capital, understood in this way, to income is estimated at around 5–6 (Piketty 
2015). It might nonetheless be asked whether the shaping of agricultural incomes 
should be decoupled from farmers’ accumulated capital. In what circumstances is 
this important, and what might the consequences be for their economic choices?
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The last of the questions listed relates to the need for the industrial-technological 
model currently dominant in commercial agriculture to be replaced with sustainable 
development. We are aware that this would not be a simple switch, but a process of 
approaching a goal, which itself is not static. There is, after all, a need to balance 
economic, demographic, environmental and social needs in such a way as to minimise 
errors of composition. There is a need for appropriate rules on interaction between 
the new institutions and instruments. It is hard to say when that process will achieve 
a critical mass, on a continental and later a global scale – it will certainly not happen 
simultaneously everywhere, and the time differences may be significant. One thing 
is certain, however. The existing mechanism, stimulating the technical effectiveness 
of production without internalising the accompanying transaction costs and reducing 
the wellbeing of the natural environment, must be changed (Zegar 2012). Stimulation 
of the scale of agricultural production in conditions of falling unit purchase prices, 
and the consequent relative fall in the marginal incomes of farmers, becomes 
economically pointless. When to this we add the increasing costs of production, due 
to the need to pay the rent of the welfare of the natural environment, the introduction 
of a policy of sustainable growth becomes essential (Czyżewski A., Czyżewski B. 
2015). To live, people need not only food, but also a healthy natural environment. 
The eutrophication of water, steppe formation, green belt loss, as well as excessive 
emissions of methane and carbon dioxide, lead to ever more vocal social objections, 
particularly in areas where the development of civilisation is advanced. The time 
is therefore approaching when a general environmental levy will have to be paid 
– a special tax to enable the preservation of the natural environment for future 
generations. It is less important that we speak today of the shift to sustainable growth 
as a process rather than a single act; what matters is that the process has begun 
and will intensify. Does this mean that over the coming decades food will become 
more expensive? Perhaps, but much depends on the effectiveness of biological 
and technological progress, which must nonetheless take account of the need for 
permanent integration of the different aspects of economic growth.
The industrial model of the development of agriculture vs. the 
sustainable agriculture paradigm5
The challenges faced by agriculture today are integrally linked to the rejection 
of the assumptions of neoclassical economics as advocated in the economics of 
agriculture (Woś, Tomczak 1983). Continuing to ignore the role of the environment 
in the provision of materials, raw materials and waste collection, as is done in 
present-day agricultural economics, makes it impossible to run business operations, 
5 The following thesis has also been presented in (Czyżewski A., Czyżewski B. 2014)
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while the assumption that people, in striving to satisfy their own needs, inevitably 
contribute to achieving a public good is counterfactual. Entities oriented towards 
profit maximisation show a strong tendency to externalise environmental costs, which 
are not always possible to express in monetary categories (Tietenberg 2006; Solow 
1974; Daly 2007). Thus the central dilemma of the new agrarian economy concerns 
the necessary relative limitation of the production efficiency of the industrial model 
of development (Wojtyna 2008) in favour of improving the quality of life as part of a 
socially and environmentally sustainable new management paradigm (Zegar 2012). 
It requires full recognition of the social and environmental costs of production, 
and the rejection of rules which lead to the degradation and decline of natural 
resources. These premises imply a need to depart from the hitherto implemented 
“industrial” economics of agriculture towards a new economic order, the growth 
of which limits are determined by the ecosystem in the conditions of a sustainable 
scale of production. Then the desired distribution of resources, to be implemented 
by way of a market mechanism to ensure effective allocation, will be specified by 
adopted rules and instruments (Zegar 2012). This allows the new agrarian economy 
to take into account the optimum relations of production scale and the natural 
environment, which would guarantee the sustainability of the management process, 
while natural resources would not be treated equally with anthropogenic capital. 
Such an understanding of the concept of full flows of inputs and effects will make it 
possible to determine whether the possibilities for renewing a specific ecosystem are 
exceeded, or as J. S. Zegar puts it, whether the final growth utility is lower or higher 
than the scale of lost profits. The problem with the new paradigm of agricultural 
economy lies in the fact that it assigns intrinsic value to natural capital, going beyond 
the classical understanding of land rent (Czyżewski B. 2010). In the economics of 
agriculture it is no longer sufficient to view processes only from the perspective of 
capital and labour (Woś, Zegar 2002). The assumption of the inexhaustibility of 
natural resources and unlimitedness of the global ecosystem, which today is seen 
as clearly counterfactual, can no longer be accepted. Neglecting the significance 
of the land factor, as is done in the Cobb–Douglas function, can be considered as 
an intellectual exercise, but not as a management practice. This factor determines 
a number of public goods and services which are essential to human existence. 
The estimation of the demand for these according to non-commercial (designed) 
prices will therefore soon become a necessity, allowing the opposition of market 
competitiveness against social competitiveness, which emphasises the divergence 
between micro- and macroeconomic criteria.
With prices, a market mechanism based on the triad of ownership and supply- 
and demand-related regulation creates demand for money (Wilkin 1995). In reality, 
this leads to the concentration of production to lower its unit costs, and the obligation 
1.1. Research challenges for agricultural economics in the new paradigm 23
to increase labour efficiency as a condition for obtaining competitive advantage 
(Hayami, Ruttan 1985). In reference to agriculture, it represents growth in the 
production of agricultural raw materials in conditions of growing pressure on the 
natural environment. Ensuring a secure supply of food to consumers requires not only 
a larger food supply, but also lower prices of agricultural raw materials. This, in turn, 
has had a negative influence on the incomes of farmers, who, by producing greater 
quantities of cheaper food, earned incomes significantly lower than the average 
for households outside agriculture (Schulz 1964, 1968). However, considering the 
immobility of the basic production factor, namely land, and the non-portability 
(massiveness) of the property invested within holdings, they were unable to perform 
allocation in a Pareto sense or effectively use substitutions of production factors 
(Czyżewski 2003). All they could do was increase efficiency in conditions of falling 
purchase prices. This, in turn, required progress in production technologies, including 
machines, devices and innovations; in short, a permanent upgrade of farming. This 
dictatorship of the need to upgrade farms and make them more efficient did not take 
into account the full costs of production processes. Unfortunately, the balancing of 
such unfavourable production factors as soil degradation, disturbance of the water 
balance, CO2 emissions, eutrophication of water courses and reservoirs, and steppe 
formation, did not come about. The welfare of the environment was not subject to 
valuation, as a result of which the need to internalise costs was not reported. It was the 
“technological treadmill” that prevailed (Thirtle et al. 2004; Czyżewski 2013). What 
is more, another mechanism of economic depreciation of agricultural holdings was 
involved. It turned out that despite the higher costs of upgrading and employment of 
new technologies and technical progress, the share of the standard economic surplus 
in a product’s price was lower. This was a consequence of a situation where the 
market witnessed a concentration of buying-in, processing and disposal of goods, 
resulting in the appearance of larger processing and commercial corporations which, 
competing with each other, won over consumers with lower prices (Zegar 2012). 
This was a path to the realisation of the assumption that a relatively larger turnover 
of goods would bring profit high enough to ensure that minimisation in the price 
of a single product would not be an obstacle to the implementation of processing 
and agricultural marketing. The paradigm of industrial agriculture based on the 
above-described mechanism was accompanied by market failure, which stimulated 
the development of oligopolist and monopolist structures in supplier-customer 
relations. As a result, this model of agricultural development failed to meet two 
basic goals of contemporary management – firstly, it was unable to secure the parity 
of agricultural incomes to farmers, limiting the generated economic surplus in intra- 
and intersectoral financial flows (Czyżewski A. 2009; Czyżewski B. 2009a); and 
secondly, with the increase in the scale of industrialised agricultural production, it 
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continued to depreciate environmental conditions, failing to internalise the external 
costs of agricultural production (Zegar 2004). The welfare of the environment and 
its ecological balance continued to suffer. It should also be stressed that in these 
conditions economic surplus was transferred from agriculture through a buying-in 
intermediary, processing entity, sales link, to the consumer, whereas its retransfer to 
agriculture was quite risky if not supported by interventionist policies of the state, 
for which the need to transfer the economic surplus back from consumers to farmers 
became a primary goal (Czyżewski 2007). The experience of the European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy shows that reimbursement of the surplus (via market 
price support) significantly destabilises the market. As a result of the evolution of 
CAP rules and instruments, it has consequently been accepted that interventionism 
via instruments intended to implement agricultural policy will take place from the 
consumer, through the budget, to the farmer, with the possible bypassing of a market 
exchange mechanism. Contemporary empirical research on individual holdings 
(according to data from the Polish Central Statistical Office) proves that, as per 
account balance, under different conditions of the business cycle, approximately 
10% of the economic surplus (Czyżewski B. 2013; Czyżewski B., Mrówczyńska-
Kamińska 2011) is transferred, purely as a result of the failure of market mechanisms 
(flexibility of agricultural prices), from the farmer to other sectors. The assumption 
that faster industrialisation would lead to a solution to the persistent agrarian problem 
(Czyżewski A., 2005; Wilkin 1986) turned out to be an illusion, while the “engine” 
of industrial agriculture ran up against an environmental barrier, preventing a further 
exclusion of agricultural production processes from natural conditions, which 
resulted in an intensive use of means of industrial origin, an excessive concentration 
of production and an increase in its scale.
Therefore, a progressive integration of agricultural holdings with the agribusiness 
environment requires a new development paradigm, if only because of the need to 
internalise the external costs of agricultural production, considering the inability 
of ecosystems to recreate them. It turns out that agriculture must be subject to the 
superiority of an ecological system, while an economic system should be regulated 
by adequate social solutions. The fact that the capacity of ecosystems today has been 
exceeded by one-third entirely discredits the idea that nature as a “machine” is worth 
the same as it is worth for a human. Even accelerated scientific and technological 
progress cannot disprove this thesis. The transformation of agricultural development 
from an industrial model back to a sustainable one is inevitable in the long term, 
while the imposition of inhibitors of an ethical and social nature on the mechanisms 
of industrial development of agriculture is becoming a necessity. Witnessing the 
popularisation of the paradigm of sustainable agriculture and supply limitations, it 
will be easier to overcome the barrier of demand for food. Its rigidity and restrictions 
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will obviously still be there, and its flexibility against incomes will remain low. 
Nonetheless, agriculture’s adaptive mechanism will be to a larger degree oriented 
towards the allocation of production factors in accordance with the requirements of 
the natural environment and its welfare. Internalisation of the full costs of agricultural 
production in conditions of rising prices of agricultural products (accompanied by 
lower supply) will enable improvement in the financial situation of holdings, releasing 
the so-called “income pliers” which exclude holdings from participation in market 
activity owing to barriers hampering the flow of fixed assets (the resisting arm) while 
limiting holdings’ market depreciation (clamping arm) (Zegar 2004; Bywalec 1995). 
In the absence of an automatic mechanism compensating for income depreciation 
in the industrial model of agriculture’s development, the sustainable model is more 
beneficial to holdings due to its relations to the market and the environment. It does 
not in any way depreciate the role of the market on the microeconomic scale on the 
grounds of a need to force through specific state interventions. However, various 
forms of sustainable agriculture might arise, as a consequence of the combination of 
its production-related function with the multifunctionality of holdings, their familial 
nature, ecological production favouring rural development, improvement in food 
quality or symbiosis with the natural environment. 
Questioning the presently applied formula of progress in agriculture is a key 
precondition for formulating a new, sustainable paradigm for its development 
(Krasowicz 2009; Fiedor, Kociszewski 2010; Brouver 2004). This view was 
expressed explicitly in a 2002 paper, now considered fundamental, titled “Socially 
Sustainable Agriculture” (Woś, Zegar 2002). The conditions for promoting this new 
agricultural development model are social awareness of the global ecosystem’s 
limited character (in reference to such elements as water, climate change, and waste) 
(Zegar 2012), and the recognition that not only market goods, but also extra-market, 
non-commercial (public) goods such as environmental welfare, the harmony of nature 
and agricultural production, and the vitality of rural areas are of great importance for 
the development of agriculture (Altieri 1995; Uphoff 2002; Gliessman, Rosemeyer 
2010). It should be noted that the recognition of the need for these public goods 
(Samuelson 1954, 1955) means that the modernity of technologies cannot be 
measured only in terms of economic (market) categories, but also in terms of the 
degree to which production complies with environmental requirements (Kośmicki 
2009a). Such a model is more complex than the industrial one, as it requires greater 
knowledge and social commitment; however, it can provide a guarantee of a healthy, 
better-quality production, and of food (Malkina-Pykh, Pykh 2003) the demand of 
which is well-balanced with supply and which is available at a relatively low price. 
In this case, the problem of the valuation of non-market goods acquires crucial 
significance.
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Conclusions
The paradigm of sustainable agriculture, closely linked to the new agrarian 
economy, concerns not only the rules of economic balance, but also the goal, scope 
and methodology of research. In the industrial development model, the focus was the 
maximisation of economic surplus for the needs of agricultural holdings. Production 
factors had their market price, while others were considered free goods. In the 
new agrarian economy, the integrity of economic, social and environmental goals 
is observed, whereas the economic balance must provide for a balance of gained 
profits, lost profits and (both negative and positive) external effects. In sustainable 
agriculture, this balance exists in not only an economic, but also a social and 
environmental sense. The need for a new balance appears, but it cannot be created 
solely by the commercial effects of agriculture. Food quality, carbon sequestration, 
water and soil protection, and biodiversity are among the other elements that are 
of considerable significance. It is also necessary to accept J.S. Zegar’s view that, 
until economic advantages are addressed to specific parties, the disadvantages will 
be borne above all by taxpayers, the world of nature and future generations (Zegar 
2012).
In considering the determinants of the sustainable agricultural development 
paradigm, the first thing that comes to mind is the need to draw up a balance of 
external costs and take a new look at sources of land rent. Without this, the balance 
reflecting the competitiveness of agricultural production will be made at the expense 
of natural capital. Secondly, the scale on which the environment is used must be related 
to a legal standard determined by the state in the form of administrative decisions 
concerning standards of quality, fees, penalties or subsidies. Some instruments serving 
the internalisation of costs can be included in the price balance, while others remain 
neutral with respect to prices. Thirdly, a condition for popularising the sustainable 
agriculture paradigm is the institutional (national) factor, which determines the 
division between private and social rationality, both in the economic balance and 
in the balance of public goods. The essence of the problem is how to support a 
market mechanism institutionally, since it is the activity of specific institutions that 
should lead to the consistency of microeconomic and social criteria in the process 
of decision-making by economic entities. It is assumed, therefore, that an efficient 
state will secure common goods better than a market driven by consumer needs. 
On the other hand, the state’s weakening capacity as a result of failure to adjust the 
institutional factor does not favour the sustainable agriculture model. Changing the 
paradigm of agricultural development from an industrial to a sustainable one will be 
neither easy nor quick. It needs to be borne in mind that the agrarian economy treats 
agriculture not only as a business, but also as a way of life, which means that time 
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is required. Economic theory should evolve towards an economy of sustainability. 
The process has already commenced, yet it brings about a number of dilemmas. 
It is obvious, however, that agriculture must satisfy the demand for food products 
while lowering the pressure on the environment, providing for technological and 
biological progress, meeting the need to ensure a secure supply of food, and ensuring 
global economic, social and environmental rationality.
1.2. From the land rent of the physiocrats to political rent 
in sustainable agriculture
(Bazyli Czyżewski6, Jan Polcyn7)
Land rent as a prototype of economic rents8
Since the early days of economics, economic rents have been linked to the land 
factor. D. Ricardo developed a theory of differential rents relating to the fertility of 
land; the theory of absolute rent emphasised the monopoly of ownership rights to 
land; marginal economics addressed the issue of location rents; and in neoclassical 
economics rents were ascribed exclusively to the inelasticity of the supply of land. 
Something that economic rents and the land factor certainly have in common is 
that both fail to fit the neoclassical models of equilibrium. Economics textbooks list 
three production factors – capital, labour and land – but many economists would 
immediately add that the third of these, land, is a constant. M. Blaug states that 
“modern economics has abandoned the notion that there is any need for a special 
theory of ground rent. In long-run stationary equilibrium, the total product is 
resolvable into wages and interest as payments to labour and capital – there is no 
third factor of production...” (Blaug 1997). If so, then the resources and inputs of 
agricultural land should be subject to the optimising mechanisms of the market – but 
why, then, is agriculture such a problematic sector of the economy?
Economic rent is the excess income which provides incentive for a production 
factor to provide services. It arises in a situation of persistent scarcity of resources, 
or the impossibility of a resource being valued by the market and taken into account 
ex ante in the economic calculation. If a resource is valued by the market, and its 
relative supply can be increased, then the economic rent vanishes and becomes a 
cost. In the case of land rent the rewarded factor is agricultural land the supply of 
which is limited, even though its production capacity can be increased thanks to 
technical progress. 
Since the 18th century there has been no agreement among economists as to the 
sources of land rent. Simplifying to a large degree, the problem can be reduced to the 
question of whether the substance of rent is created by the productivity of the land, 
or by a subjective perception of the exchange value of that resource, which results 
6 Poznań University of Economics and Business; b.czyzewski@ue.poznan.pl .
7 Stanisław Staszic University of Applied Sciences in Piła; Jan.Polcyn@pwsz.pila.pl .
8 Use has been made of parts of Czyżewski (2013) in English translation.
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exclusively from the scarcity of the land factor. Regardless of the answer to this 
question, land rent is taking on an ever greater importance in agricultural economics, 
because it conditions the processes of extended reproduction in agriculture and the 
restructuring of that sector. According to many authors, the contemporary agrarian 
question can be reduced to the problem of the realisation of land rent in agriculture 
(Czyżewski 2005). This importance is underlined by the strong upward trend in 
prices of agricultural land in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
In market conditions the reduction of the land rent to zero, or any long-term 
downward trend, would appear to be impossible, because growing demand for 
land in the long term will, in the author’s view, ensure the absolute scarcity of that 
resource. Land ownership fulfils too many non-production functions, historically 
rooted in people’s mentality – it is a determinant of the territorial sovereignty of 
nations, a measure of social status, the most durable form of accumulated property. 
Expectations of an upward trend in land prices in the long term can therefore be 
considered rational. Land fulfils the three economic conditions ensuring growth in 
the price of a resource in the long term – it is useful, it is scarce, and there are no 
substitutes for it. Land rent, in view of its permanence, may become a fundamental 
source of comparative advantages of the agricultural sector, which might be protected 
from the process of economic globalisation.
The contemporary importance of the category of land rent is not reflected in 
academic work on the subject. The theory of land rent developed rapidly in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, with key chapters of scholarly works being devoted to it – this 
even made it possible to talk about the question of land rent, being a fundamental 
source of economic surplus, for example with reference to F. Quesnay’s theory of 
pure product. The scarcity of the land factor attracted the attention of economists in 
the early 18th century, particularly among the physiocrats, who considered land rent 
to be the only type of pure product created by farmers and realised by landowners 
in the form of leasing payments from tenants. The physiocrats’ theory includes the 
assumption of zero accumulation by the “sterile class”, in which average profits 
were reduced through competition to zero, and rents did not occur. The physiocrats, 
however, merely stated the fact of the existence of land rent in agriculture, without 
attempting to explain its source. Moreover, the concept of the produit net of agriculture 
as the sole source of income was not treated seriously by classical economists. For 
example, Adam Smith wrote: “That system which represents the produce of land 
as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country has, so far as I know, 
never been adopted by any nation (...) It would not, surely, be worthwhile to examine 
at great length the errors of a system which never has done, and probably never will 
do, any harm in any part of the world.” (Smith 1954). Similarly, until the 1970s, that 
is, until the award of a Nobel prize (in 1973) to W. Leontieff, the “economic table” 
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of F. Quesnay was neglected. A. Gray wrote that it was in its time the crowning 
achievement of Quesnay and the school of physiocrats, “now perhaps better reduced 
to an embarrassed footnote (...) it may be doubted whether it will ever be anything 
but a vast mystification” (Gray 1948).
Contemporarily, as we know, the table of intersectoral (input-output) flows is a 
foundation stone of well-known and useful models of prediction (Galbraith 2011). In 
a certain sense, history has come full circle. Bearing in mind the great importance that 
developed countries currently attach to agriculture, it can be seen that mainstream 
economics has been guilty (not for the last time) of the sin of immodesty in the face 
of the unknown.
The physiocrats, however, did not attempt to analyse the situation in which the 
agricultural producer is also the landowner and does not realise a rent. Who then 
takes over the rent, and what are the economic consequences of this for agriculture 
and for the economy as a whole? These are among the key dilemmas encountered by 
the theory of land rents, and it must be noted that today they are taking on an ever 
greater significance. 
In the 20th century, however, all that happened was a review of the phenomenon 
of the occurrence of land rent, according to either the neoclassical or Marxist 
theory. Keynesian economics disregarded the problem entirely, accepting the 
existing theories wholesale. In his General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, Keynes referred only to a “quasi-rent” as a reward for the postponement of 
consumption (Keynes 2003). 
The institutionalism of the 1930s did not make any attempt to modify the 
existing theories, and broad mainstream economics emphasised the marginalist 
or neoclassical concepts. Economists who addressed the agrarian question – 
K. Kautsky and E. Bernstein in the early 20th century, T.W. Schultz in the 1950s, 
and M. Mieszczankowski, J. Lewandowski, H. Chołaj and M. Pohorille in Poland in 
the 1960s – considered the problem of land rent very widely, but within the Marxist 
paradigm9 (see also Lewandowski 1960, Mieszczankowski 1964). Similarly, in 
New Classical Economics and the neo-Keynesian theory no separate analyses are 
made of rents of the land factor. At present, economics textbooks generally present 
the Pareto concept of land rent (reformulated by P.A. Samuelson) or else omit the 
question entirely. A characteristic view is the one of M. Blaug, cited above, that there 
is absolutely no need for a special theory of land rent (Blaug 1997).
Such a vision of the functioning of the economy is based on a fully predetermined 
model, in which it is stated from the outset how market players adjust their decisions 
9 An exception is the work of T.W. Schultz, who showed, with reference to the American 
economy, that the importance of land rent as an element of inputs would rise despite the process of 
industrialisation of agricultural production (Schultz 1953).
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and how the resulting allocation of resources changes over time. In this model no 
account is taken of individual creativity, structural changes, the evolution of needs, 
and especially the possibility of reversing the hierarchy of values on which choices 
are based. R. Frydman and M.D. Goldberg point out that a fully predetermined 
model forces the researcher to adopt qualitative limitations at the starting point of 
the analysis, such as an assumption of diminishing marginal utility. Based on these 
qualitative limitations, however, precise quantitative forecasts are produced, and the 
model theoretically retains its properties at different points on the time line. This 
creates a “semblance of precise knowledge”, and the imprecision and uncertainty 
is reduced in the model to the probabilistic form of a random component, which 
is an excessive simplification of these phenomena (Frydman, Goldberg 2009). In 
the light of this, the cited assertion that the product of the land in the long term 
melts away into pay and interest represents the reistic assumption that human labour 
(including capital as its objectified form) is capable of satisfying all human needs, 
given sufficient time.
The issue of land rent was again overlooked in the discussion on the economic 
role of the state, which took place in the mainstream of economics following the 
departure from the Keynesian doctrine in the 1970s. Like the earlier belief in the 
“tuning” of the economy using instruments of fiscal and monetary policy (see also 
Heilbroner, Thurow 1981), similarly the mainstream negation of the active role of 
the state was total in nature, in the sense that it applied to all production factors, 
including land. No consideration was given to the case of specific external effects 
and public goods produced in agriculture, which would have justified the application 
of discretionary national policy with respect to that sector (Wojtyna 1988).
In consequence, in the history of economic thought one can identify four 
alternative concepts of land rent: the Ricardian differential rents, the “Marxist” 
absolute rents (referring to Adam Smith), the residual rents of H. George (viewed 
as marginal rent of scarcity), and the neoclassical rents of inelastic supply of land 
(Czyżewski B. 2010). Perhaps up to the time of Agenda 2000, which sanctioned 
the need for changes in the industrial model of agriculture in the European Union, 
the above theories were sufficient. It is the author’s view that in the current era of 
transformations in the model of agriculture in developed countries there is a need 
for a new concept of land rent, which can be constructed based on the methodology 
of contemporary institutional economics. The neoclassical theory of rent generally 
presented in the subject literature is insufficient to describe reality, because it reduces 
the sources of land rent to the inelasticity of supply of land and treats it as a constant 
in economic models. 
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How did land rent become a political rent?
Land rent took a permanent place in the annals of political economy through the 
agrarian question and the resulting need for the retransfer of income to agriculture. 
To quote J. Wilkin, “(...) the agrarian question can be most simply and most briefly 
defined as the problem of the lack of adjustment of agriculture, in terms of its structure 
and mechanism of functioning, to the situation existing externally” (Wilkin 1986). 
The main symptom of the agrarian question is the disparity in the incomes of the 
agricultural population, linked to the low productivity of the factors of production, 
particularly labour, and the insufficient elasticity of productive structures in terms 
of adjustment to changing market conditions. In the induced development model, 
Y. Hayami and V. Ruttan nonetheless attempted to show that such adjustments take 
place as a result of dynamic interactions between agriculture and related sectors, 
triggered by innovations which upset equilibrium prices. As a result of technological 
development, there are changes in real prices which “induce” the adjustment of 
productive structures in agriculture, because agricultural producers are guided 
by rational criteria (Hayami, Ruttan 1985). In this way, according to J. Wilkin, 
agriculture theoretically has the ability to participate in both “the feeding of sources 
of economic development, and the division of the benefits” (Wilkin 1986), but this 
does not happen if imperfections of the market (such as price flexibility) deform 
market signals. 
The scale of market imperfection is closely linked to a country’s level of 
economic development. Partly because of this, in the early stages of economic 
development agriculture co-finances the development of the national economy as 
a whole, in the sense that a significant part of the added value produced in that 
sector flows out to non-agricultural sectors. At more advanced stages, at first an 
equalisation of the streams flowing out of and into agriculture occurs, and later it 
becomes a net beneficiary, taking over part of what has been accumulated from non-
agricultural sectors. “Only in such conditions is there a possibility of growth in the 
competitiveness of native food producers in foreign markets and the obtaining of 
benefits from the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products. However, reversal 
of the aforementioned sequence may be a source of serious social conflicts, because 
an unprepared agricultural sector comes up against structural and investment barriers 
that it is not able to overcome” (Woś 2003).
In Poland, the agrarian question visibly arose in the first decade of the systemic 
transformation after 1990. In the 1990s there was a widening of the disparity between 
agriculture and other sectors. This was reflected in a declining relationship between 
the surplus and disposable incomes of individual farms, and the surplus and incomes 
of entities outside agriculture. At the same time there was a decrease in the ratio of 
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disposable incomes in agriculture to the added value generated. According to Woś, 
these processes represented “the flow of agriculture’s added value to non-agricultural 
sectors”, which is the fundamental ground for agricultural interventionism (Woś 
2003). The thesis of “surplus drainage” from agriculture is commonly put forward 
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. For example, A. Czyżewski and 
A. Matuszczak conclude that “in countries with stable and sustainable economic 
growth, it has long been noticed that it is necessary to retransfer to farmers that are 
part of the surplus which flows out of agriculture (...)” (Czyżewski, Matuszczak 
2005). Elsewhere, A. Czyżewski explains that “the depreciation of agriculture in 
intersectoral flows is evidenced by the fact that realised production is smaller than 
output” (Czyżewski 2007).
An undoubted weakness of such claims of “surplus drainage” is that they can 
be verified only on the basis of input-based theories of value (such as those based 
on labour). How is it possible to define the “part of the surplus which flows out of 
agriculture”, the difference between “realised production” and actual output, or even 
the actual disposable income of a farm (after payment of all production factors)10? 
Data concerning the current surplus of the agricultural sector are available, and are 
objective. Nonetheless, it is hard to state definitively what part of this surplus has 
already flowed out; in other words, what would the surplus be if agriculture were 
not depreciated by the market? At most one can attempt to value the inputs provided 
(paid for in agriculture out of the surplus), namely own labour and the costs incurred 
“for the land”, and then compare their value with the realised surplus. Such an 
approach has two defects: firstly, in a market economy the output is generally not 
the sum of the inputs; and secondly, the land factor is deprived of its “subjectivity” 
when its value is defined on the basis of labour and capital inputs. This is analogous 
to the thesis, known from the history of economic thought, that “capital is objectified 
labour” – but even less realistic. It should be noted that input-based methods of 
valuing land rent were criticised in Poland even in the 1960s, although the basis 
for that criticism was not related to the labour-based theory of value (Chołaj 1966, 
Czyżewski, Grzelak 2012).
Is it possible, then, to prove the claim of “surplus drainage” in a more objective 
manner, and consequently to provide justification for the necessity and scale of 
budgetary retransfers to agriculture? There is a significant gap in economic theory 
here, because despite the symptoms of depreciation of agriculture relative to other 
sectors, difficulties arise in precisely defining and quantifying that mechanism. 
There is therefore a lack of an adequate theory of land rent, which as we can see, 
10 The problem arises here of the valuation of own labour and land rent, which in individual 
agriculture are paid out of the surplus.
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has no wish to “melt away into pay and interest”. The excessive simplification 
contained in this reasoning results from the fact that the utilities supplied by land do 
not necessarily come from labour. If that were so, M. Blaug would be entirely right, 
and the reference point for an “optimum” level of surplus in agriculture would be 
the average productivity of labour in the economy. The key to solving this problem 
is therefore assigning to the land factor its own “subjectivity”, namely the ability to 
create certain utilities by itself without the involvement of labour or capital. In this 
way, it would be shown how land is genuinely distinct from the other productive 
factors. 
The paradigm of sustainable development is helpful here, which in fact accepts 
such an approach. Sustainable development is a concept of order integrated in 
the environmental, social, economic, spatial and ethical planes, which assumes 
the maximisation of benefits from economic development subject to ensuring the 
durability and protecting the utility of natural resources in the long term (Woś 1998; 
Fiedor, Jończy 2009). This concept identifies natural resources as an independent 
production factor, which is subject to different criteria of effective allocation than 
labour and capital, at the very least because it does not produce private utilities, 
only public and common ones. These are inseparably connected with the land factor, 
which at the same time constitutes a potential resource for agricultural production. In 
the existing model of agriculture in developed countries (the post-industrial model), 
agricultural production and the creation of environmental utilities represent competing 
functions of land. From the point of view of sustainable development, over time 
those functions should become complementary, which requires the development of 
new theoretical frameworks for the economics of the land factor, and in particular 
a new theory of land rent. This theory should explain the relationships between the 
agrarian question, including the phenomenon of rent drainage, and the new integrated 
functions of the land factor in the context of the sustainable development paradigm. 
Existing theories of land rent value the rent in a manner that is not adequate to the 
contemporary utilities of land, and as a result do not enable an objective estimation 
of rent “drainage”. 
Efficiency-based and monopolistic motives for rent seeking 
Rent seeking, according to some authors, means the loss of resources in a 
process of attempting to gain a monopolistic rent. Some economists believe that it is 
chiefly in this way that rents affect the allocation of resources (see also Sztaba 2002) 
and stimulate processes of vertical integration, the goal of which is the occupation 
of a dominant market position. The motives for rent seeking are therefore of a 
monopolistic nature (Raczyński 1998).
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The scale of the phenomenon of economic rent seeking might therefore 
be quantified by estimating the size of the consumer’s rent that is taken over by 
monopolists in a given industry. Another method used is calculating the losses in 
the whole of the economy caused by the existence of monopolies. In both methods, 
however, it is assumed that rent seeking is a negative phenomenon, being associated 
with political lobbying or even corruption (Sztaba 1998). Institutional economics 
nonetheless challenges that view, drawing attention to what can be called efficiency-
based motives for rent seeking. The driving force behind seeking rent may be striving 
to optimise transaction costs.
In the 1950s, A.C. Harberger calculated that the social costs of monopolies are 
in fact insignificant, amounting to less than 0.1% of GDP (Harberger 1954). This 
also provides support for the claim that motives for vertical integration are not only 
monopolistic in nature, but can also be related to efficiency.
E. Katz and J. Rosenberg showed that the higher a country’s level of development 
expressed in GDP per capita, the lower the degree of active rent seeking (Katz, 
Rosenberg 1989). On the other hand, in the Anglo-Saxon models of the market 
economy (Albert 1994), there is a dynamic rise in transaction costs and society 
incurs the costs of disintegration. Citizens are required to participate more and more 
in activities which increase the domestic product, but not necessarily well-being. 
Although transaction costs of growth are unavoidable, they do not serve well-being. 
Some of the growth consequently has the nature of an idle gear. In such conditions, 
rent seeking becomes an inevitable mechanism of defence against various forms of 
exclusion in a polarised society (Sztaba 1998).
If rent seeking involves increasing outlays on the “internal” organisation of 
transactions, but this action has the goal of optimising transaction costs, then social 
losses do not occur, or else are compensated for by the increase in the producer’s 
rent and the exchange value of goods. It is also argued that sectors with a high degree 
of consolidation feel a much smaller need for state intervention. This is because 
they are able to generate economic rents by using their market potential. A parallel 
process, however, is the intensification of lobbying, directly proportionally to the 
degree of consolidation of the sector.
Modern institutional economics sets itself the goal of integrating the neoclassical 
theory with an analysis of the way “in which institutions modify the set of choices 
available to individuals” (North 1986). In this way methodological individualism, 
which ascribes the feature of potential rationality to individuals, combines with 
structural determinism (path dependency), which acquires significance in systems 
with a large degree of uncertainty, in which market failures accumulate. Theoretically 
such failures always occur when the market cannot distribute every unit of a shared 
resource in such a way that the benefit resulting from its switch to another use is 
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exactly equal to the loss related to its withdrawal from the alternative use. According 
to institutional economics, transaction costs are among the key types of market 
failure, and their size reflects the level of the market’s inefficiency.
There is no doubt that the level of market failure and imperfection in agriculture 
is high. Non-optimal allocation in the food economy is caused by the natural rigidity 
of demand for food, the inelastic supply of raw agricultural products, and the low 
mobility of assets in agriculture. This means, among other things, that agriculture 
in Poland is characterised by overpopulation and irrational use of agricultural 
production space. At present around 17% of the working population is connected 
to agriculture (compared with just 5% in the “old” member states of the EU-15). 
Opportunities for the development of Polish agriculture must be sought in improving 
labour efficiency and the quality of agricultural products, which is forced by the 
cross-compliance principle realised under the CAP (Leopold 2002). The goal of 
structural changes in Polish agriculture is therefore to increase labour efficiency or 
reduce labour intensity, to initiate a process of extended reproduction, to bring about 
the accumulation of land rent, and to increase the rural population’s contribution to 
the country’s economic development. This growth should result to a large extent 
from the diversification of the sources of agricultural incomes. It should be noted 
that in the “old” EU-15 member states agriculture accounts for about 5% of the 
total working population, who produce about 2.0% of GDP. In Poland agriculture 
accounts for around 17% of the working population, but also currently produces about 
2.0% of GDP, counting the added value of agriculture excluding CAP subsidies, or 
approximately 4% including subsidies.
An effect of the market failure in the agricultural sector is the need for the 
state to operate a large-scale policy of agrarian interventionism (although there 
are some economists who would say that this is not an effect, but the cause). It is 
shown, however, that the retransfer of incomes to the agricultural sector is justified 
to a large extent by objective economic arguments resulting from the theory of 
optimisation of transaction costs (see also Czyżewski 2005). A higher degree of 
contractual integration (vertical and horizontal) of productive structures in the Polish 
food industry, for example in pig and dairy production, increases the added valued 
realised on individual farms and initiates processes of high-capital intensification of 
production. This phenomenon, however, could take place on a wider scale. These 
processes are theoretically stimulated by flows of capital from agriculture-related 
sectors to farms, made possible by savings of transaction costs in the processing 
sector and by the increased share of agricultural producers in the processing margin. 
This is therefore a complementary mechanism to the budgetary retransfer of profits 
to agriculture, and may ameliorate the problem of rent seeking as agribusiness 
develops. 
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To sum up, the motives for rent seeking and related actions in the food industry 
may be efficiency-related, serving to produce savings of transaction costs. From a 
theoretical standpoint, the mechanism operates as follows: an economic rent occurs 
if average productivity is higher than marginal productivity. In the market for final 
goods the average takings are higher than the marginal value, and the sale price is 
higher than the equilibrium price. Classically, this phenomenon is explained by a 
monopoly rent. However, if it is assumed that the lower marginal cost results from 
the optimisation of transaction costs (and an increase in efficiency), the producer 
realises a rent. Transaction costs are not, by assumption, subject to market valuation. 
In terms of factors of production, if the average product of labour is greater than 
the marginal product of labour (equal to the unit price of inputs), then either we are 
dealing with the rent of a monopsony, or we explain the phenomenon by a fall in 
transaction costs. 
The above considerations also imply that, regardless of the motivations, 
rent seeking does take place in the food industry. The accumulation of market 
imperfections in agriculture means that this involves the seeking of land rent. The 
market environment, in view of the rigidity of demand and supply in the agricultural 
sector, takes over the effects of the growth in the real productivity of agriculture, 
thus realising economic rents. Perhaps these compensate for higher transaction 
costs which are not subject to market valuation – this is another matter. It may also 
be disputed to what degree rent seeking is stimulated by inappropriate national 
regulations rather than market inefficiencies. It is nonetheless a fact that the process 
of the creation and division of economic rents in the food industry is determined 
by the land rent. Other rents in the system of the food industry outside agriculture 
undoubtedly also occur, but they are short-term in nature. Only land rent is a timeless 
phenomenon. For this reason the process of its creation and division deserves to be 
given particular attention. 
Rent seeking and the paradigm of sustainable development
In the previous section, doubt was cast on the monopolistic motives for rent 
seeking in the food industry. Apart from these, an important role is also played by 
efficiency-related motives, which lead to contractual integration for the purpose of 
achieving savings of transaction costs. The problem of transaction costs takes on 
particular importance when we recognise that agricultural land provides not only 
raw agricultural products, but also public goods (Klimowicz, Bokajało 2012). The 
concept of public goods here is generalised to some extent. In economic theory 
four types of goods are distinguished: private, common, club and public. The 
classification is made based on four features: “rivalrousness”, “non-rivalrousness”, 
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“excludability” and “non-excludability”. In a narrow sense, public goods are those 
which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable (Ulbrich 2003). For our purposes, 
however, it is necessary to broaden this definition, above all to include:
• rivalrous goods, because an increase in the consumption of utilities of the 
well-being of the natural environment may negatively affect its remaining 
utility; 
• merit goods, related to the multifunctional nature of agriculture11.
In some cases the utilities provided by the land factor may also have the status of club 
goods12. Hence we take public goods also to include common goods related to the 
agricultural land factor, merit goods related to the multifunctionality of agriculture, 
and in certain cases also club goods13. 
The well-being of the natural environment and rural areas can be regarded as 
common property, namely such that is not assigned to specific parties and thus cannot 
be transferred. Environmental resources are therefore exploited on a “first come first 
served” basis, and the related costs and benefits are hard to value objectively and 
assign to specific users. Any attempt to value them gives rise to high transaction 
costs, but failure to do so also generates transaction costs ex post, related to, for 
example, the repair of the effects of inappropriate exploitation of resources or the 
budgetary redistribution of the rents of the land factor which agriculture has “lost” 
to other sectors.
It is a matter of debate what in fact creates the new utilities of the well-being 
of the natural environment. Is it land “intrinsically”, or are capital and labour also 
involved? The authors propose the thesis that there are intrinsic utilities of the 
agricultural land factor. The aim of our further deliberations will be to justify this 
claim.
11 Merit goods are those that have a social utility that is greater than their individual utility. 
J. Wilkin points out a number of non-commercial functions of agriculture: “green” functions – 
management of land resources for the maintenance of its valuable properties, creation of conditions 
for wild animals and plants, protection of the welfare of animals, maintenance of biodiversity and 
improvement of the circulation of chemical substances in systems of agricultural production; “blue 
functions” – management of water resources, improvement of water quality, flood prevention, 
production of hydrothermal and wind energy; “yellow” functions – maintenance of the coherence 
and vitality of rural areas, maintenance and enrichment of the cultural tradition and identity of 
the countryside and regions, development of agrotourism and hunting; and “white” functions – 
assurance of food security and food safety (Wilkin 2010).
12 They then have the features “non-rivalrous” and “excludable”. This applies to all types of 
concessions and permits to use specified utilities of the well-being of the natural environment – for 
example, for the operation of distilleries, drilling for mineral water, tree felling, economic activity 
in national parks, hunting, angling, etc.
13 Public goods in the narrow sense will be called “pure public goods”.
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To begin with, however, it should be considered whether the concept of sustainable 
development deserves the status of a “paradigm”, and what place agriculture takes 
in it. The concept of sustainable development has been described as a new paradigm 
by many authors (Borys 2009, Morozova 2009). This view is also well established 
in studies by international institutions, in particular in the 1987 report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development – the Brundtland Report – and in the 
EU Sustainable Development Strategy adopted by the European Council in 2001.
Sustainable development is defined more broadly than simply in terms of 
the precedence of ecological over economic requirements (Borys 1998), creating 
concepts of an integrated order over the environmental, social, economic, spatial and 
ethical planes. Quoting B. Fiedor and R. Jończy, sustainable development “involves 
a maximisation of the net benefits from economic development, at the same time 
protecting and ensuring the reproduction of the utility and quality of natural 
resources in the long term. Economic development must then mean not only growth 
in per capita income, but also improvement of other elements of social well-being. 
It must also include necessary structural changes in the economy and in the whole 
of society” (Fiedor, Jończy 2009, Pearce, Turner 1990). This definition alludes to 
the original idea contained in the aforementioned Brundtland Report, to satisfy the 
aspirations and needs of today’s generations without limiting the possibilities of 
satisfaction of the needs of future generations14.
It is clear how the foregoing definitions can be applied in agricultural economics, 
on the assumption that the utility and quality of all natural resources is inseparably 
linked to the land factor, which at the same time constitutes the principal resource in 
agricultural production. Adding to this the fact that most of the world’s population 
lives in rural areas, it might be concluded that problems of social and economic 
balance are also concentrated in the agricultural sector. It is easy to show that the 
problems of an integrated order are particularly linked to that sector. Agriculture 
has an impact on most ecosystems and to a large extent determines the quality 
of natural resources, but also the “quality” of human capital, because it supplies 
products the consumption of which is forced – namely foodstuffs, in a broad sense. 
The agricultural sector is also a key element of the social (including political) and 
economic order. 
Social order is defined by, among others, such factors as rural culture and tradition 
– elements of the well-being of the countryside, the rural population’s access to 
infrastructure and services, waves of rural-urban migration, diffusion of knowledge 
and technical progress in rural areas, and the participation of the agricultural sector 
14 In that report sustainable development is defined as a “path of human progress which 
meets the needs and aspirations of the present generation without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (Estes 1993). 
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in national economic development, which is the greater the less highly developed 
a country is. From a global perspective, however, it is agrarian interventionism 
that has been and continues to be a bone of contention in the forum of the WTO. 
Representatives of less developed and developing countries take the position that 
the developed countries’ subsidisation of agricultural production and protectionism 
in markets for raw agricultural produce block their development and processes of 
convergence with the developed countries. It also upsets the environmental order in 
developing countries, because they are forced to rapidly increase the efficiency of 
agricultural production at the cost of natural resources. 
As regards the creation of an economic order, agriculture can again be 
distinguished from other sectors, because on the one hand it is a strategic sector, 
while on the other it does not have functional self-regulating market mechanisms. 
Developed countries, despite an extensive range of instruments of agricultural policy, 
remain unable to solve the problem of disparity between agricultural incomes and 
those of other sectors.
In the light of all this, the paradigm of sustainable agriculture is fundamentally 
an elaboration of the paradigm of sustainable development. This is confirmed by 
selected definitions of the integrated orders – economic, social, and environmental 
– as used in agricultural economics (see Table 1.1.). Long-term forecasts tell us that 
agriculture of the 21st century will be increasingly environmentally sustainable; it 
will nonetheless remain unbalanced in economic terms, as this results from processes 
which by nature involve the continuous destruction of the achieved balance and the 
attainment of a new one, on a new and higher level. Nonetheless, these processes 
will be subjected to ever stricter environmental requirements. The social aspect will 
thus be “torn between globalism and locality” (Zegar 2007).
From the paradigm of sustainable agriculture comes the following message: 
natural and social capital (including public goods) can only to a limited degree 
be replaced by human-made capital, and the degradation of natural and social 
capital cannot be compensated for by the benefits provided by human-made capital 
(Jeżowski 2009).
In reference to this thesis it may be noted that in the conditions of the new 
paradigm, the land should create certain utilities “intrinsically”, that is, without the 
participation of capital. Land cannot therefore be treated in accordance with the 
mainstream economic doctrine as just another type of fixed asset, with neoclassical 
microeconomic concepts applied to the optimisation of its inputs. The foregoing 
also implies that the productivity of natural resources cannot in all conditions be 
increased by means of the substitution of capital. 
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Table 1.1.  Definitions of sustainability of the economic, environmental and social orders under 
the paradigm of sustainable agriculture
A
ut
ho
r
Economic (productive) order Social order Environmental/ecological order
M
. A
da
m
ow
ic
z
Production in sufficient quantities 
with acceptable quality and good 
efficiency.
Provision of satisfactory 
conditions for the population 
living in the agricultural and 
rural environment, both in 
terms of level of incomes 
and in terms of social status 
and place in contemporary 
societies.
Absence of pollution, but 
above all the valuing of natural 
resources.
A
. H
ar
as
im
Creation of agricultural income 
ensuring a decent quality of life 
for farmers and their families and 
enabling farm development.
Creation in appropriate quantities 
of agricultural products with the 
qualities required by the consumer 
or the processing industry.
Creation of agricultural income 
ensuring a decent quality 
of life for farmers and their 
families and enabling farm 
development.
Assurance in the long term 
of a balanced agrosystem and 
avoidance of degradation of 
the natural environment.
L.
H
.G
. S
la
ng
en
The economic dimension is the 
ability of agricultural productive 
potential to satisfy society’s food 
needs.
The social dimension is linked 
to a system of institutions 
(formal and informal) laying 
down principles that guarantee 
to the whole of society food 
security and the protection of 
nature.
From an ecological perspective 
it is important that the 
agricultural sector be able to 
maintain the resources of the 
natural environment in good 
condition.
J. 
S.
 Z
eg
ar
On a microeconomic scale, the 
delivery of a satisfactory income, 
which means that satisfaction 
occurs when there is parity between 
agricultural and non-agricultural 
incomes. On a macroeconomic 
scale, gross added value and the 
value of agricultural production, 
particularly commercial production.
Valuation of environmental 
services, use of agricultural 
labour resources, contribution 
to the maintenance or 
development of the economic 
and social vitality of the 
countryside and of cultural 
values.
Adherence to a code of good 
agricultural practices and 
consideration of legal and 
administrative criteria in the 
granting of support from public 
funds.
Source: Based on Matuszczak (2009)
Similar doubts arise regarding the process of substitution of capital for the labour 
factor in the context of the problem of hidden unemployment in rural areas and the 
so-called “storage” functions of agriculture in the period of systemic transformation 
in Poland. It is hard to speak about a labour-intensive model of agriculture in Poland, 
because the degree of intensity of organisation of agricultural production, measured 
for example by Kopeć’s index (Kopeć 1984), is low. Following the first five years 
of transformation, the population of redundant persons in agriculture was estimated 
at 916,800, of whom 48% were classified as “totally redundant”, and thus by the 
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nature of things excluded from processes of substitution (Błąd 2010). This means 
that capital-intensive progress, in the sense of interdependent processes of growth 
of the resource of capital and reduction of the resource of labour, is a debatable 
development scenario for agriculture in Poland and other countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe that face similar problems. 
Capitalisation of the intrinsic utility of land in its market value
From the start of human civilisation, land has created certain utilities satisfying 
that civilisation’s needs. These arise without the participation of other factors of 
production, constituting an unquestionable gift of nature. In his encyclical Caritas in 
Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI describes it as a “miraculous fruit which human beings 
may use responsibly so as to satisfy their rightful needs – material and immaterial – 
with respect for internal balance” (Czyżewski, Matuszczak 2012). 
In tribal (natural) economies, where agricultural land in today’s sense did not 
exist, examples of such utilities were forest fruits, hunted animals, and access to 
water and firewood. The creative role of the land factor in providing these was 
dominant over the required inputs of labour and capital. It can therefore be stated 
that the dominant part of the utility of land arose intrinsically. When land came to be 
cultivated and animals domesticated, the part ascribable to nature decreased slightly 
in favour of the active role of human beings. Increments in the mass of plants and 
animals, building materials, and broadly-defined living space were nonetheless still 
obtained with minimal inputs. 
In the feudal system, a kind of legitimisation of the intrinsic utilities of land can 
be seen in “servitudes”, understood as the right to make use of the natural utilities of 
land belonging to the feudal lord (in the form of brushwood, fruits, clay, or fish).
As the money-goods economy developed, that part of the utility of the land 
factor which arose without the participation of capital and labour was transformed 
into “intrinsic productivity” (in money terms). This is expressed, for example, in the 
previously mentioned concept of produit net proposed in the 18th century by the 
physiocrats.
Hence, in the peasant economy, the part of the utility ascribed to the exclusive 
action of forces of nature (land) was relatively large, and was also expressed in a 
certain part of the cash productivity of the economy (since it created part of the product 
without inputs). Its importance began to decline in the face of the industrialisation 
of agriculture and activation of the law of diminishing marginal utility. In industrial 
agriculture the intrinsic contribution of land to the creation of utilities decreased 
in favour of capital and hired labour. The intrinsic cash productivity of land also 
vanished to a significant degree.
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With time, however, the productive functions of agricultural land, subordinated 
to microeconomic optimisation, and the requirement for it to satisfy existential 
needs, became mutually competitive. This led to the need to seek a new concept of 
economic development.
To what extent does the assertion of the existence of an “intrinsic utility of 
land” hold in the context of the paradigm of sustainable development? One of the 
reasons for the development of this paradigm is the fact that in developed countries 
the natural environment has become almost completely anthropogenic. In such 
conditions there must also be a change in the way of using natural resources. This 
is enforced by new needs and priorities – for example, the desire to ensure the 
renewability of natural resources. These uncover anew the “utilities” of the land 
factor which were marginalised in industrial agriculture, assigning them the status 
of public goods for which the whole of society should pay. This cannot, however, be 
the same intrinsic utility of agricultural land as in the 18th century, because, at least 
in developed countries, the natural environment has been changed overwhelmingly 
by human action. An increasing part of the utility of land is again coming into being 
intrinsically, but in conditions of far-advanced and irreversible accumulation of 
capital. It can therefore be said that in sustainable agriculture many new utilities of 
the land factor are created intrinsically, that is, without additional inputs of capital and 
labour (but not without them playing any active role whatsoever). Since these have 
the nature of public goods, they are paid for largely out of taxes (through the CAP 
in EU countries)15, and that payment goes to the owners of the land resources which 
created them. In this way the intrinsic utility of land takes the form of an economic 
rent, which increases the cash productivity of farms and is discounted by the market 
for agricultural land and through prices of certain products (e.g. organic products).
For example, the extensification of the cultivation of meadows under agro-
environmental programmes makes it possible to reduce capital and labour inputs 
and to pay an economic rent under the CAP. This rent is sometimes erroneously 
interpreted as compensation for reduced productivity. It should be noted, however, 
that even if in terms of value it scarcely compensates for the lost productivity, this 
occurs in conditions of lower inputs of capital (working capital and depreciation) and 
labour. Thus, in effect, the cash productivity of the factors of production (understood 
as the ratio of the cash product to the inputs) increases. This increase can be ascribed 
to the creative force of nature (land), since a lower intensity of management activates 
its natural utilities, which are of the nature of public goods. In the cited example 
of the extensive cultivation of meadows, these utilities will include, for example, 
15 Given an adequate level of social awareness, these utilities can also be paid for through 
prices of products and services. 
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increased biodiversity, landscape and recreational values, and a more “ecological” 
raw material (hay).
Another example is organic farming. In this case capital inputs are reduced 
with the substitution of labour inputs, this being a condition for obtaining the 
aforementioned rent from the CAP. Given adequate social awareness, the fall in 
productivity here may be compensated for by an increase in the prices of organic 
produce. However, the rent received from the CAP is remuneration for new utilities 
of land and, as above, increases the cash productivity of the factors of production. 
Analogous reasoning may be applied to other subsidies given under the CAP. In 
the author’s view, the CAP programmes represent an attempt to value the intrinsic 
utilities of land that have the nature of public goods. Rent on this account is received 
by the owner of the resource or by the user, who passes it on in the form of payments 
for the lease of land. The user is nonetheless required to enable (or at least not 
obstruct) the creation of those utilities by the land.
To recap, agricultural land creates some utilities intrinsically, these being subject 
to institutional valuation (through rents paid under agricultural policy) or valuation by 
the market (through the prices of products), insofar as the intensity of the agricultural 
economy is limited to some degree. This, however, is conditioned by a specified level 
of “original” accumulation of capital, which means that the economy has reached a 
stage in its evolution where society voices a demand for those utilities. 
This “original accumulation” should be understood here in a broad sense. 
It includes technological progress, advancement of processes of urbanisation, 
development of infrastructure, standard of living, as well as the attained level of 
spatial management, agricultural culture and cultivation of land. Referring to the 
cited example of meadows, one must not forget that it was through many years of 
cultivation that those meadows (in today’s meaning) came into being, and neglect to 
prevent the secondary succession of vegetation (encroachment of bushes and trees). 
In this case the essence of the utility of the land is the meadow ecosystem. This is so 
unless secondary succession is a conscious choice, having the aim of enabling the 
land to create other utilities – for example, non-cultivation of land in the buffer zone 
of a national park.
The driving force here, then, is the demand side. As an effect of its action, a 
multifunctional model of agriculture is formed, delivering public goods as side 
effects of agricultural production. These include, according to A. Vatn: environmental 
factors (landscape, biodiversity, pollution, recreation, cultural heritage, food and 
nutrition security) and factors relating to rural life such as settlement models and 
rural culture and tradition (Vatn 2010, Fałkowski 2010).
We can therefore conclude that at present, the reason for the existence of land 
rent are the intrinsic utilities of the land, which in a money-goods economy cause 
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the expected productivity of capital in agriculture to be higher than in related market 
sectors. These expectations are largely connected with the political rents received by 
agriculture, and hence with the phenomenon of rent seeking, but not exclusively. To 
an increasing degree the market for agrotouristic services and organic produce also 
values the intrinsic utility of land. The value of land rent is therefore determined by 
the positive difference between the expected productivity of capital in agriculture 
and in related market sectors. The market for agricultural land discounts, in prices, 
the expectations concerning this excess productivity of capital in agriculture. 
Evidence of this is provided by the data given in Tables 1.2. and 1.3., relating 
to land rents discounted in the prices of land and payments for the leasing of land in 
Poland.
Table 1.2.  Annual value (in Polish zloty1) of payments for the lease of land in Poland (a proxy 
for the use value of land)
land area (ha) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
up to 1.00 90.38 86.23 92.03 77.54 108.85 155.76 97.75 156.14
1.01–9.99 87.94 81.53 75.59 75.91 98.41 129.60 114.12 188.54
10.00–99.99 99.39 115.55 96.73 89.08 126.99 223.56 157.89 211.54
>=100.00 85.98 120.82 111.75 109.16 122.96 256.60 177.75 196.56
300.00 or more -  -  -  -  - 211.83 210.62 141.59
Average 90.92 101.03 94.02 87.92 114.31 195.47 151.63 178.87
land area (ha) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
up to 1.00 282.22 335.24 316.98 299.65 710.67 621.43 641.71 549.59
1.01–9.99 348.84 373.75 250.00 356.23 587.45 643.32 703.59 612.36
10.00–99.99 451.14 445.57 297.78 436.15 651.15 942.92 886.88 944.89
>=100.00 2 450.77 426.71 207.02 321.68 1064.03 437.53 595.23 1298.57
300.00 or more 425.54 799.19 230.02 521.64 581.00 466.07 500.75 368.73
Average 391.70 476.09 260.36 387.07 718.86 622.25 665.63 754.83
1Euro (EUR) to Polish zloty (PLN) average exchange rate over 1999-2014: 1EUR=4,06 PLN
2from 2004: 100.00–299.99
Source: Central Statistical Office (GUS) and Agricultural Property Agency (ANR) in Poland (granted by the 
National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
Table 1.3.  Value of land rent discounted in prices of land (in Polish zloty1), and the excess part 
of the value of land rent depending on land area (a proxy for farmland amenities and 
speculation)
item 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Average land rent (zloty)2 418.4 564.3 612.7 371.1 332.5 457.7 430.3 485.9
Land area (ha) Surplus part of the value of land rent
up to 1.00 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.67 0.66 0.77 0.68
1.01–9.99 0.79 0.86 0.88 0.80 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.61
10.00–99.99 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.76 0.62 0.51 0.63 0.56
>=100.003 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.71 0.63 0.44 0.59 0.60
300.00 or more - - - - - 0.54 0.51 0.71
Average 0.78 0.82 0.85 0.76 0.66 0.57 0.65 0.63
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item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Average land rent (zloty) 665.0 934.0 1043.0 1042.5 1192.2 1272.1 1061.5 1137.6
Land area (ha) Surplus part of the value of land rent
up to 1.00 0.58 0.64 0.70 0.71 0.40 0.51 0.40 0.52
1.01–9.99 0.48 0.60 0.76 0.66 0.51 0.49 0.34 0.46
10.00–99.99 0.32 0.52 0.71 0.58 0.45 0.26 0.16 0.17
>=100.00 0.32 0.54 0.80 0.69 0.11 0.66 0.44 -0.14
300.00 or more 0.36 0.14 0.78 0.50 0.51 0.63 0.53 0.68
Average 0.41 0.49 0.75 0.63 0.40 0.51 0.37 0.34
1 Euro (EUR) to Polish zloty (PLN) average exchange rate over 1999-2014: 1EUR=4,06 PLN
2 Annual land rent (R) discounted in prices of agricultural land, calculated from a formula discounting the 
stream of perpetual rents: R = L*s, where L is the market price of land (according to the Central Statistical 
Office, Eurostat code: apri_ap_aland), and s is the discount rate, i.e. the long-term interest rate (Eurostat 
code: irt_lt_mcby_a)
3 from 2004: 100.00–299.99
Source: Central Statistical Office (GUS) and Agricultural Property Agency (ANR) in Poland (granted by the 
National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
The lease payments are the results of tender procedures for the leasing of land from 
the national stock administered by the Agricultural Property Agency (ANR), in which 
the participants are primarily farms. This value therefore reflects the productive 
utilities of the land and the expected income from them. Table 2 shows the land rent 
discounted in average prices of agricultural land, assuming that the current value of 
the land is a discounted stream of perpetual rent. This can be seen to be significantly 
higher than the lease payment, but it must be noted firstly that the difference is 
smaller in farms above 100 ha in size, and secondly that it decreases year by year 
(for example, the average land rent was 4.5 times higher than the average lease 
payment in 1999, but only 1.5 times higher in 2014). The following conclusions are 
therefore suggested:
1) since the end of the 1990s the market for land has discounted, in rising prices, 
the process of integration with the EU and the introduction of the SAPS 
system in Poland from 2004;
2) year by year, and in line with the phasing-in of CAP subsidies, land prices 
reflected the increasing political rents and the related expected increase 
in farm income, but also the new utilities of land. On large farms land has 
primarily a use value, hence the excess value of the land rent contained in 
land prices is smaller. We believe that the process of discounting of political 
rents has now ended;
3) formally, the phasing-in process in the EU-12 countries ended in 2013 (in 2011 
in Poland, due to national support). The excess value of land rent discounted 
in prices is nonetheless still found to be approximately 34–40% of that rent 
Table 1.3.  cont.
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(cf. Table 2). This shows that prices of agricultural land are still discounting 
expectations of increasing productivity of capital in agriculture. The question 
is: from what is that growth expected to result? Is it purely speculation, or is 
account being taken of non-agricultural utilities (amenities) of land, including 
environmental ones? This is a complex problem, requiring an analysis of the 
market for land in different locations and with different uses. This topic will 
be addressed in later parts of the book.
Conclusions
The statistical data presented here show that land prices in Poland discount 
a significantly greater quantity of utilities than would result from the agricultural 
functions of land. A similar situation exists in other EU countries. The question is 
where the excess value of land comes from. It is undoubtedly created by expectations 
of political rents and by speculative motives, but also by the non-agricultural utilities 
of the land. It is nonetheless difficult to determine the proportional contributions 
of these factors. A new theory of land rent should take account of the fact that in 
sustainable agriculture many new utilities of the land factor are created intrinsically, 
that is, without additional inputs of capital and labour. These have the status of 
public goods, and are paid for chiefly through agricultural policy (that is, through 
taxes). In this way the intrinsic utility of land takes the form of an economic rent, 
but we believe that this process may also take place through market channels. In this 
way history has come full circle, and the pure product of land as described by the 
physiocrats has been reactivated.
1.3. Interest groups and rent seeking in agriculture 
– a theoretical approach
(Agnieszka Poczta-Wajda16)
Introduction
Contemporary agricultural policy in developed countries, and its mechanisms, 
do not always accord with the theories of classical economics, which neglect 
the conditions and structures in which the maximisation of profits takes place. 
Methodological individualism, characteristic of the neo-classical approach, often 
overlooks the benefits and costs resulting from collective actions (Czyżewski, Kułyk 
2013). It is partly for this reason that contemporary agricultural policy is also a focus 
of interest for political economy and the public choice school. These theories seek 
to explain the forces influencing the selection and implementation of public policies 
in a particular governance environment. The policy-making process is a function 
of bureaucracy and the actions of rent-seeking interest groups, which expend time, 
energy and money to influence the design and implementation of policies. Once a 
policy is in place, the process of incidence begins and results in market adjustments 
and economic consequences (Rausser, Roland 2010). The interlinkage between the 
economic situation and the policy-making process is presented in Figure 1.1 In this 
paper we shall review only a part of these complicated policy-economic relations, 
with reference to the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy.
The high level of economic support received by European farmers seems to 
result at least partly from the lobbying activity of interest groups, and is a good 
example of political rent. This paper is intended as strictly descriptive, and its main 
objective is to review the basic concepts of public choice theory with regard to 
agricultural policy. Hence it explains the mechanisms of rent-seeking behaviour and 
its consequences, discusses the ideas behind the interest group theory, which might 
be useful in analysing lobbying activities in agricultural policy, and looks for some 
empirical evidence in the contemporary literature. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides definitions of economic 
and political rent and discusses different aspects of rent-seeking mechanisms. Section 
3 explains the relationship between rent-seeking behaviour and collective action. 
Section 4 presents a simple model for the influence of lobbying on agricultural policy, 
and includes a short review of empirical literature on rent-seeking activities in the EU 
agricultural sector. Finally, section 5 sums up the topic and draws some conclusions.
16 Poznań University of Economics and Business; agnieszka.poczta@ue.poznan.pl .
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Figure 1.1. The policy-making process and economic consequences
Source: Rausser, Swinnen, Zusman (2011)
Economic versus political rent and rent-seeking activities
The concept of rent was introduced to the literature by D. Ricardo, who referred 
to the scarcity of land as a factor of production in the face of rising demand for food. 
This is what is called land rent (Ricardo 1817). The modern concept of rent also 
encompasses the benefits arising from the possession of other limited resources. 
It may be understood as the excess above the alternative cost, as the remuneration 
of a production factor, or as a profit. Rent obtained in a natural way, namely in the 
market through the competitive (price) mechanism, is called economic rent. This is 
viewed positively, since it motivates economic entities to make more efficient use of 
the productive resources that they control (Tollison 1982).
On the other hand, rent obtained in an artificial manner, namely by way of 
political mechanisms and government decisions, is called political rent. This is a 
form of benefit resulting from the employment of limited resources in activity that 
does not increase the quantity of products or services, but only leads to the transfer 
of income between economic entities (Hindmoor 1999). Sources of political rent 
may be found, for instance, in customs duties and other trade barriers, subsidies 
and grants, tax relief and exemptions, monopolies, preferences in the awarding of 
government contracts, etc. Political rent is usually assessed negatively, since it leads 
to the unproductive use of resources, thus reducing the level of social well-being 
(Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny 1993, Czyżewski, Matuszczak 2016). It also results in 
a distribution of income other than that which would be determined by the market. 
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Apart from economic effects, the desire to obtain political rent may also produce 
adverse social symptoms, such as corruption (Elsenhans 1997).
The term rent seeking most often refers to attempts to gain political rent, where 
economic entities strive to exert influence on their economic or legal environment 
for the purpose of obtaining additional advantages not resulting directly from 
economic activity. J. Wilkin (2012) defines rent seeking as actions taken by rational 
entities which believe that the employment of their resources in additional direct 
productive activity leading to some sum of useful products and services will bring 
them less benefits than the use of those resources to obtain a rent being the result of 
a political decision. The term was first used in the literature by A. Krueger (1974), 
but the phenomenon had previously been described by, among others, one of the 
leading representatives of the public choice school, G. Tullock (1967). He claimed 
that the social costs of imposing customs duties are not limited only to the loss of 
social well-being resulting from the fall in consumption of the protected good and 
inefficient use of resources for its production, but also include the transaction costs 
of the customs system and the cost of lobbying that leads to the imposition of such 
duties17. The direct social cost of rent seeking corresponds to the alternative cost of 
using the resources allocated for that purpose in other productive activity (Tullock 
1980a). In turn, based on research in India and Turkey, A. Krueger found that firms 
compete among themselves for the rents obtained by way of political decisions. 
These rents result from limitations in the free operation of the market mechanism, 
in the form of trade policy instruments (e.g. customs duties, import quotas, export 
subsidies) and instruments of internal support for specified social groups (such as 
the subsidisation of credit). The third fundamental work on rent seeking is that of 
Posner (1975), who presented the first model of rent seeking using the example of 
lobbying for a fixed price. 
Rent seeking may be done by legal methods (such as lobbying or the financing 
of election campaigns) or illegally (as in the case of corruption). In the first case, 
interest groups use their resources to finance the activities of lobbyists (lawyers, 
economists, experts) so as to push through measures that are favourable to them. The 
institution of legal lobbying is characteristic of developed countries. Rent seeking 
is expected to occur primarily in situations where the advantages resulting from 
government regulations will go to a relatively small group of beneficiaries, while 
the costs will be divided among a large group, for example taxpayers. Opportunities 
to gain political rent will be the greater, the better organised the rent-seeking group 
is. A good example of this phenomenon is the activity of agricultural organisations 
17 In the same paper, Tullock also pointed out the social losses resulting from monopolies 
and from theft.
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(such as COPA-COGECA in the EU) that have been able to achieve high levels of 
financial transfers to agricultural producers, which in developed countries account 
for only a few percent of the workforce. Rent seeking may also take the form of 
social campaigns, exerting influence on public opinion. An opportunity to obtain 
additional political rent arises in connection with matters of technical regulations, 
health standards and other measures the evaluation of which requires relevant 
knowledge. Even scientists are often unable to evaluate an issue unambiguously, 
which creates room for action by interest groups and the possibility of manipulating 
public opinion (Lamb 2006). An example of such behaviour are the attempts by the 
agricultural lobby in the EU to block the import of genetically modified food and 
meat from animals that have been given hormones (Skoba 2013). Citing scientific 
studies (Cooper et al. 2009) the EU agricultural lobby also attempts to convince 
public opinion of the necessity to continue giving support linked to the supply of 
public goods by agriculture.
An illegal form of rent seeking, namely corruption18, occurs primarily in less 
developed countries. Bribery is regarded as a particularly damaging form of rent 
seeking, since apart from the socioeconomic costs, it also has consequences for 
public trust in state institutions and their legitimacy. 
Apart from the phenomenon of rent seeking, mention should also be made of 
the phenomenon of rent protection. Individuals or groups may use real resources to 
protect their rents from encroachment by other rent seekers. Once an interest group 
wins a political rent, any reforms or other attempts to remove that rent will encounter 
difficulties. The beneficiaries of a political rent will be ready to spend at least part of 
it on resisting reform and protecting their transfers (Tollison, Wagner 1991).
Although political rent seeking is evaluated negatively19, it is nonetheless a sign 
of rational behaviour by entities striving to realise their interests and maximise their 
utility function. The government is a rational economic entity that aims to maximise 
its utility, which in its case means retaining power for as long as possible. To win 
votes, the government tries to gain the support of various social groups by offering 
them assistance in the form of desired regulations, taxes and subsidies. Interest groups 
18 Some authors (Tollison 2012) believe that bribes are not, by definition, a cost of rent 
seeking. A bribe is a transfer and a method of exerting influence on the government, but it does not 
involve the expenditure of costly resources to procure a transfer.
19 It is claimed by some authors (Schmitz et al. 2010, Baylis, Furtan 2003) that in some 
circumstances political rent seeking can improve social well-being. This results from the fact 
that interest groups may have better information on social preferences than the government 
does, and hence decisions influenced by lobbying activity may be more effective. Schmitz 
(2010) writes that “if an economy has no distortions, rent-seeking activity will result in 
inefficiencies. However, if distortions do exist, it is possible that rent-seeking activity can 
improve economic efficiency.”
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aim to inform the government of their needs, devoting resources to such activity. 
Hence there exists a political market in which the government offers political rents 
to interest groups in exchange for their support (Schmitz et al. 2010). The result 
of this political game may be the government selecting measures that are not most 
effective from an economic point of view, but which enable it to gain the greatest 
number of votes. In an extreme situation, as presented in Table 1.4., politicians may 
decide against implementing the economically most effective policy (policy A) in 
favour of the least effective policy (policy D), if the latter is expected to bring them 
the greatest number of votes. 
Table 1.4. Political rent-seeking activity and policy choice
Policy rank with regard to:
Political choice
Economic efficiency Number of votes
A
B
C
D
D
C
B
A
D
C
B
A
Source: (Schmitz et al. 2010)
Rent seeking in the interest group theory
Rent seeking is a phenomenon considered by most of the theories originating 
from the public choice school. It is primarily associated with the theory of interest 
groups, and is asserted to be the principal cause of the formation of such groups. 
Action to obtain rent often requires significant expenditure, which can only be covered 
if interest groups are formed. Tullock stated (Rowley et al. 1988) that governments 
generally do not impose protective tariffs unless there is an interest group lobbying 
for them. It may appear that the greatest opportunities for obtaining political rent 
belong to large interest groups, which have large amounts of resources and represent 
large numbers of votes. This assumption only holds, however, in conditions of direct 
democracy. Under representative democracy, it is smaller groups that turn out to be 
politically more effective (Hillman 2003). 
The relationship between the effectiveness of interest groups and their size was 
first considered by M. Olson, in his well-known book The Logic of Collective Action: 
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Olson 1965). This book questions two 
widespread opinions: that in a democracy the majority will prevail over the minority; 
and that everyone in a group will act collectively to achieve a common interest. 
Because its considerations apply to many important real-world situations, the book 
remains highly relevant even today (Sandler 2015; Congleton 2015). Olson argues 
that incentives to act collectively decline as the interest group becomes relatively 
larger, and that smaller interest groups gather more political power. There are several 
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factors which explain this phenomenon20. Firstly, in order to act collectively, a group 
requires some kind of organisation, communication and coordination among its 
members. The transaction costs of organising a lobby are higher in larger groups 
than in smaller ones. Even when the question of costs is neglected, the effectiveness 
of communication between members of a large group is smaller and often makes 
joint undertakings impossible. Secondly, an inextricable element of the theory of 
interest groups is the phenomenon of “free-riding”. Public policies favouring a given 
social group do not distinguish between the members of that group on the basis of 
their spending on rent seeking. Such policies are usually of the nature of public 
club goods, and hence some entities, acting strategically, will adjust their rent-
seeking expenditure to the decisions of other members of the group, thus obtaining 
the same individual benefit for a relatively low output. In his analysis of interest 
group behaviours, Olson (1965) pointed out that smaller groups are better able to 
control free-riding than large ones. In turn, Pincus (1975) claimed that the control 
of free-riding is favoured by the geographical concentration of a group. Thirdly, 
the size of the benefits that members of interest groups receive as a result of policy 
decisions is larger in smaller groups. Potential gains per capita in smaller groups are 
higher, while individuals in larger groups gain less21. This means that incentives to 
act collectively are weaker in larger groups.
The theory of interest groups is well suited to rent-seeking activity in the 
agricultural sector and to explaining the effectiveness of farmers’ political lobbying. 
In terms of politics, the group size theory assumes two groups, one favouring the 
policy and the other opposing it (Pecorino 2015). The effectiveness of agricultural 
lobbying relative to activity on behalf of consumers or taxpayers becomes clearer 
when one analyses in detail the sharing of the social costs and benefits of agricultural 
policy. Along with economic growth and changes in the structures of the economy, 
the distribution of the benefits and costs of agricultural policy also changes. Firstly, 
the proportion of the population working in the agricultural sector becomes relatively 
smaller, while the antagonistic group, which bears the costs of supporting farmers, 
namely consumers or taxpayers, grows in size. This means that the per capita cost (i.e. 
per person employed outside agriculture) of supporting agricultural income becomes 
smaller, and so does the incentive to act against such a policy (Swinnen 2008). 
Secondly, because consumers become richer and due to Engel’s law the expenditure 
on food as a percentage of total consumer spending decreases, public opposition 
20 More formal considerations regarding the group size paradox and rent-seeking behaviour 
in groups can be found in (Cheikbossian 2008; Baik, Lee 2007; Nitzan, Ueda 2009; Kolmar, 
Rommeswinkel 2013).
21 This holds only when the public good for which the group lobbies is rivalrous (Pecorino 
2015).
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to agricultural subsidies will be reduced as the relative cost of such support per 
consumer declines. Thirdly, awareness of the rent-extracting situation among the 
antagonistic group is usually lower (Fischer 2006). Sometimes consumers are not 
even aware of the cost that they are required to bear.
These three facts lead to a situation in which the benefits of a potential reduction 
in agricultural support would be distributed among a large group of consumers and 
taxpayers, which decreases incentives to engage in a policy against agricultural 
support. For an individual it is simply not beneficial enough to engage resources and 
time, because the profits would be too small. R. Tollison (2012) argues that “not all 
suppliers of wealth transfers find it economically rational to allow their wealth to be 
taken away (why spend a dollar to save a dime?)”.
On the other hand, it is also worthwhile to look more closely at the benefits 
that agricultural policy generates for the farmers. Firstly, as the level of farmers’ 
income received from the market drops, they start to look for other sources of 
income, including government transfers. The result is that the incentives to engage 
in political and collective actions are stronger. Secondly, because the relative size of 
the farmers’ interest group is declining, the per capita benefits of agricultural policy 
are higher and of greater importance for individuals, hence they tend to act actively 
in favour of their interest group. Being aware of this, the government and political 
parties support the most influential group – farmers in this case. For this reason, 
the relatively smaller farmer group might benefit from a higher level of agricultural 
protection. 
Rent-seeking activities under the Common Agricultural Policy – a need 
for empirical evidence
The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy is a modern example of the 
phenomenon of rent seeking22. The state plays an important role in facilitating rent 
seeking and rent protection in Europe. A large part, sometimes even the majority, of 
the income obtained by farmers in the EU is a result of political decisions and the 
financial support received, rather than of productive activity. The level of subsidies 
and other benefits is decided by the authorities at European level. Though decreasing 
over time, the various forms of transfers to the agricultural sector and rural areas 
amount to almost half of the total EU budget. One must also add the losses to 
22 This view is disputed by B. Czyżewski and A. Brelik (2014), who claim that subsidies 
paid to agriculture under the CAP cannot be treated as political rents according to the classical 
definition. In view of the “drainage of economic rent” from agriculture that results from market 
failure and the fact that the sector supplies public goods (landscape, biodiversity, rural culture, 
traditions, etc), only the part of the subsidy remaining after the deduction of sums compensating 
for market failure and payments for public goods should be considered a rent.
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consumers resulting from higher food prices. It can be assumed that these subsidies 
are partly a consequence of the political activities of interest groups. In order to 
secure these benefits, farmers continue to engage considerable resources in lobbying 
efforts. Rent-seeking or rent-protecting behaviours of European farmers also include 
their engagement in actions to influence public opinion such as demonstrations, 
dumping agricultural products on the street or blocking traffic with tractors (Mueller 
2015). 
A model of the influence of lobbying on decisions relating to the Common 
Agricultural Policy was constructed by Jonnson (2007). He assumed after Gardner 
(1987) that policy makers face a redistribution problem between consumers and 
producers when setting agricultural support levels. The agricultural subsidy (si) for 
commodity i benefits both consumers and producers, but the subsidy cost is borne by 
taxpayers. The government tries to maximise a weighted sum of consumer surplus 
C(si) and agricultural producer rent P(si, Xi), where Xi is a vector of commodity- or 
producer-specific exogenous variables. Hence the government’s objective function 
can be written as:
 Ωi = C(si) + θiP(si, Xi) (1.1)
where θi (≥1) is the weight attached to the producers of commodity i, determined 
by how effective their lobbying is. Assuming that there are no cross-commodity 
linkages, the subsidy cost (si) is an implicit budget restriction in the redistribution 
problem, hence the maximisation of expression (1) with respect to si gives:
 si = f(θi, Xi) (1.2)
However, if there are cross-commodity linkages, which means that increasing 
support to one producer group would mean less support to other groups, then the 
budget constraint can be written as:
 τ = ∑i s
i (1.3)
where τ is the exogenous total expenditure for the CAP. Assuming that the overall 
government objective Ω is the sum of the product specific objectives Ωi, where 
i=1,...,n, then the maximisation problem can be written as:
 si = f (θ1, ..., θn, X1, ... , Xn, τ) (1.4)
Therefore the agricultural subsidy size for commodity i will depend on the 
effectiveness of the lobbying group, the commodity- or producer-specific exogenous 
characteristics and the overall CAP budget. 
Although the theoretical literature on issues of rent seeking and collective 
actions is vast, there is not much empirical work dealing with political rents under 
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the EU Common Agricultural Policy23. One of the most common approaches to 
measuring the political rents received by European farmers is based on the Producer 
Support Estimate (PSE), calculated and published annually by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This index shows what part 
of an agricultural producer’s income is the result of various forms of government 
support24. The data presented in Figure 1.2 suggest that currently about 20% of the 
income received by European farmers results from public support (OECD 2015). 
Three or two decades earlier this figure was higher; however, one should not rush to 
conclude that political rents in European agriculture have been shrinking. The PSE 
does not take account of many new policy tools addressed to the sector as a whole, 
or some of the rural development measures.
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Figure 1.2.  Agricultural support estimate for the European Union (28 countries), percentage 
PSE, 1986-2014
Source: OECD (2016)
There is also not much existing work relating to the empirical analysis of rent-
seeking behaviour in the EU agricultural sector. The author has found only a few 
papers dealing with the problem of lobbying under the CAP. For example, in one of 
his earlier papers, Olper (1998) examined seven EU countries over fourteen years 
and found that national indicators of lobbying by farmers partially explained the 
variation in total agricultural support. However, Jonnson (2007) argues that because 
23 For a theoretical approach to rent seeking under the CAP see Nedergaard (2006) and 
Bednarikova and Jilkova (2012).
24 Caution must be applied, however, when using the PSE as a measure of political rent in 
agriculture, since it is calculated taking account of the difference between domestic and world 
prices, which is not always the result of government action.
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the CAP is set as an overall EU policy, lobbying as a collective action by farmers 
should also be analysed at international level. Hence he assessed the influence of EU-
wide interest groups on the CAP, analysing the activity of fifteen commodity groups 
over eighteen years. The results of that study suggest that Euro-group lobbying has 
been able to influence the CAP.
The contemporary subject literature deals not only with the origin and size 
of the political rents received by particular interest groups, but also with the issue 
of free-riding. Since the CAP is a community-wide policy, it represents a form of 
public good, from the consumption of which no-one may be excluded. However, 
the lobbying costs incurred in obtaining the political rent are not distributed equally 
among beneficiaries (Czyżewski, Kułyk 2013). This is therefore a classical example 
of free-riding in Olson’s sense. The phenomenon has been studied by, among others, 
H. Furtan, J. Sauer and M. Jensen (2009), and A. Zawojska (2011). Both of those 
papers provide a comparison between the contributions of particular EU countries to 
the total membership fees paid to the agricultural lobbying organisation COPA, and 
the share of CAP funds received by the same countries from the EU budget25. 
Conclusions
This paper has presented and explained some basic concepts of the public 
choice theory, which might serve as a background for explaining the high level of 
support for farmers in the European Union. It defines the political rent problem and 
discusses the mechanism of rent seeking. It also explains the relation between rent-
seeking activities and the collective action theory. The review of the literature on 
rent seeking and collective actions suggests that these theories provide at least a 
partial explanation of the level of political rents and lobbying actions in European 
agriculture. The position of agricultural lobbying results from the relatively small 
and homogeneous groups, a good organisation, and a weak opposition on the part of 
consumers. 
Although the theoretical literature on issues of rent seeking and collective actions 
at worldwide level is vast, not much empirical work has been done with regard to 
these problems under the Common Agricultural Policy. There is certainly a need for 
25 It was found that in 2005, the year analysed, the three large founding members of the 
European Communities – Italy, Germany and France – received a significantly higher percentage 
of the total CAP subsidy than their contribution to COPA fees. Those countries’ “free-riding” was 
financed chiefly by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. Hence the surprising 
finding, not commonly recognised in the literature, that the larger CAP beneficiaries are free-
riding on countries which benefit less. However, such a conclusion is controversial and not 
straightforward, because those countries are among the highest net payers to the EU budget and 
therefore the higher receivers. 
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more research to precisely identify the mechanisms by which lobbying influences 
the CAP. It would also be useful to investigate the interactions between lobbying 
at EU level and at national level, since although the CAP is an EU-wide policy, 
there are also other national policies (such as tax policies) which affect the rents 
obtained by farmers. What is more, with the accession of new member countries 
the EU agricultural policy is becoming more complex and lobbying activities are 
consequently becoming more sophisticated, and there is an ever greater possibility 
of free-riding behaviour. 
Part 2. 
International Perspective. 
Sustainable Development of Agriculture 
and Political Rents
2.1. The sustainability of agriculture in the European 
Union against a global backdrop
(Walenty Poczta, Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka26)
Introduction
The principal function of world agriculture is to produce the raw materials 
required to feed the human population. Given the growing scale of ecological 
problems, a complementary function has become the reduction of the external costs 
accompanying production processes, and the production of public goods of an 
environmental nature. At least in the short term, there is a conflict between these two 
functions, as the need to increase output implies an increase in the intensity and area 
of cultivation, while the need to protect the environment implies an extensification 
of production. These issues are fundamental to the economics of sustainable 
development27. This is often defined as the satisfaction of basic human needs with 
the simultaneous preservation and active maintenance of the systems ensuring life 
on Earth (Rogall 2010). Majewski (2008) writes that “all human actions on Earth 
should be economically vital, ecologically safe and socially acceptable.” According 
to that author’s analysis, the essence of sustainable agriculture should be its lasting 
nature, which is dependent on friendliness to the environment, social acceptance 
and economic effectiveness. To supplement these assumptions, it should be noted 
that alongside the neoclassical allocative efficiency, the sustainable development of 
agriculture also requires adaptive efficiency. Kozuń-Cieślak (2013) observes that the 
concept of adaptive efficiency was introduced by D.C. North, who identified it as a 
condition for sustained economic growth. Adaptive efficiency reveals itself in the long 
term, and is related to the elasticity of the institutional structure. It is manifested in 
the ability to accumulate knowledge, and to create forms of cooperation and creative 
attitudes favouring increased well-being. Applying this concept to sustainable 
agriculture, a significant issue will be the ability of agriculture to adapt to varying 
conditions, assuming that institutional support is provided for those processes.
26 Poznań University of Life Sciences; poczta@up.poznan.pl .
27 The issue of sustainable development is widely discussed in the literature, with various 
levels of analysis and differing viewpoints presented, for example, by Atkinson et al. (1997), 
Faucheux et al. (1998), Baum (2011), Fiedor and Jończy (2009), Lawn (2006), Majewski (2008), 
Matuszczak (2013), Rogall (2010), Woś and Zegar (2004), Sadowski (2012), Wrzaszcz (2012), 
and Zegar (2012, 2015).
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FAO estimates indicate that, given the expected rise in the global population 
to 9 billion by 2050, agricultural production will need to be increased by at least 
60% (FAO 2015). It must therefore be asked, firstly, whether modern agriculture 
is capable of ensuring food security at present and in the future, and secondly, 
whether this can be done in conjunction with sustainable development. With regard 
to these issues, an evaluation will be made here of the sustainability of European 
Union agriculture in comparison with agriculture worldwide. Consideration will be 
given to matters relating to economic, social and environmental balance, against 
a backdrop of resource-related and structural determinants. Determinants arising 
from nature are omitted, these having an exogenic character and being subject to 
human influence only to a relatively limited extent. Historical determinants are also 
neglected, since although these are anthropogenic, they are fixed and no longer 
subject to the influence of contemporary humanity28.
Resource-related and structural determinants
Approximately one-third of the world’s total agricultural land is in Asia, 24% 
in Africa, and 19% in Europe and North America (Table 2.1.). Agriculture in the EU 
uses only 3.8% of the world’s agricultural land resources. However, it concentrates 
13.1% of productive assets, including more than one-quarter of all machinery and 
equipment. A similar quantity of productive assets is found in North American 
agriculture. The value of productive assets per hectare of agricultural land in the EU 
is more than three times the world average, and twice the value for North America. 
Another region with a relatively high index of technical equipment to land use is 
East Asia, which has 16.6% of the world’s productive assets, equivalent to US $1400 
per hectare of agricultural land. Extremely low values of the ratio of capital to land 
are found in Africa and Central Asia. These patterns are reflected in the productivity 
of land. This is highest in the EU and in East Asia, where it is close to three times the 
world average, and lowest in Central Asian and African agriculture. The latter are 
also regions where agriculture accounts for a large percentage of the total workforce 
(approximately 60% in Sub-Saharan Africa). In South Asia almost half of the 
working population is employed in agriculture. The situation is very different in the 
EU and North America, which account for only 1% of the world’s total agricultural 
workforce, and where the percentages of workers engaged in agriculture are 4.5% 
and 1.7% respectively. In North America, one person working in agriculture has 
available approximately 50 times more land and 70 times more productive assets 
28 Use is made in this chapter of extracts from the work titled Możliwości trwałego i zrów-
noważonego rozwoju rolnictwa – refleksje na tle Deklaracji Warszawskiej (Poczta W.), which 
appeared in Ekonomia jest piękna?, Hardt Ł., Milczarek-Andrzejewska D. (eds.), Wyd. Naukowe 
Scholar, Warsaw 2015.
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than the world average. In the case of EU agriculture the asymmetry is less marked – 
one agricultural worker has almost 5 times more land and 17 times more productive 
assets than the global average. This results in more than 13 times higher labour 
productivity, and only a little over 20% lower productivity of assets, despite the 
much higher level of those assets.
According to FAO data, the world’s total number of farms is close to 570 million. 
Approximately 92–98% of them are individual farms, accounting for approximately 
56% of agricultural land globally (Table 2.1.). This form of ownership is least 
predominant in South America. In the two largest countries of that region – Brazil 
and Argentina – alongside family farms applying traditional production methods, 
and often functioning at social minimum levels, there is a large group of modern 
farms (neolatifundios) which carry out agricultural production and processing 
of agricultural and food goods at very high levels of technical and technological 
advancement. In Paraguay, one of the least developed countries of South America, 
80% of the agricultural land belongs to approximately 3% of landowners, who 
run farms covering up to several hundred thousand hectares, but adopt extensive 
production practices (Falkowski, Kostrowicki 2005). As Falkowski and Kostrowicki 
(2005) note, a high degree of diversity in terms of farm size and ownership is found 
in Africa – from units dominated by primary agriculture and with a high degree 
of common land ownership (Central Africa), and small individual farms (mainly 
in northern Africa), to the industrialised market farms found chiefly in southern 
Africa.
According to the report titled The State of Food and Agriculture. Innovation in 
Family Farming, on a worldwide scale as many as 72% of family farms, which the 
FAO identifies with individual agriculture, have less than one hectare of land; these 
account for just 8% of the world’s total agricultural land. The next 12%, having 
areas of 1–2 ha, account for 4% of the total. Therefore 84% of farms control only 
12% of agricultural land, the average size of these farms being 1.2 hectares. On the 
other hand, 1% of farms control 65% of total agricultural land. In the most highly 
developed countries there are close to 22 million farms, with an average area of 
57 ha (in these countries, farms above 50 ha represent 9% of the total number, but 
control 82% of agricultural land) (The State of ... 2014). 
As noted above, individual agriculture is identified in FAO analyses with 
family agriculture. Family farms are defined there as units run and managed by 
households, where productive processes primarily make use of the labour of family 
members, chiefly the head of the household. The family and farm are connected, 
develop in tandem, and combine economic, environmental, social and cultural 
64 2. International Perspective. Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Political Rents
functions (Garner, Gender 2013)29. The family character of farms is fundamental 
to the European Model of Agriculture, shaped to a large extent under the influence 
of the agricultural policy implemented in the European Union for more than 50 
years30. On family farms the basic factors of production belong to the owner (or 
the family) who acts as a manager, labour is provided mainly by the owner and the 
owner’s family, and ownership and the method of management are passed down 
from generation to generation. There is no separation between the household and the 
productive farm, and the economic result is the income obtained (Tomczak 1997). 
Under the European Model of Agriculture, it is on family farms that the sustainable 
development of European agriculture is to be realised. 
Despite the absence of a single definition of family farms in theory and in 
practice, it is fairly widely accepted that such a farm should be the principal or sole 
source of income for the family, and its products (as a basic economic category) 
serve to meet the needs of both consumption and production. Such farms should 
be capable of recreating their productive potential, extended reproduction and 
innovation (Michna 2008).
The synthesis of the economic capacities for the maintenance and development 
of family farms is therefore an agricultural income large enough to provide conditions 
of durability at a given place and time. In this context it will be useful to consider 
how the European Agricultural Model is situated against the backdrop of family 
farming on a global level.
Economic and social sustainability
A value relatively close to the income that can be obtained by a person working 
in agriculture, and well reflecting the economic situation of such people, is the gross 
added value. In North America this is close to US$69,500 per worker, in the EU 
more than US$25,000, and in world agriculture only US$1,254 on average (Table 
2.1.). The productivity of labour in agriculture in South America, the Middle East 
and North Africa is around 15-18 times lower than in North America and 5-6 times 
lower than in the EU. In other world regions the gross added value per worker is 
extremely low, standing at slightly over half of the world average. In these regions 
29 The FAO does not define “hard” identifiers of family agriculture. Generally speaking, 
there is no universally applied definition of a family farm, either in the subject literature or in 
farming and social practice. The concept is defined using a variety of criteria, social and cultural 
as well as economic.
30 The most characteristic feature of the European Model of Agriculture is the sustainable 
development of the agricultural sector and the multifunctional character of agriculture, in 
conjunction with the multifunctional development of rural areas. The model corresponds to a 
large degree to the premises of economically, socially and environmentally sustainable agriculture 
(Woś, Zegar 2004).
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the value added per worker per day is less than 2 US dollars, while support for 
agriculture from public funds is extremely modest, and in many countries nonexistent. 
Moreover, farming families in poorly and moderately developed countries are usually 
large, and hence the value added per family member will be lower accordingly, 
often below 1 US dollar daily. It can be concluded that in the great majority of 
countries the level of income obtained on the largest number of farms excludes the 
possibility of economic and social sustainability. In this light it is not possible to 
speak of full sustainability of agricultural production on a global scale31. It may 
also be suggested that, globally, the inadequate incomes obtained in agriculture are 
the principal obstacle to its sustainable development. This is not changed even by 
the lack of market connections and the autarchic nature of farms in many poorly 
developed countries. From a formal standpoint, the products taken from one’s own 
farm constitute the family’s income, but more importantly the sum of income in cash 
and in kind is so low that the family seeks possibilities of changing its social status 
at every opportunity. Farms in developed countries are often sustainable through 
compulsion, and consequently do not fulfil the FAO criteria defining family farms. 
The low level of per capita income excludes the performance and realisation of 
cultural and social functions, and such farms frequently operate without respect for 
the natural environment. 
As regards agriculture in the EU, research by Poczta et al. (2015) shows that 30% 
of farms are family farms that fulfil the tenets of three-dimensional sustainability: 
economic, social and environmental32. These farms account for approximately 51% 
of all agricultural land and three-quarters of agricultural production in the EU. In 
the future, particularly in conditions of growth in non-agricultural income, chiefly 
in the new member states, the number of farms meeting the full set of criteria for 
family (sustainable) agriculture may fall rapidly, although the land resources used 
by those farms should not be expected to decrease. The authors suggest that the 
Common Agricultural Policy favours and should favour their development. At the 
same time, they note that in many EU countries a significant role is played by very 
large individual farms (not having the features of family farms, basing production 
on hired labour) or by farms belonging to groups or corporations. In the authors’ 
view, even these forms of farming, provided that specified conditions are met, may 
be carried on in a sustainable manner.
31 Family agriculture accounts for more than 50%, and according to some FAO data even 
80%, of total agricultural production (Putting Family Farmers ... 2014). 
32 To distinguish family farms among the farms analysed by the FADN, the authors adopt the 
assumption that, firstly, such a farm should be the farmer’s (or the farmer’s family’s) individual 
property, and secondly, farm income per FWU (family work unit) should be at least at the level of 
the minimum wage for the economy as a whole. 
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Environmental sustainability
Agriculture, being dependent on the environment, actively exerts influence 
on certain environmental parameters. Zegar (2012) notes that agriculture has a 
significant impact on climate, being responsible for almost one-third of anthropogenic 
climate change33 and to a certain extent for biodiversity loss. Climate change, in turn, 
impacts the condition of agriculture, and hence also the food security of particular 
communities. Agriculture is therefore both one of the culprits and a victim of climate 
change (Gregory et al. 2005). At the same time, negative environmental impact is 
frequently blamed on the conventional system of agricultural production (Kośmicki 
2009b, Zegar 2012) used chiefly in countries with a high level of socioeconomic 
development. Nonetheless, research by Sadowski (2015a) shows that, globally, the 
greatest quantity of greenhouse gases emitted per unit area of agricultural land is 
found in less developed countries, which use an extensive system of agricultural 
production. That author notes that the pollution associated with food production 
(quantity of greenhouse gases produced by agriculture, per capita) is lower in these 
countries than in more developed ones only in view of the high density of population. 
This leads to the conclusion that traditional systems, as well as failing to ensure food 
security, in many cases also generate high ecological costs (Sadowski 2015a).
It is a cause for optimism that in the period from 1961 to 2009 all continents 
recorded a certain degree of improvement in the parameters relating to greenhouse 
gas emissions (Figure 2.1.). Moreover, it was European agriculture that made the 
greatest progress in reducing quantities of such gases emitted per kcal of agricultural 
production. In 1991-2009 pollution from agricultural production in Europe per capita 
fell by 22%, and despite the high density of population, this is relatively low on a 
global scale. However, Europe has one of the highest figures for pollution produced 
per hectare of agricultural land, which is understandable in view of the small area 
used for food production per capita – while on the other hand it is the only world 
region in which agricultural greenhouse gas emissions per hectare have fallen in 
recent years (by 12%). This results to a large extent from changes made to agriculture 
in the EU and may be linked both to the implementation of pro-environmental 
policy in agriculture, particularly since the early 1990s when the MacSharry reform 
realigned the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy, and to scientific and 
technological progress (Sadowski 2015b). In most other regions of the world the 
ecological “costs” of agricultural energy production are higher than in European 
agriculture. This even applies to North America, a fact that may be linked to the 
rapidly progressing concentration of production. Of particular note is the situation 
in Africa, where despite the low unit efficiency of production and significant food 
33 Including approximately 50% of methane (CH4) emissions and 70% of NO2 emissions.
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supply problems, the ecological costs of production are, comparatively, the highest 
(Figure 2.1.). 
The cited research shows that there is no country anywhere in the world where 
the food production goal and a full spectrum of ecological goals might be realised 
simultaneously in the short term; there is a competition between the two types of 
goals. In the long term there is no alternative to the attainment of both goals – the 
rising population and the need to eliminate famine and undernourishment require 
growth in food production, and to achieve such growth agriculture requires an 
undegraded environment, which is a necessary condition for the maintenance of 
productive capabilities. 
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Figure 2.1.  The ecological “costs” of agricultural energy production by continent in 1961-2009 
(kg of greenhouse gases per kcal produced by agriculture)
Source: Sadowski A. (2015b)
Conclusions
It can be concluded from the foregoing analysis that, from a global perspective, 
it is European agriculture that most fully conforms to the tenets of balance and 
sustainability. Relative to world agriculture it is economically effective (under the 
institutional conditions guaranteed by the CAP), it meets varied economic and social 
needs, and the environmental burden caused by its development is decreasing. The 
costs of bringing about this state of affairs are unquestionably high, and could not 
be implemented at present in developing countries for economic reasons; moreover, 
there is a need for the appropriate development of institutions providing strong 
regulations for the functioning of agriculture. A pattern can be noticed where at a 
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certain (earlier) stage of development the targets that are necessary in the short term 
(increased food production) take precedence over other urgent goals (care for the 
environment). Furthermore, the model for the development of agriculture in the EU 
would appear to be better suited for imitation in other relatively densely populated 
countries, where the area of land used for food production per capita is small. 
Possibilities for the simultaneous attainment of environmental and food production 
goals are different, and probably less challenging, in conditions where areas of food-
producing land per capita are large, and problems of undernourishment then also 
occur far less frequently.
A much less encouraging picture is presented of the situation of family agriculture 
globally, and its contribution to the balanced and sustainable development of the sector 
and of overall socioeconomic and environmental relationships. It can be estimated 
that on a global scale, the tenets of sustainability and balance are fulfilled by a far 
smaller percentage of farms than is the case in the EU. This applies both to highly 
developed countries with an excessive concentration of agricultural production (such 
as in North America), meaning that the goal of environmental balance is achieved 
only to a very limited extent, and to regions where small, economically marginal 
farms are predominant, where apart from the lack of economic sustainability there 
is often a failure to adhere to good agricultural practices (as in Africa). Therefore, in 
worldwide agriculture the requirements of economic or environmental sustainability, 
and in many cases both, are fulfilled to a lower degree than in the European Union.
2.2. A sustainable bioeconomy in Europe 
– the European Union’s policy and strategy
(Jarosław Gołębiewski34, Kazimierz Pająk35)
Introduction
The change in the vision of economic development from one based on fossil 
fuels to a system in which significantly greater use is made of renewable materials 
of biological origin, as well as progress and innovations in biotechnology and the 
natural sciences, have stimulated the formulation of new strategies and policies 
relating to the bioeconomy. In many countries in recent years, separate strategies 
and policies have been adopted relating to biotechnology, products of biological 
origin, and bio-industry. More and more often, however, all of these strategies are 
combined into cohesive, integrated bioeconomy strategies, in which nations define 
their vision of coordinated action to protect biodiversity, to ensure food safety, to 
develop industrial production using materials of biological origin, and to reduce 
climate change.
The first published strategy relating to the bioeconomy was a document from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development titled The Bioeconomy 
to 2030: Designing a Policy Agenda (OECD 2009). This stated that progress 
in biotechnology and the natural sciences creates opportunities to solve many of 
the problems that the world faces, particularly with respect to health and limited 
supplies of raw materials. Biotechnology is the foundation for the development of 
the bioeconomy, and the OECD indicates that both the public and private sectors 
must take active steps to ensure that maximum use is made of its potential. The 
OECD study is an extensive document setting out the concept of the bioeconomy and 
directions for its development. The document presents the situation in the bioeconomy 
in 2009, describes its status in 2015 and indicates possible scenarios up to 2030. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the bioeconomy strategy of the European 
Union. An analysis will be made of the EU strategy drawn up by the European 
Commission. The evaluation of this bioeconomy strategy will be preceded by 
remarks concerning different interpretations of the concept, the key social challenges 
that influence its development, and its importance in rural area development. The 
method applied includes the search for, identification, analysis and assessment of 
relevant EU programming documents and studies found in the subject literature. 
34 Warsaw University of Life Sciences (SGGW); jaroslaw_golebiewski@sggw.pl .
35 Poznan University of Economics and Business; k.pajak@ue.poznan.pl .
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Towards a broad definition of bioeconomy
The term bioeconomy36 first appeared in the scientific literature towards the end 
of the twentieth century. It was related to the development of biotechnology and its 
practical application in many branches of the economy. In an article in Science in 1998 
(Enriquez 1998), Juan Enriquez stated that discoveries in genomics were creating a 
new sector in the global economy, related to the natural sciences. To begin with, the 
concept of bioeconomy was used chiefly in terms of applications of biotechnological 
discoveries in processes of industrial production. This interpretation is reflected, 
for example, in the OECD’s definition, according to which the bioeconomy uses 
advanced technological knowledge and renewable biomass to produce various types 
of products. The use of biotechnology leads to an increase in output and economic 
benefits (OECD 2009). In subsequent years many new approaches to the concept were 
developed. Attempts have also been made in the scientific literature to systematise 
the terminology used and its definitions. This problem has been taken up by, among 
others, Maciejczak and Hofreiter (2013), Ascham Associates (2010), Schmid et al. 
(2012), and Smeets et al. (2015).
An analysis of these publications shows that there are large differences in the 
ways of understanding the concept of bioeconomy. Among the many different 
positions, two fundamental approaches may be distinguished. In the first, the 
bioeconomy is seen from an industrial perspective, while in the second it is viewed 
in terms of public goods. Each of these approaches determines a different direction 
of development for systems of agricultural production and indicates a different role 
for agricultural producers in those systems. The view of the bioeconomy as a further 
stage in the industrialisation of agriculture can be found in the cited publication of 
the OECD (2009) and in the positions of many international corporations operating 
within the broad agricultural-industrial complex. According to the OECD report, the 
bioeconomy encompasses the production, using knowledge from the life sciences, 
of new sustainable, ecological and competitive products. A similar approach is 
developed in the BECOTEPS project, the report of which states that the bioeconomy 
refers to sustainable production and the processing of biomass into food, industrial 
products and energy. Renewable biomass includes all biological material (produced 
in agriculture, forestry and animal production, including fishing) which can be used 
as a raw material (BECOTEPS 2011). Biomass, also taken to include organic wastes, 
is a valuable substitute for fossil fuels. In this context attention is often drawn to 
36 Terms found in the economic literature include “biobased economy” (BBE) and 
“bioeconomy” (BE). Although both of these refer to the concept of making economic use of 
renewable resources of biological origin, sometimes there are significant differences in the ways 
in which they are defined. Often, however, they are used interchangeably. In the present work only 
the term “bioeconomy” will be used.
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the need to increase the production of biomass, including through changes in the 
structure of agricultural crop production. To achieve this, there must be progress in 
genetics to enable the necessary changes to be made in the technology and structure 
of agricultural production. Similar approaches are found in strategic documents 
relating to the bioeconomy in the United States. In 2011 a report was published by 
the US Department of Agriculture, presenting a set of indicators for measuring the 
growth and effectiveness of the bioeconomy, in which it is stated that the bioeconomy 
encompasses activities relating to the production and distribution of bioproducts. 
Bioproducts are understood as commercial or industrial products (other than food 
and animal feed) which consist – wholly or in a significant part – of biological 
products, including renewable agricultural raw materials and forest materials 
(USDA 2011). In turn, in a document published in 2012 titled National Bioeconomy 
Blueprint, referring to the OECD publication, it is accepted that a bioeconomy based 
on research and innovations in the biological sciences creates economic activity and 
generates social benefits (White House 2012). 
A focus on biomass and biotechnology (based on genetic modifications in 
particular) places limits on the development of the bioeconomy, since it overlooks 
industries and sectors which produce or otherwise make use of biological resources 
(such as agriculture, food production, fisheries and forestry). For this reason, the 
predominant industry-based definitions are often criticised as being too narrow, 
particularly since they reduce the role of agriculture to merely supplying biomass, 
and give prominence to the concept of novel food37. The industrial perspective on 
the bioeconomy promotes quality as a set of measurable features characterising 
food products (Levidow et al. 2012). However, this perspective ignores the 
importance of agriculture in the production of traditional and regional products, the 
significant progress in the technology of agricultural production and in food science, 
the contribution of farmers to the development of rural areas through social and 
organisational innovations, and the public goods as well as social and environmental 
benefits that agriculture supplies (Matuszczak 2007, Brelik, Matuszczak 2013). The 
importance of agriculture in this context is underlined in many academic works 
37 According to Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients, the definition 
of novel foods includes the following categories of food and food ingredients: those with a 
new or intentionally modified molecular structure; those consisting of or isolated from micro-
organisms, fungi or algae; those consisting of or isolated from plants and food ingredients 
isolated from animals, except for foods and ingredients obtained by traditional propagating or 
breeding practices and having a history of safe food use; and those to which has been applied 
a production process not currently used, where that process gives rise to significant changes 
in the composition or structure of the foods or food ingredients which affect their nutritional 
value, metabolism or level of undesirable substances (Regulation...2016)
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(Adamowicz 2005, Majewski 2008, Zegar 2008, Cooper et al. 2009). In the report of 
the Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR) it is also stated that when 
the concept is viewed from an industrial perspective the human factor vanishes, 
and industry is seen as the main player in the bioeconomy (Freibauer et al. 2011). 
This means that the structure of the bioeconomy encompasses only part of what 
agriculture is and should be. 
Hence to ensure long-term economic growth, the bioeconomy should not be 
defined too narrowly. Former agriculture commissioner Franz Fischler defined the 
bioeconomy more broadly: as a production paradigm which is based on biological 
processes and, as a natural ecosystem, makes use of natural resources while using 
minimal quantities of energy and not producing waste, since all materials rejected by 
one process are reused in another (Ascham Associates 2010). 
The definitions used in various strategic documents and scientific studies 
often focus on identifying the sectors that make up the bioeconomy. An example of 
such a definition is the formula adopted at a conference on the bioeconomy, which 
states that it includes all branches of the industry and sectors of the economy that 
produce and use resources of biological origin, such as agriculture, the food industry, 
fisheries, forestry, etc. (European Commission 2005b). In the seventh framework 
programme, an important objective of which was the building of a knowledge-based 
European bioeconomy, it was stated that the term “bioeconomy” includes branches 
of the industry and sectors of the economy (such as agriculture, food production, 
fisheries and forestry) engaged in the production and use of biological resources 
(DG Research 2007). 
The concept of the bioeconomy was further developed with the European 
Commission adopting the document European Strategy and Action Plan towards a 
sustainable bio-based economy by 2020. According to that document, the bioeconomy 
includes all sectors of the economy which produce and process biological resources 
originating from the land or sea environment. The bioeconomy is a tool for the 
attainment of political goals, which include, among others: strengthening of European 
leadership and creativity in the biological sciences; optimisation of innovation and 
systems of knowledge transfer; research into food safety; improved effectiveness 
of agriculture and food processing and distribution; increased competitiveness of 
European industry and agriculture; and reduced emissions of greenhouse gases and 
waste (European Commission 2010a).
With the aim of preparing a comprehensive strategy for the bioeconomy, in 2011 
the European Commission took a series of actions to develop a cohesive concept. 
These included consultations on the subject of a renewables-based economy, which 
resulted in the formulation of a more precise definition of the bioeconomy. In the 
published consultation report it is stated that the bioeconomy is “[...] a low waste 
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production chain starting from the use of land and sea, through the transformation 
and production of bio-based products adapted to the requirements of end-users. More 
precisely, a bio-based economy integrates the full range of natural and renewable 
biological resources – land and sea resources, biodiversity and biological materials 
(plant, animal and microbial), through to the processing and the consumption of these 
bio-resources. The bio-economy encompasses the agriculture, forestry, fisheries, food 
and biotechnology sectors, as well as a wide range of industrial sectors, ranging 
from the production of energy and chemicals to building and transport. It comprises 
a broad range of generic and specific technological solutions (already available or 
still to be developed) which could be applied across these sectors to enable growth 
and sustainable development, for example in terms of food security and requirements 
for industrial material for future generations” (European Commission 2011a).
A broader understanding of the bioeconomy is found in the European Commission 
communication of 2012 (European Commission 2012a), and particularly in the 
accompanying working document. As regards defining the bioeconomy, a significant 
role was played in particular by the first document, which states that the introduction 
of a bioeconomy in Europe offers a significant potential: it is able to stimulate and 
maintain economic growth and create jobs in rural, coastal and industrial areas; 
reduce dependence on fossil fuels, and contribute to improvement in the economic 
and environmental balance of basic production and processing industries. The 
bioeconomy therefore makes a significant contribution to attaining the goals of the 
flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission 2012a).
In the Commission staff working document, the bioeconomy is defined as 
encompassing the production of renewable biological resources and the transformation 
of those resources and the waste stream into products with added value, such as 
food, animal feed, bioproducts38 and bioenergy. Its sectors and industrial branches39 
have significant potential for innovation, because they make use of a wide variety 
of branches of science and supporting and industrial technologies40, as well as local 
and hidden knowledge (European Commission 2012a). This document indicates that 
the bioeconomy strategy will support ecosystem management and will lead towards 
synergy with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Common Fisheries Policy 
38 Bioproducts are products originating in whole or in part from materials of biological 
origin, except for materials deposited in geological or fossil formations.
39 The bioeconomy includes the sectors of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, food, and paper 
and pulp production, as well as certain sectors of the chemical, biotechnological and energy 
industries.
40 The bioeconomy is based on the biological sciences, agronomy, ecology, food science, 
social sciences, biotechnology, nanotechnology, information and communication technologies 
and engineering.
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(CFP) and other EU policies. It is emphasised in the document that the full potential 
of a sustainable bioeconomy should be developed to an ever greater degree through 
connections with public goods and the very important role of farmers.
The bioeconomy and contemporary social challenges
The start of the 21st century starkly revealed the increasing scale of social 
problems at European and global level. The limited nature of natural resources, loss 
of biodiversity, climate change, food security issues, dependence on fossil resources, 
and most generally, the need to ensure sustainable growth represent a significant 
challenge for policymakers, who need to produce a concept for a cohesive response 
to these problems. In view of its wide-ranging nature, the bioeconomy is seen as 
a system which may assist comprehensively in addressing interrelated social 
challenges and form a basis for a new wave of economic growth, based on the use of 
renewable sources, natural and environmentally-friendly biological resources, and 
efficient recycling technologies (Figure 2.2.).
Figure 2.2. The bioeconomy as a new wave of economic growth
Source: Sustainable growth...(2014).
The document accepted by the European Commission in 2012 titled Innovating 
for Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe (European Commission 2012a) 
defines five specific social problems which can be expected to be solved through the 
development of the bioeconomy. These are: assurance of food security, sustainable use 
of natural resources, reduction of dependence on non-renewable resources, reduction 
of and adaptation to climate change, and the creation of jobs and maintenance of 
Europe’s competitiveness. 
The assurance of food security is becoming a key challenge for the modern 
economy. Demographic forecasts of significant growth in the world population in 
the coming decades make it necessary to consider the growing demand for food, 
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including in particular animal products. According to the Commission, the increase 
in the world population by 2050 will cause a growth in food needs of 70% and a 
doubling of meat consumption. The development of the bioeconomy can be expected 
to help meet this challenge. Through investments in scientific research supporting 
growth in basic production, changes in production and consumption models and the 
development of healthier and more sustainable ways of eating, we can expect to see 
a change of balance in demand-supply relationships in the food market. There also 
should be a reduction in waste, both in the food production sector and in households. 
The concept of the bioeconomy also assumes support for and development of more 
resource-efficient and effective food supply chains. 
Another social challenge which may be addressed with the support of the 
bioeconomy is the problem of the sustainable management of natural resources. Many 
sectors of the world economy, including agriculture, forestry, fisheries and fishing, 
make use of a range of limited resources. These include not only space on land and 
sea, soil, water and ecosystems, but also means of production such as minerals and 
energy, for example for the production of fertilisers and chemical agents. The use 
of these often causes adverse effects on ecosystems. Growing needs for biomass 
will in the future increase demand for the resources used in its production, leading 
to a greater pressure on the environment. The concept of the bioeconomy in this 
context provides for the development of research and innovations which will make it 
possible to increase productivity while ensuring the sustainable use of resources and 
limiting the negative environmental impact. It also draws attention to the need for a 
change of the approach to management and policy (Czyżewski, Majchrzak 2016). 
Management in the bioeconomy must take account of environmental aspects and the 
maintenance of existing ecosystems, and in the policy supporting economic growth 
there is a need for synergy and complementarity between the actions taken. At EU 
level this applies in particular to the common agricultural and fisheries policies 
(CAP and CFP), integrated maritime policy and EU environmental policy relating to 
resource efficiency, sustainable use of natural resources, protection of biodiversity 
and habitats, and provision of ecosystem services. 
A significant problem for many countries, and also for the European economy, is 
the significant dependence on non-renewable resources. The European economy is 
based to a large extent on fossil fuels, which means that it is dependent on uncertain 
and shrinking supplies and the increasing volatility of markets for raw materials. The 
maintenance and strengthening of the competitiveness of any economy currently 
requires the development of low-emission and resource-efficient sectors of the 
industry. A bioeconomic system including initiatives relating to innovative markets 
for bioproducts, energy technologies and the market for renewable energy can be 
expected to contribute to the attainment of those goals. This may also be supported 
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by progress in the use of alternative sources of carbon and energy (such as wastes 
from agriculture, forestry, and other sectors of the food economy) and the promotion 
of research into renewable resources such as microalgae.
With the growth in demand for biomass, for both industrial and food purposes, 
in the coming decades there will need to be a significant increase in the productive 
capacities of agriculture, forestry, fisheries and fishing. The concept of the 
bioeconomy provides for the development of innovative production systems with 
lower greenhouse gas emissions, adapted to the negative effects of climate change 
such as floods and droughts, and ameliorating those effects. It is anticipated that the 
bioeconomy will limit production processes that make intensive use of coal, energy 
and water, and develop economic processes that are more resource-efficient and 
environmentally-friendly. 
The development of the bioeconomy can also be expected to contribute to job 
creation. According to the European Commission, even today approximately 9% 
of those employed in the European economy work in the sectors that make up the 
bioeconomy. A growth in basic production, processing of foodstuffs, industrial 
biotechnology and biorefining can be expected to contribute to economic growth, 
which will stimulate the creation of new branches of the bioindustry and new markets 
for bioproducts. The development of these branches and markets will generate 
new jobs for highly qualified workers, as well as training opportunities (European 
Commission 2012a). 
The role of the bioeconomy in the supply of public goods and rural 
area development
Sectors that rely on biological processes and resources, such as those which make 
up the bioeconomy, have extensive links with the social and natural environments. 
They are therefore able to influence the state of public goods, both positively and 
negatively. A bioeconomy encompassing the sectors of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
food, animal feed, chemicals and bioenergy has an impact on both environmental 
and social public goods. Cooper, Hart and Baldock (2009) list the following as 
environmental public goods: the agricultural and forest landscape, agricultural and 
forest biodiversity, water quality and availability, functionality of the soil, climate 
stability, air quality, and resistance to floods and fires. In turn, the main components 
of social public goods are food safety, the vitality of rural areas, animal welfare, and 
public health. 
The effectiveness of the bioeconomy may be limited by negative external 
effects generated by particular sectors of that economy. Reduction in soil fertility 
and resistance to flooding, or greater erosion, will undermine the functioning of the 
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bioeconomy in its environmental dimension. The bioeconomy also impacts social 
public goods. Public opinion in Europe would appear to attach high importance to 
public goods, demonstrating widespread fears concerning matters of environmental 
protection, particularly in terms of loss of biodiversity, amelioration of the effects 
of climate change, water and air pollution, and the exhaustion of natural resources, 
including soil quality. Hence, the inclusion of public goods under the concept of 
the bioeconomy may ensure persistent economic growth based on systems that are 
environmentally, socially and economically sustainable. 
As well as noting the links between the bioeconomy and public goods, it is also 
necessary to consider its impact on the development of rural areas. This link has 
been noted in strategic documents, with the assertion that the bioeconomy may make 
a significant contribution to the development of rural and coastal areas, because it 
will promote action on both the supply and demand sides at regional level, such 
as the creation of supply chains of residues and wastes as raw materials for the 
bioproducts industry, the creation of networks of small local biorefineries, and the 
development of fishing infrastructure. Research and innovation play an important 
role in the development of these activities, and for that reason will be supported by 
Horizon 2020, as well as by the reformed CAP and Cohesion Policy. In particular, 
the cohesion policy promotes regional and local projects relating to the bioeconomy 
under national and regional strategies of intelligent specialisation (European 
Commission 2012b). 
The degree to which the new plants processing biomass and bioenergy create 
new jobs and income will depend on policy, which may favour either large-scale 
centralised enterprises or other more decentralised systems with a greater involvement 
of farmers. As Schmid, Padel and Levidow (2012) note, a bioeconomy more oriented 
towards public goods may create additional opportunities for the development of 
rural areas, for example by: 
• Increasing the value of the landscape and quality of life in rural areas as a 
basis for other agricultural activities such as agrotourism and ecotourism, 
incorporating its economic value into the development of rural areas. 
• Supporting enterprises that protect green areas: the protection of greenery 
applies to the use of farms – livestock, plants, gardens, forest and landscape – 
as a basis for the promotion of psychological and physical health and quality 
of life for various groups of clients.
• Linking agriculture with energy production through recycling biowastes at 
farm level, thus reducing production costs and greenhouse gas emissions.
• Constructing short food supply chains, which will reward farmers for applying 
ecological methods.
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• Increasing the resistance of agro-social systems with high biodiversity through 
built-in measures to protect against threats of infectious diseases.
• Creating attractive places of work for specialists in agriculture, horticulture, 
food processing and care services (Schmid, Padel, Levidow 2012).
The EU bioeconomy strategy – goals, priorities and measures
The EU strategy published in 2012 by the European Commission is titled 
Innovating for Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe, and is divided into 
two documents: a Commission communication (European Commission 2012a) 
and a working document (European Commission 2012b). These set out goals and 
present a strategy and plan of action. The working document also includes the results 
of preparatory work, including reports on public consultations between interested 
parties in European academic circles, the private and public sectors and NGOs 
(European Commission 2011a). The EU bioeconomy strategy is a development of 
the strategy titled Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive 
Growth (European Commission 2010a) and the document A Resource-efficient 
Europe – Flagship Initiative under the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission 
2011b). 
The bioeconomy strategy provides for a comprehensive approach to issues of 
ecology, environmental protection, energy, food supply and the management of 
natural resources. Its goal is to build foundations for a more innovative, resource-
efficient and competitive society, in which there is no conflict between the assurance 
of food security and the principles of sustainable use of renewable resources for 
industrial purposes, combined with the protection of the environment. 
The strategy sets out four priorities relating to the bioeconomy. These are: a 
cohesive political framework, increased investment in research, the development of 
markets for bioproducts, and better communication with the public (Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3. Priorities of the EU bioeconomy strategy
Source: own elaboration based on: European Commission (2012a).
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The bioeconomy strategy provides for a greater interaction between different 
areas of policy at EU and member state level. This will make it possible to create a 
more cohesive political framework, which will not only guarantee public support, but 
also increase private investment. The development of the bioeconomy requires both 
public financial support and private investment, which must cohere with spending 
on scientific research and innovations. A dissonance often arises in practice between 
scientific research and the practical use of its results. This is caused both by a lack 
of knowledge and by institutional barriers between scientists, innovators, producers 
and end users. Many promising results of scientific research remain unused due 
to unresolved legal and patent issues. Hence the regulation of such issues, as well 
as investment in demonstration projects and the development of enterprise and 
consulting services in the whole value chain of the bioeconomy, become priority 
elements of the strategy. 
The creation of a productive and sustainable bioeconomy requires further research, 
as well as the construction of rural, maritime and industrial infrastructure, a network 
of knowledge transfer, more effective supply chains, and biorefineries. Biorefineries 
enable fossil fuels to be replaced with renewables (including wastes), creating new 
income sources and jobs in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, particularly in rural 
areas. For the building of sustainable supply chains and new commercial facilities, 
various sources of financing may be used, including private investment and EU aid 
from the Rural Area Development Fund or Cohesion Fund. Bioproducts and bioenergy 
may serve as “organic versions” of traditional products, or else become new products 
with new and innovative functions supplied to both new and existing markets. 
An important priority in the EU bioeconomy strategy is the creation of a 
participation model that engages citizens and end users so as to strengthen the links 
between science, society and policy creation. A more informed dialogue will enable 
science to create strong foundations for the development of political solutions. 
A set of measures which are to be undertaken within the framework of the 
bioeconomy strategy is presented in Table 2.2. 
This set contains 11 specific activities, divided into three groups: investment in 
research, innovation and skills; stronger political interaction and engagement of interested 
parties; and the development of markets and competitiveness in the bioeconomy.
The working document accompanying the strategy contains more details 
concerning both the background and the action plan than appeared in the Commission 
communication. It describes measures in such areas as social innovation, agriculture, 
fishing and fisheries, forestry, energy production, food (including waste management, 
safety and packaging) and biotechnology. It is therefore a detailed document covering 
a broad spectrum of sectors that play leading roles in the process of moving towards 
a bioeconomy.
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Table 2.2. Set of measures serving to implement the bioeconomy strategy
Area Measure
Investment in research, 
innovation and skills
1. Provision of significant EU and national financing as well as private 
partnership and investment for research and innovation in the area of the 
bioeconomy.
2. Increased contribution of multidisciplinary and multisector research and 
innovation to address the complexity and multidimensionality of social 
challenges by improving the existing knowledge base and developing new 
technologies.
3. Publicity and promotion of the use of innovations in sectors of the 
bioeconomy.
4. Building the human resources required to support the growth and further 
integration of sectors of the bioeconomy by organising university forums 
serving to develop new teaching and professional training programmes in the 
area of the bioeconomy. 
Reinforced policy 
interaction and 
stakeholder 
engagement
5. Creation of a Bioeconomy Panel to increase synergy and cohesion between 
bioeconomy-related policies, initiatives and economic sectors at EU level in 
combination with existing mechanisms. 
6. Establishment of a Bioeconomy observatory.
7. Development of international cooperation in research and innovation in the 
area of the bioeconomy so as to jointly face global challenges such as food 
security and climate change, as well as the issue of sustainable supplies of 
biomass (from 2012). 
Enhancement 
of markets and 
competitiveness in 
bioeconomy
8. Provision of a knowledge base for sustainable growth in basic production. 
9. Promotion of the creation of networks encompassing necessary logistics for 
integrated and diversified biorefineries, demonstration and pilot facilities 
throughout Europe, including necessary logistics and supply chains for the 
cascading use of biomass and the waste stream. 
10. Support for the development of new markets through the creation of standards 
and a standardised methodology for the evaluation of the sustainability of 
bioproducts and systems of food production, and support for operations on a 
larger scale. 
11. Development of scientifically grounded approaches to supplying product 
information to consumers (e.g. food benefits, production methods or 
environmental sustainability) to promote a healthy and sustainable lifestyle.
Source: based on European Commission (2012a).
Conclusions
The goal of this chapter has been to evaluate EU policy and strategy relating 
to the bioeconomy. Attention has been drawn to the various understandings of the 
term bioeconomy found in the subject literature and in strategic and programming 
documents at both national and EU level. There are two approaches to defining 
the bioeconomy. The first and narrower approach, referred to as the industrial 
perspective, is predominant in, among others, documents from the OECD and the 
United States. This perspective is promoted by interested parties who anticipate 
further industrialisation of agriculture, seeing this as a potential area of activity and 
profit generation. The industrial perspective focuses on the potential (based on the 
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use of biotechnological discoveries, among other things) for increased effectiveness 
of resource use and improvement in global economic competitiveness. This 
chiefly benefits capital-intensive industries at higher levels of the value chain. A 
broader understanding of the bioeconomy encompasses sustainable use of natural 
resources, such as soil, water and biodiversity, many of which have the character 
of public goods. Under this approach, agricultural producers are seen as providers 
not only of raw materials, but also of high-quality food. They are also valued for 
their contribution as managers of agricultural ecosystems, landscape protection 
and rural area development. The concept of a bioeconomy oriented towards public 
goods emphasises the importance of organic and resource-efficient methods of 
production in agriculture and the food sector. It would appear that the bioeconomy 
concept should be given a significantly broader scope than is generally the case 
in the European Commission’s innovation policy. Development of the bioeconomy 
requires an integrated, comprehensive and sustainable approach to innovations, 
which will enable the future rational use of natural resources both in and outside 
agriculture, and lead to the development of rural areas. 
In 2012, based on the results of social consultations, the European Commission 
published a strategy and plan of action relating to the bioeconomy in Europe. 
This strategy aims to enhance knowledge concerning the bioeconomy, encourage 
innovations that increase the natural productivity of resources, and support the 
development of production systems that reduce the adverse effects of climate 
change. The strategy creates a cohesive framework for a comprehensive approach 
to the solution of complex social problems (challenges) in Europe and worldwide. 
The measures undertaken with respect to the bioeconomy are focused on three 
pillars: investment in research, innovations and skills; strengthening the impact 
of the policy and engagement of interested parties; and strengthening markets and 
competitiveness in sectors of the bioeconomy. The bioeconomy strategy represents 
an important step towards solving contemporary economic and social problems. 
Nonetheless, attention also needs to be paid to the absence of concrete actions and 
new financing mechanisms. There is also a lack of precisely defined and binding 
targets. On the other hand, it should be noted that the bioeconomy strategy drawn up 
at EU level has provided a stimulus for action at national and regional level. Many 
EU countries have produced their own bioeconomy strategies, including Germany, 
Finland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and others. Moreover, a greater 
number of actions and changes have taken place in local and regional systems 
connected with the development of the bioeconomy, and particularly the bioenergy 
sector. A deeper analysis of the impact of actions taken at EU and national level 
should be the subject of further research. 
2.3. Support for agriculture in the European Union 
and the evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(1956-2011)
(Paweł Błaszczyk, Agnieszka Sapa41)
Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), one of the fundamental community 
policies of the European Union, came into being as a response to post-war political 
and economic conditions, and with regard to the particular nature of agriculture. On 
the one hand, in the post-war period, the countries forming the community needed to 
re-establish food security and to become independent of food imports. On the other 
hand, the actions taken reflected the universalism of the so-called agrarian question42 
resulting from the limited possibilities of accumulation and extended reproduction43. 
In consequence, maintaining farms’ competitiveness, including their balanced 
development and capacity for extended reproduction, required an active state 
policy44. Moreover, agriculture is found to lag behind other sectors of the economy 
irrespective of a country’s system of government or level of economic development. 
However, in the initial stages of economic development agriculture helps to finance 
the development of the national economy, but as a country attains a higher level of 
development, agriculture becomes a net beneficiary of an interventionist agricultural 
policy45. This is reflected in the changing interventionist instruments applied with 
respect to the agricultural sector, as a result of variation in both the internal and 
external conditions for agricultural activity. Such a transformation can be observed, 
for example, in the history of the Common Agricultural Policy.
41 Poznań University of Economics and Business; pawel.blaszczyk@ue.poznan.pl, a.sapa@
ue.poznan.pl .
42 J. Wilkin (1986) describes this as the problem of agriculture’s inability, in terms of its 
structure and functional mechanisms, to adapt to the externally existing situation. Its universal 
nature and constant renewal have their source in the particular features of agriculture as a sector 
of the economy and of the social, cultural and natural environment. The main symptom of the 
agrarian question is the disparity in the incomes of the rural population, resulting from the lower 
efficiency of production factors and insufficient flexibility of productive structures in adapting to 
changing market conditions (Czyżewski 2013).
43 Further see e.g. Matuszczak 2013.
44 This is addressed by e.g. Czyżewski 2010.
45 Further see Poczta-Wajda 2013, Poczta-Wajda 2014.
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The goals and principles of the CAP were formulated in the 1950s. Since that 
time there has been a change of priorities in EU agricultural policy, being a response 
both to the effects achieved by the policy and to new challenges appearing in the 
world economy. Successive reforms of the CAP brought about an evolution of its 
instruments – away from price and market intervention towards direct support for 
the income of agricultural producers and the development of rural areas supplying 
public goods (Czyżewski, Brelik 2013). It should be remembered, however, that an 
interventionist agricultural policy distorts the market, among other things through the 
higher prices obtained by agricultural producers. These differences in prices can thus 
be treated as a kind of political rent. It is interesting to investigate how these rents 
vary in EU countries along with the changing instruments of the CAP at successive 
stages of its evolution. This is the chief aim of the research reported here.
Directions of change in the Common Agricultural Policy
The objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were formulated in 
1957. Its main aims were to ensure growth in agricultural productivity, an adequate 
level of agricultural incomes, stabilisation of the market for agricultural products, 
continuity of supply, and the ability of consumers to buy food at reasonable prices46. 
These goals were served by specific instruments (for example, the common 
organisation of the agricultural market, principles for a common price policy, and 
funds to finance interventionist measures from the community budget), which were 
designed and gradually implemented, and which underwent changes over the years. 
The changes made to those instruments resulted both from internal factors (such 
as the food situation in member states and the income parity of farms) and from 
external ones (such as the GATT/WTO negotiations). The history of the functioning 
and modification of the Common Agricultural Policy can be divided into a number 
of phases (Table 2.3.).
The first phase, covering the 1960s (1957-1968), saw the original formulation 
and implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy. The instruments created were 
chiefly oriented towards ensuring food security and self-sufficiency by supporting 
growth in the volume of agricultural output. The actions taken were of the nature of 
price and market intervention. In other words, farmers were encouraged to increase 
production by maintaining suitably high prices for agricultural products, i.e. by using 
a market mechanism. At this stage in the CAP implementation, price was the basic 
element for correcting a market mechanism. The actions taken led to an adequate level 
of food self-sufficiency, while at the same time producing surpluses of agricultural 
46 Article 39 of the Treaty of Roma
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products47. The price-based mechanism of intervention effectively encouraged 
agricultural producers to increase their production, at the same time causing prices 
in Community agricultural markets to be higher on average than world prices48. This 
also meant an increase in spending related to intervention in markets characterised by 
surpluses49. At the same time, the intensification of agricultural production, indirectly 
supported by the price-based intervention, resulted in adverse environmental effects. All 
of this aroused objections from the European public, as well as international disputes. 
The source of the latter were, among others, the Community implementing export 
47 During 10 years (1973-1982) overall self-sufficiency in agricultural products rose 
from 79% to 87%. The Community production surpluses in terms of internal demand became 
structural, not incidental. In 1982/83, the self-sufficiency rates for sugar, wine, cereals, milk 
products and all meats were 147%, 125%,117%, 118% and 100%, respectively (Commission of 
the European Community 1985). The result was a growing intervention buying of agricultural 
products. Initially, the intervention buying was focused only on seasonal surpluses of agricultural 
products. However, since the late 1970s the state purchase of agricultural products resulted in 
the systematic expansion of the stocks. For example, in 1986 in the EEC there were about 1.3 
million tonnes of butter, and 672 thousand tons of beef, and 14.7 million tonnes of cereals, 283 
thousand tons of olive oil, and 862 thousand of skim milk powder (Czykier-Wierzba 2012). 
The management of surplus storage and the buying in of surplus products accounted for 20% 
of total agricultural expenditure, or 5.5 billion ECU in 1993 (Ockenden, Franklin 1995). 
48 For more about this relation (NRA indicator) see the second part of this chapter. 
49 This expenditure resulted from both the maintenance of suitably high prices for Community 
producers and support for the export of agricultural products to third countries.
Table 2.3. Evolution of the priorities of the Common Agricultural Policy
Food security 
Competitiveness 
Sustainability 
Cohesion 
Policy Efficiency 
The Early 
Years
(60s)
The Crisis 
years
(70s/80s)
MacSharry 
Reform 1992 Agenda 2000
CAP Reform 
2003
CAP Health 
Check 2008
CAP Reform 
post-2013
Price support
Productivity 
improvement
Market 
stabilisation
Over 
production
Exploding 
expenditure
International 
conflicts
Supply 
controls
Price cuts and 
compensatory 
payments
Surplus 
reduction
Income 
budget and 
budget 
stabilisation
Deepening 
the reform 
process
Rural 
development
Market 
orientation
Decoupling
Cross 
compliance
Consumer 
protection
Environment
Enlargement
Reinforcing 
2003 reform
Dairy quotas
Greening
Targeting
Redistribution
End of 
production 
constraints
Food chain
Research & 
innovation
Source: European Commission (2016)
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subsidies and para-tariff barriers (mostly levies). These activities, on the one hand, 
artificially supported the competitiveness of EU goods in the world markets, and on 
the other hand, they limited access to the internal Community market for agricultural 
products from third countries. In view of the criticism levelled against the forms of 
support given, alternative instruments were sought that would have less of a distortive 
effect on the market and would reduce the costs of the CAP (Tomczak 2009).
The first attempts to make changes to the CAP came with the Mansholt Plan of 
1968, part of the next phase of the CAP’s evolution, which covered the 1970s and 
1980s. The solutions presented were intended to reduce market distortion and bring 
about changes in agricultural structures, seen as the reasons for the weaknesses of 
the CAP50. The crisis in the Common Agricultural Policy was also reinforced by the 
world economic crisis (Josling 2008b). The breakdown of the international currency 
system, the oil shock, growth in inflation and unemployment, and the slowdown 
in economic growth placed limits on the action of the mechanisms for determining 
common prices, and led to a mechanism of change in national currency prices 
according to “green exchange rates”51. These actions produced an imbalance between 
supply and demand for agricultural goods, an increase in budgetary expenditure, 
deeper income disparity, and the maintenance of an unfavourable agrarian structure. 
The Mansholt Plan aimed to reduce these dangers by creating the foundations of 
a socio-structural policy. The plan included proposals for, among other things, 
early retirement pensions for farmers passing on land for the purpose of improving 
the agrarian structure, assistance in enlarging or creating farms, afforestation, and 
reduction of the amount of agricultural land in use through a set-aside system. 
Although this reform was not implemented in full, it was the forerunner of the 
changes that would take place in the 1970s52 and 1980s53, which involved instruments 
50 The implementation of the first stage of the CAP brought to light the systemic deficiencies 
in the measures adopted. These included the absolute priority given to a policy based on market-
type rather than structural tools (concentration on increased production through intensification, not 
the elimination of structural barriers), inequality in support for different markets (intervention in 
markets with low rates of development), and unequal treatment of the countries of Northern and 
Southern Europe.
51 This mechanism enabled price differentiation between member states. In consequence, 
exports from low-price countries were taxed, or exports from countries with relatively high prices 
of agricultural products were subsidised.
52 In 1972 directives came into force concerning assistance for farm modernisation, farmers’ 
ability to take early retirement and withdraw from agricultural activity, and education for persons 
employed in agriculture.
53 In the 1980s the first instruments were applied with the aim of reducing production and 
stabilising the level of expenditure on the CAP. In 1984 milk quotas were introduced, and in 1988 
an expenditure stabiliser was implemented (reduction in the quantity of production for which price 
support was guaranteed).
86 2. International Perspective. Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Political Rents
for correcting agricultural markets, elements of structural policy, and mechanisms 
for limiting budgetary expenditure. The modifications made to the CAP instruments, 
while they initiated the policy’s structural aspect, did not bring the expected results 
in terms of limiting productive potential or lowering guaranteed prices (reduction 
of motivation to increase production). On the one hand, the applied interventionism 
continued to lead to intensification and growth in production, which led to growing 
food surpluses and a worsening of the public perception of the CAP in member 
states. On the other hand, the instruments of trade policy (export subsidies, variable 
equalisation payments), which had been criticised earlier by the international 
community, formed an area of negotiation in the ongoing Uruguay round of GATT 
(1986-1995). Expenditure from the community budget on agricultural policy also 
continued to increase54. The results obtained from the Common Agricultural Policy, 
and the negative effects of the actions taken, necessitated far-reaching changes to the 
CAP instruments. The proposed changes represented the start of another stage in the 
process of development of the Common Agricultural Policy (1992-2000).
The turning point was the MacSharry reform of 1992. The proposed changes in 
the form and instruments of agricultural support were intended, among other things, 
to balance the supply of agricultural products with existing demand, to reduce the 
costs of financing intervention, to reduce prices, to improve the competitiveness of 
Community agriculture in world markets, to ensure that farmers received a reasonable 
level of income – but through market activity, not production oriented towards obtaining 
subsidies, to focus on meeting the high standards for environmental protection, 
animal welfare and food safety, in line with social expectations, and to ensure that 
Community agriculture functioned within the internationally imposed limitations 
(under the Uruguay Round) as regards rules for international trade (Poczta, Sadowski 
et al. 2014). The actions taken primarily involved lowering the guaranteed prices 
of basic agricultural products55 (especially cereals and beef), which had an adverse 
effect on the level of agricultural incomes. To counteract this drop in incomes, a new 
instrument was introduced – direct payments (Poczta-Wajda et al. 2015). Farmers 
received this compensation directly from the Community budget, thus bypassing the 
market mechanism. The receipt of such payments was also linked to the requirement 
to set aside a certain amount of land or reduce herd sizes. The measure was intended 
54 In 1980-1990, total CAP expenditure (2011 constant price) doubled, from over 20 billion 
EUR to 40 billion EUR. At the same time, the share of CAP expenditure in total EU expenditure 
dropped from over 70% to above 60%. Another problem was the concentration of this expenditure, 
as a significant part of it went to a relatively small number of economically stronger farms.
55 In 1992, support prices were cut for the first time. Then further cuts followed with 
subsequent reforms. It is worth noting that before 1992 more than 90% of all EU agricultural 
expenditure went towards market support and export subsidies; in 2009 that figure was down 
to 10% of the CAP budget (European Commission 2011c).
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to reduce production while maintaining farmers’ income at a constant level56. This 
represented a reform of the values of the Common Agricultural Policy, away from 
increasing supply, towards stimulating demand and paying attention to the needs of 
the market. Because the payments were made directly from the EU budget, the degree 
of market distortion resulting from agricultural policy was expected to be lowered. 
There was a move away from a policy of price and market support for farmers towards 
one of direct subsidies. This change answered international demands for a cessation 
of support for agricultural producers using instruments that distorted competition 
and prevented imports into the Community from third countries. Alongside direct 
payments, structural actions were also undertaken, directed towards not only the 
development of agriculture, but also that of rural areas, taking into account the 
protection of the natural environment. This in turn was a sign of the evolution of the 
Common Agricultural Policy towards support for other functions of agriculture and 
rural areas besides food production. The changes were oriented towards not only 
production and income, but also social and environmental goals.
The next phase of changes, taking place in 2000-2003, was driven by the prospect 
of the expansion of the European Union to include countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe57, and the need to improve the internal competitiveness of EU agriculture 
in a way that was friendly to the natural environment, as well as to continue to 
solve problems relating to overproduction of agricultural goods which were not 
externally competitive. Also important were the challenges related to reducing trade 
protectionism, resulting from the decisions of the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round and 
the ongoing negotiations in the Doha Round (Stępień, Czyżewski 2012). The basis 
for the changes was the Agenda 2000 document, which defined the CAP as a policy of 
two pillars, encompassing a common system of organisation of agricultural markets 
(pillar I) and a policy of rural area development (pillar II)58. The undertaken actions 
56 Direct subsidies were intended, on the one hand, to stabilise agricultural markets by 
reducing motivation (price support) to increase production. On the other hand, the direct 
payments guaranteed the stability of agricultural incomes. It should be noted, however, that 
at this stage of the reform the separation of subsidies from production was only partial. Direct 
support was available for specific types of crop and livestock production. This meant that, 
although farmers were not directly motivated to intensify production, their choice of the type 
of crop or livestock was dependent on the support available. 
57 In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Hungary became the members of the EU, and in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania. In 2004, the EU 
also included two countries outside Central and Eastern Europe, ie. Cyprus and Malta. The last 
enlargement took place in 2013, when Croatia became a member of the EU.
58 Pillar II includes structural measures favouring the multifunctionality of agriculture and 
development of rural areas. The first measures of this type (“accompanying instruments”) were 
introduced under the MacSharry reform. Agenda 2000 both strengthened the importance of the 
CAP’s structural instruments and broadened their scope.
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concentrated on improving competitiveness in the internal and external market, 
orienting agriculture towards food quality and safety and the natural environment, 
stabilising agricultural incomes, and creating alternative sources of income and 
employment. So the changes aimed to create a competitive agricultural sector in 
terms of both price competitiveness and quality criteria. Furthermore, the CAP 
ceased to be a typical policy focused exclusively on the development of agriculture, 
and became a policy more directed towards the development of rural areas.
Further support for the competitiveness of the food sector, at the same time 
aiming to reduce the intensiveness of production, came with the changes made to 
the CAP in 2003 (the Fischler/Luxembourg reform). It turned out that the system 
of direct (compensatory) payments only to a certain extent made farmers’ decisions 
independent of the assumptions of the policy59, and the procedure for obtaining 
subsidies was complex and costly. Moreover, the international community (the WTO) 
was demanding the cessation of payments linked to production (Gay, Osterburg et al. 
2005). The existing system of payments was thus modified with the introduction of 
payments that were better decoupled from production60. The receipt of these payments 
was also linked to the farmer’s duty to fulfil defined “cross-compliance” standards 
relating to environmental protection and animal welfare. The measures adopted firstly 
made production decisions more independent of the type of support61, and secondly 
59 There is agreement that even decoupled direct payments do have an effect on production, 
although there is less agreement on how strong this effect is in practice (Matthews 2011). For 
example, Bhaskar and Beghin (2007) identified five major coupling channels of decoupled 
payments: (i) they affect the risk faced by farmers, either by reducing their level of risk aversion 
(wealth effects) or by reducing the risk they face (insurance effects); (ii) they ease credit constraints 
faced by farmers; (iii) they affect the labour allocation decisions of farm households; (iv) they alter 
land values, rents and land prices; and (v) they influence farmers’ decisions through expectations 
about future payments. The decoupled payments are also generally not justified as an effective or 
efficient environmental instrument (Brady at al., 2009).
60 Most existing subsidies were replaced by a single farm payment, independent of 
production (SPS – Single Payment Scheme). At the same time, member states were able to 
choose between several models for the new system of payments, including a historical, regional 
or mixed system. The reform was introduced prior to the 2004 expansion of the EU, and so 
those principles did not apply to the new member states (the EU-10, and from 2007 the EU-
12). For these, a simplified system of area payments (SAPS – Single Area Payment Scheme) 
was implemented, supplemented by national payments and “special support”. The initial size 
of the subsidies in the EU-12 was much lower than in the old member states, although the 
differences were to be reduced over time. At EU level, then, the system was non-uniform and 
complex. A defect of this system were the significant differences in rates between member 
states, particularly between the countries of the EU-12 and those of the EU-15.
61 The reform agreed upon in 2003 has been gradually implemented since 2005. In just 
three years, 85% of the support has been decoupled, marking a major shift of EU agricultural 
policy (European Commission 2011c).
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meant that the funds granted could be regarded as a kind of payment for the public goods 
supplied by farmers to society (care for the natural environment through the fulfilment 
of cross-compliance standards). An importance change was the introduction of the 
modulation principle, namely the possibility of transferring some of the funds awarded 
to larger agricultural producers as direct payments (pillar I of the CAP) to the pool of 
funds allocated for the development of rural areas (pillar II). Moreover, a mechanism of 
financial discipline was introduced in the form of reductions in direct payments in case 
of exceeding a set limit on CAP expenditure. As regards the organisation of particular 
agricultural markets, changes were made relating to, among others, the markets for 
milk, cereals, pulses, potatoes, and renewable energy sources. Strengthening the 
scope and level of financing rural area development was a symptom of the continued 
growth in importance of the structural aspects of the CAP (Swinnen 2010a; Poczta, 
Sadowski et al. 2014). In the light of the challenges relating to the socioeconomic 
situation, in 2008 the so-called Health Check was carried out. A review was made of 
the assumptions, goals and instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy, in order to, 
among other things, make the system of direct subsidies more effective, align existing 
market support instruments with actual conditions existing in the EU and worldwide, 
and to address challenges relating to climate change, biodiversity, bioenergy production 
and water resource management. Ultimately, the existing direction of the CAP reform 
was maintained. The need was underlined for a further decoupling of direct payments 
from production, for their simplification, and for subsidies to be dependent on the 
fulfilment of requirements relating to environmental protection, food safety and animal 
welfare. There was also found to be a need for a further reduction in intervention in 
agricultural markets and for more importance to be attached to instruments supporting 
the development of rural areas62. In the face of the growing demand for food, it was 
underlined that growth in agricultural production must proceed in conformance with 
agro-environmental requirements, which provide a guarantee of sustainability in the 
management of natural resources (Stępień, Czyżewski 2009).
The economic slowdown and the pressure of some EU countries to reduce the 
EU budget63 lead to subsequent changes in the instruments of the CAP. In terms of 
62 As a result of the Health Check agreement, the distribution of expenditure for the 
period 2010-2013 was expected to be 69% for producer support (direct payments), 7% for 
market measures (product support), and 24% for rural development. This shows that the 
CAP has changed its objectives while at the same time still trying to meet the farmers’ needs 
(European Commission 2011c).
63 The budget for the new financial perspective remains almost unchanged compared to 
the period 2007-2013. It is the first case of this kind since the programming of multi-annual 
budgets (i.e. Delors Package 1988-1992). At the same time the share of budget expenditures in 
the total GDP of EU member states is expected to fall from 1.03% in 2014 to 0.98% in 2020 
(Czyżewski, Stępień.2014).
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direct support, the previously existing rules for granting direct payments64 with some 
modifications are maintained. In the framework of strengthening the greening of the 
CAP, 30% of the payments that a farmer receives to the farm area will depend on the 
fulfilment of specific environmental requirements. There is also the possibility of 
tying payments to production (up to 15% of the national envelope payments) for the 
sensitive sectors. Member states may also grant redistributive payment for the first 
hectares of farmers, to provide more targeted support to small and medium-sized 
farms. The mechanism of reducing direct payments for the farmers receiving the 
highest support was also established. Within the rural areas the development (financed 
from the second pillar of the CAP) of areas connected with the modernisation of 
the agricultural sector, the development of entrepreneurship in rural areas and 
environmental protection will be supported. The priorities in this scope should be 
accelerated transfer of knowledge and innovation, a smooth functioning of the food 
chain and risk management (European Commission 2013).
Throughout the stages in the evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy 
described above, a change in its priorities can be observed. This is reflected in the 
instruments applied, and in the transformation from price and market intervention 
to direct support for agricultural producers’ incomes and the provision of public 
goods. These changes can be expected to lead to less distortion of the market, and of 
prices in particular. The effects of the changing Common Agricultural Policy should 
be visible not only in the way in which it influences agricultural producers, but also 
in the effect it has on food consumers and the level of budgetary expenditure. The 
changes taking place may be made apparent and evaluated by means of synthetic 
indicators used in the assessment of agricultural policy.
Indicators of the level of support for producers
In view of the different methods used to support both agricultural producers (across 
countries and particular agricultural markets over the years) and food consumers, 
the quantification and comparative analysis of this support has been and remains a 
challenge for researchers. For many years agricultural policy was evaluated using a 
set of indicators of support for agricultural producers and consumers developed by 
the OECD65. Published statistical data related primarily to the member countries of 
64 This means that the two systems continue to function, i.e. the SPS (in the EU-15 plus 
Malta and Slovenia) and the SAPS (other countries). The proposed common system (BPS) for all 
member states was not implemented (Czyżewski, Stepień 2014).
65 Details of the methodology for calculating these indicators can be found in e.g. OECD 
(2015.
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the OECD66, while for the countries of the European Union such data are available 
only in aggregate form, for the grouping as a whole. That database therefore has 
limited usefulness in comparing the level of support resulting from the Common 
Agricultural Policy in EU member states. Although these countries are subject to 
a common policy, the support given to agricultural producers in different countries 
is not uniform. An assessment of these differences, and of the level of support for 
agriculture as influenced by the evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy, is 
made possible by the World Bank’s DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) 
database67. For the purposes of the present research, four measures were analysed:
• nominal rate of assistance (NRA);
• nominal rate of assistance considering decoupled payments (NRA_D);
• gross subsidy equivalent (GSE);
• consumer tax equivalent (CTE).
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) determines by what percentage the prices 
obtained by an agricultural producer differ from world market prices68. This index 
is calculated both for individual products and for the whole agricultural sector. In 
the present study, use was made primarily of NRA values aggregated for the whole 
agricultural sector of particular countries, calculated as an average weighted by the 
contribution of particular products to the total value of a country’s agricultural output 
measured in world prices. The analysed NRA values for the sector also include the 
estimated level of support for the part of production not covered by the research, 
and support provided for the sector in general, not linked to specific agricultural 
production. The research also used a sectoral indicator of nominal support taking 
account of decoupled payments (NRA_D), which unlike the previous indicator 
also takes account of direct payments to farmers not related to production. The 
analysis also includes, to a limited extent, NRA values for particular agricultural 
66 Non-OECD countries covered are Brazil, Columbia, China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, South Africa and Ukraine.
67 The current DAI database contains a group of indicators of support for agricultural 
producers and consumers for 82 countries. These were calculated for more than 70 products, 
selected so that for each country the computed indicators of support would cover at least 70% 
of agricultural production. The database covers the years 1955-2011. A detailed methodology 
for the calculation of the indicators can be found in e.g. Anderson, Valenzuela (2008), Anderson 
(2009), Anderson, Nelgen (2013), also available on the World Bank website: http://econ.
worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64214825&piPK=64214943&theSitePK=469
382&contentMDK=21960058 (1.01.2016).
68 In other words, this indicator shows the level of distortion of prices of agricultural products 
caused by an interventionist agricultural policy. It should be noted that such a policy may involve 
both support for agricultural producers (found chiefly in developed countries) and taxation of 
those producers (especially in developing countries). These result in positive and negative NRA 
values respectively.
92 2. International Perspective. Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Political Rents
products, namely beef, milk and wheat69. Also used are a measure of gross support to 
agricultural producers (gross subsidy equivalent, GSE) for the whole sector, which 
determines the money value (in US dollars) of the transfer to agriculture; and the 
consumer tax equivalent (CTE), which indicates the difference between the price 
paid by consumers and the world price.
The analysis covers all EU member states except for Croatia70. Its maximum 
time range covers the years 1956-2011, although data for this whole period are 
not available for certain countries and measures. An analysis was therefore made 
based on the maximum period, but differentiated for particular (groups of) countries 
depending on the availability of data. Secondly, to make the analysis uniform in 
terms of time for all of the analysed EU countries, in some cases the period analysed 
was restricted to 2000-2011. All changes in the timeframe will be noted in the text.
The study involved the use of a descriptive method as well as a comparative 
analysis of selected areas of support for agriculture based on selected indicators of 
assistance given to agricultural producers. Annual data relating to the aforementioned 
measures were used. Calculations were made for the entire period for which data 
were available (variable depending on the country and group of countries) and for a 
uniform period for all countries (2005-201171). The results are presented in the form 
of tables and graphs.
Nominal assistance to agriculture in EU countries
The values of the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in EU countries 
show that over the whole period under analysis EU agricultural producers were 
beneficiaries of the agricultural policy (positive NRA values; Fig. 2.4.), which means 
that the prices that they received on domestic markets were higher than those that 
they would have received without this assistance.
From the signing of the Rome Treaties up to 1962 (when the CAP was launched) 
there was a rapid rise in the nominal assistance given to agricultural producers, from 
around 30% to more than 80%. The countries that made up the EEC72 increased their 
69 Besides the content of the text, Appendix 1 contains a table of support for a group of 
agricultural products for all member states (except Croatia). In view of the availability of data, 
this table is not uniform and relates to variable time periods.
70 The study does not include Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013. The upper time limit for 
the availability of data is 2011. Belgium and Luxembourg were analysed jointly as a single unit 
(denoted Bel-Lux).
71 In the case of Romania and Bulgaria, for 2007-2011.
72 The six original European Economic Community (EEC) countries are Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The EEC was then incorporated and renamed 
as the European Community (EC), and in 1993, the European Union (EU). For the two members 
Belgium and Luxembourg the data are unified and available from 1986.
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protection (increase of NRA and GSE, Fig. 2.4. and 2.6.). This was a result of the 
creation and implementation of a system of organising agricultural markets based on 
price and market intervention. Until the end of the 1960s the NRA remained high 
and relatively stable. During this time, as mentioned earlier, the applied support 
mechanisms led to increased production and efficiency, but also caused significant 
distortions of the world prices of agricultural products73. 
The CAP was also a major problem for the negotiations connected with the 
first enlargement of the EU, which took place in 197374. Although the EU prices for 
most farm products were significantly higher than in the new member states, the 
additional distortions due to the CAP were relatively small over the first two years 
of the EC-9 (Josling 2008b). The global crisis of the 1970s, and the related increase 
in the world prices of agricultural products, led to a temporary reduction in nominal 
assistance to agriculture (in 1974 the NRA fell to a similar level to that of 1960). So 
the high world prices in 1973-75 for many commodities masked the full impact of 
the price increases, which was expected as an effect of the accession.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
%
NRA NRA_D CTE
Figure 2.4.  Nominal rate of assistance (NRA, NRA_D) to agriculture in the EU in 1956-2011 (%)
Source: based on figures from the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (granted by 
the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
73 That also explained the complaints from overseas suppliers about the protectionist nature 
of the emerging CAP. It was the period when the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations took place 
(1963-1968). The talks were mainly focused on a reduction of the protectionist tendencies of the 
CAP. In this they were largely unsuccessful.
74 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the Community. For Denmark and 
Ireland, the perspective of diversifying their exports to the Continental market was a positive 
outlook. But the UK wanted to protect as much as possible the preferential access of its former 
Dominions and colonies (Josling 2008a).
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The macroeconomic instability after the first “oil shock” influenced the policy 
prices set under CAP. Because farm input costs rose sharply and the real value of price 
support declined, policy makers responded by increasing agricultural prices to keep 
up with costs. During subsequent years there was a consistent growth in the NRA, 
from about 40% in 1975 to almost over 80% in 1983. The gross support to agricultural 
producers increased also in all nine member states (Fig. 2.4. and 2.6.). In 1981 the EC 
welcomed Greece, after political freedom was re-established. Five years later (1986) 
Spain and Portugal joined the EC. Both countries had moved from dictatorships to 
democracies in the mid 1970s, and their agriculture needed mainly structural changes. 
Overall support levels were very low for the applicant countries, so the transition 
period for producers in the EC-9 was needed to gear up for competition from Spain 
and Portugal (Josling 2009). So for countries of Southern Europe the membership in 
the EU meant an increase of agricultural support (NRA, GSE, Fig, 2.6.).
The subsequent fall in NRA values came in a period which witnessed growth 
in world prices (end of the 1980s) and the introduction of the first instruments 
aimed at reducing production, such as milk quotas. As was mentioned above, by the 
mid 1980s the CAP had become an important topic of concern in the multilateral 
system. It came under criticism abroad (because of the high level of protection, 
increasing surpluses, and major cause of low world prices) and at home (because 
of high support costs and high consumer price). Although the EU in the Uruguay 
Round was defensive, the CAP was forced to adjust its policy (MacSharry reform 
of 1992) to the final Agreement on Agriculture75. Moreover, there was a reduction in 
the amount of production for which price support was guaranteed, in order to reduce 
expenditure from the EU budget on the agricultural sector (this is partly reflected in 
the fall in the GSE values; Fig. 2.6.). The 1992 CAP reforms marked a change in 
instrumentalities as well as price levels. So after the NRA peaking at close to 100% 
in 1986, when world prices were at historical lows, this indicator generally declined 
thereafter (Fig. 2.5.). By 1994 the NRA for the EU was down to 40%. In 1995 three 
countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) became member of the European Union. 
Their accession went smoothly, mainly because of the fact that they were able to pay 
for schemes that temporarily sheltered the northern farmers76. And they did not use 
their membership to press for higher agricultural prices at the EU level.
75 The EU was obliged to reduce tariffs, to remove the variable levy and convert them into a 
fixed tariff, and reduce agricultural support.
76 In 1985-1994 Finland had the highest agricultural support among other countries 
applying for membership. In the case of Austria, protection levels increased in the five years 
up to its membership. Sweden maintained a policy much like the other Nordic countries until 
the late 1980s. Suffering from overproduction, Sweden abolished agricultural support and 
export refunds in 1990. Direct payments in compensation were paid, and an early retirement 
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Figure 2.5. Nominal assistance to agriculture in EU countries in 2005-2011 (%)*
* The countries are shown on the graph with the “old” 15 members at the bottom, followed by the 10 which 
joined in 2004, and then the two which joined in 2007
Source: based on figures from the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (granted by 
the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
As a result of the following successive CAP reforms (Agenda 2000, and the 
Fischler reform of 2003), there has been a continued decline in NRA values. The 
main directions of these reforms were to continue reducing the support prices and 
substituting direct payment tied by a “cross-compliance” obligation to environmental 
goals. Because support for farmers was supplemented by decoupled payments, the 
values of the indicator NRA_D were steadily growing (Fig. 2 and 4). So it can be said 
scheme for farmers was introduced (Smędzik-Ambroży 2013). The export subsidies were 
reinstated when Sweden joined the EU, and prices rose somewhat as a result (Rabinowicz 
2003, Josling 2008b).
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that from 1992 the total support (including mainly direct payments) and the market 
price support (limited to price support for individual commodities) began to diverge. 
The last enlargements of the EU (2004, 2007 and 2013) did not change the tendency 
of the NRA and NRA_D as mentioned above (Fig. 2.5.). It should also be noted that, 
over the entire analysed period, the indicator of taxation of food consumers took 
positive values (Fig. 2.5.). The similar values for the CTE77 and NRA indicators 
up to the mid 1980s indicate that average prices for producers and consumers were 
distorted in the same scope, and the positive value of assistance resulted chiefly from 
the effects of trade policy instruments. In subsequent years the NRA was higher than 
the CTE, signifying that agricultural producers obtained support from instruments 
of internal policy (compensatory payments), but still linked to production (the CAP 
reforms of the 1980s and the MacSharry reform). A comparison of CTE and NRA 
values after the year 2000 shows that the prices received by farmers and those 
paid by consumers are determined by EU trade policy. Agricultural producers are 
nonetheless supported by decoupled instruments (NRA_D higher than NRA), in line 
with the further phases of CAP changes as previously described. The fall in CTE 
values can also be linked to the gradual liberalisation of trade. Reduction of customs 
tariffs and other instruments of trade policy (resulting from the GATT Uruguay 
Round) brought prices in the EU closer to world prices. At the same time, however, 
the fall in NRA and NRA_D values was relatively small, indicating that agricultural 
producers began to be supported by instruments of internal agricultural policy.
Based on the values of nominal assistance to EU agricultural producers as 
described above, it can be concluded that, after an initial period of growth, for 
the past two decades the value of that assistance has been consistently declining. 
In the last period of analysis it is even lower than (when measured by the NRA) 
or comparable to (when measured by the NRA_D) the values from years prior to 
the introduction of the common organisation of agricultural markets (1962). This 
is because the changes made over the years to the priorities of the CAP and the 
instruments used have reduced the political rent paid to EU farmers; moreover its 
level varies between member states (Fig. 2.6.).
77 It should also be stated that the CTE values vary considerably across countries when 
expressed on a per capita basis (Josling 2009).
2.3. Support for agriculture in the European Union and the evolution ... 97
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
1
9
5
6
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
8
[bln $][%] Austria
GSE EU accession NRA NRA_D
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
[bln $][%] Bel-Lux
GSE NRA NRA_D
-1200
-700
-200
300
800
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
[mln $][%] Bulgaria
GSE EU accession NRA NRA_D
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
[mln $]
[%] Cyprus
GSE NRA NRA_D
0
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
[bln $][%] Czech Republic
GSE EU accession NRA NRA_D
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1
9
5
6
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
8
[bln $][%]
Denmark
GSE EU accession NRA NRA_D
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
[mln $][%] Estonia
GSE EU accession NRA NRA_D
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1
9
5
6
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
8
[bln $][%] Finland
GSE EU accession NRA NRA_D
Figure 2.6. (continuation on next pages)
98 2. International Perspective. Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Political Rents
Figure 2.6. cont.
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Figure 2.6. Gross support (GSSE, constant 2000 US$) and nominal support (NRA, NRA_D, %) 
to agricultural producers in EU countries
Source: based on figures from the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (granted by 
the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
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Figure 2.7. Nominal support (NRA, %) to EU producers of beef, milk and wheat in 1956-2011
Source: based on figures from the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (granted by 
the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
The existence of a Common Agricultural Policy does not mean, of course, that 
the level of support for agriculture is the same in all EU countries (Figs. 2.5. and 
2.6.). This level is dependent on, among other things, the structure of production and 
the time of accession to the EU. In 2005-2011, among the “old” member states, the 
highest average level of support (measured by the NRA and NRA_D) was recorded 
in Ireland, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands and Austria. Among the EU-12, the 
highest levels were found in Romania, Slovenia and Poland78. In turn, the lowest 
levels of support for the agricultural sector were noted in Italy and Bulgaria. In the 
case of Bulgaria, however, although the NRA is relatively low, EU membership 
brought about a shift from net taxation of the country’s agricultural sector (negative 
NRA; Fig. 2.6.) to net support. Negative assistance for agriculture was also recorded 
in such countries as Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. In 2005-2011 the average 
levels of nominal assistance in the EU-15 and EU-12 were similar, which may 
contradict the thesis of variation in support for agriculture (at the sectoral level) in 
the “old” (higher support) and “new” (lower support) European Union members.
Variation in the support given to agriculture in the EU is found not only between 
countries (Figs. 2.5. and 2.6.) but also between agricultural markets (Fig. 2.7.). The 
scope of this differentiated support and its development over time are determined 
by the nature of the support instruments applied in particular markets. In the case 
78 Taking into account the Eastern European countries, it should be stated that at the 
beginning in the early 1990s on average support to agriculture fell to a very low level. In some 
countries the support increased during the mid 1990s. For these countries the pre-accession 
period and accession was a chance to support domestic agriculture. The accession of the CEE 
countries to the EU increased their levels of farm assistance, although they now face more 
competition within the enlarged EU (Anderson, Swinnen 2009).
2.3. Support for agriculture in the European Union and the evolution ... 101
of the beef, milk and wheat markets, it is seen that until the early 1990s the highest 
level of nominal assistance was given to producers of milk (Fig. 2.7.). Because of 
the system of intervention applied in the milk market,79 in 1977 the prices received 
by producers of milk were six times higher than they would have been without that 
support. Following the introduction of milk quotas in 1984 there was an increase 
in nominal assistance, but from 1987 onwards NRA values for the EU milk market 
began to fall. In the case of cereals, in 1962-1992, in conditions of positive nominal 
assistance, noticeable falls in the NRA came at times of falling world grain prices. 
The consistent fall in the NRA for wheat since the early 1990s is linked to the gradual 
elimination of support in that market and its increasing subjection to international 
competition. The highest NRA values for the beef market were recorded in the first 
half of the 1980s; in subsequent years the level of nominal assistance consistently 
declined. This analysis of NRA values for the beef, milk and wheat markets shows 
that they vary in line with successive CAP reforms and the move away from types 
of support that distort prices, but are also affected by external factors influencing 
agricultural activity in EU countries. The low values of nominal assistance for the 
selected markets observed in the final years of the analysed period do not exclude 
the application of other instruments of agricultural policy supporting agricultural 
producers and affecting their international competitiveness.
Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis based on indicators 
of nominal assistance to agriculture:
• Until the mid 1980s the level of support for agriculture in the EU (measured 
by the NRA) systematically increased. The fall in support recorded in 
subsequent years was maintained by decoupled payments, as reflected in the 
NRA_D indicator and the equalisation of CTE and NRA values. This pattern 
is consistent with the evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy, embodied 
in the changes of its priorities and instruments used. It also implies a decline 
in the political rents obtained by EU farmers.
• The NRA values show that nominal assistance in 2011 was at a level 
comparable to that recorded prior to the implementation of the organisation 
of agricultural markets; that is, before 1962. This means that the degree to 
which the CAP distorts world prices and consequently destabilises world 
agricultural markets is now decreasing. Moreover, EU agricultural producers 
are losing (although to differing degrees) the relative competitive advantages 
which resulted from CAP intervention.
79 Further see Witzke at al. 2009.
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• The level of nominal assistance to agriculture differs between EU countries. 
In 2005-2011 it was the highest in Ireland, Slovenia, Poland, Belgium and the 
UK, and the lowest in Italy and Bulgaria. The values of nominal assistance 
relating to the entire agricultural sector of particular countries do not indicate 
any evident division in obtaining political rent from the CAP by farmers from 
the old and new member states. This is also a manifestation of the equalisation 
of the prices recorded in the various member states.
• Nominal assistance to agriculture in the EU also varies between particular 
agricultural markets. Among the markets selected for analysis, the highest 
nominal assistance up to the early 1990s went to milk producers. From 
the mid 1980s (for the beef market) and the early 1990s (for the milk and 
wheat markets) there was a marked decline in NRA values. The pattern of 
NRA values for the analysed markets reflects the changes in the instruments 
applied under the CAP, involving a move away from price support, which 
causes distortion of prices, in favour of direct subsidisation.
2.4. Disproportions in the system of support for 
agriculture in EU countries: an attempt at estimation
(Piotr Kułyk80, Bazyli Czyżewski81)
Introduction
The use of a variety of forms of financial support for agriculture, although a 
widespread practice, gives rise to many questions concerning the effects of such 
measures. However, regardless of the question of the appropriateness of such 
actions, still more doubts relate to the mechanism of economic interference itself. 
A dilemma arises, significant for both economic theory and practice, as to whether 
the huge variety of applied measures can be represented by a single model, or at 
least by several, describing the determinants of choice of specific detailed measures 
and the amount of economic surplus transferred to agriculture. In attempting to 
explain the mechanisms of financial support, researchers refer to macroeconomic 
conditions, the significance of public and merit goods, the role of interest groups, 
and the importance of the supply side in agriculture or related sectors. Consequently, 
the research carried out in this area requires reference to a broad range of factors of 
an economic, social, political or cultural nature. This requires that a differentiated 
research perspective be adopted. In an attempt to clear up at least some of the 
aforementioned issues, the goal of the present chapter is to estimate the scale of the 
disproportions in the financial flows resulting from support for agriculture between 
economic entities in selected EU countries. Our considerations therefore concern the 
market encompassed by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Differences in the 
production structures in agriculture, and in the support instruments applied, suggest 
the hypothesis that the level of financial support, relative to the value of agricultural 
production, is not uniform among countries. 
Methodology for measuring financial support to agriculture
An analysis was made of systems of financial support for agriculture in fourteen 
EU countries: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, the UK and Italy. It was decided 
based on the availability of data that the study would cover the years 1995-2012. An 
evaluation was made based on a constructed Farm Receipts Gap Estimate (FRGE), 
80 University of Zielona Góra, Faculty of Economics and Management; p.kulyk@wez.
uz.zgora.pl .
81 Poznań University of Economics and Business.
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adopting the same measurement assumptions as in the calculation of the Producer 
Support Estimate (PSE) (OECD 2010). This shows by how much a farm’s revenue, 
calculated in terms of producer prices (Is), is higher as a result of the applied measures 
than it would be without any system of support (Io). A change in the proportion may 
thus be an effect of both an increase in the revenue earned by the farms themselves (due 
to the initiation of development processes, for example) and the regulation of budget 
transfers. The indicator is constructed to take account of the following elements: price 
support, production payments, area and livestock subsidies, investment subsidies, 
payments limiting the employment of current means of production, income support 
payments, and other transfers. The required number of markets for agricultural 
products was determined based on a calculation of their percentage contribution to the 
total agricultural production in a given country. The following markets were taken into 
account: durum wheat, soft wheat and spelt, barley, oats, maize, rice, sunflower, soya, 
potatoes, tomatoes, sugar, wine, milk, pork, beef and veal, poultry, eggs, and mutton 
(the last being treated as a supplementary market, not analysed in all countries). The 
contributions of these agricultural markets, when averaged, amounted to no less than 
70% of total agricultural production in individual years. This value was computed 
as the average contribution of the selected markets to total production for individual 
countries, weighted by the significance in the total agricultural production of the 
analysed countries. Next, the individual component indicators making up the Farm 
Receipts Gap Estimate were calculated. First, price disproportions were determined 
between particular national markets for agricultural products and an annual reference 
price adopted for particular agricultural markets (P0i) based on OECD reports, 
separately for different years and markets (i)82. This is the external market price (FOB 
or CIF) taking account of the costs of transport and insurance of agricultural products. 
Next, price differences were calculated for each national agricultural market, using 
the average annual prices for particular agricultural products based on EUROSTAT 
data (European Commission 2014). These price differences were then multiplied 
by quantities of production, obtaining the price deviation value (P1i – P0i)*Qi. If the 
current price from a given national agricultural market was less than or equal to the 
reference value, then it was taken to be the reference value, and the deviation was zero 
(it was assumed that no negative price transfers occurred)83. This indicator of price 
82 Unlike in the case of the PSE, a single price was taken for all EU countries, according to 
the Law of One Price, and assuming that the flow of products between those countries took place 
without barriers and at zero cost.
83 This assumes that part of the price differences results from variations in household income 
levels. Consequently, the continuing disproportions are a result of conscious actions by agricultural 
producers and their adaptation to the market situation. Only when a defined threshold is exceeded 
(in this case the reference price adopted for the entire EU market) can they be ascribed to existing 
internal barriers and constitute a producer’s surplus. 
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transfers was transposed to total agricultural production, assuming that the average 
value of price support in other agricultural markets not included in the analysis was 
identical in percentage terms to the value calculated. The total value of price support 
was taken as the sum of the values for the individual agricultural markets, according 
to the formula:
 W P P Qi i ii
n
= −( )×=∑ 1 01  (2.1)
At the next stage, an adjustment was made to account for the fact that the 
agricultural markets considered did not account for 100% of total production. It 
was consequently assumed that the level of price support in the other markets was 
the same as in those for which it had been calculated. At the next stage, the level 
of support was adjusted by the rise in prices of plant products designated as feed, 
which was a burden on the agricultural producers who used such feed in their 
production. This adjustment was made for the following markets: common wheat, 
barley, oats, maize, rape and potatoes. A determination was made of the quantity of 
agricultural plant production in the aforementioned markets which was used as feed. 
This value was then multiplied by the price difference, and the result was subtracted 
from the total amount of price support (Z coefficient). The value of the Z coefficient 
for internal transfers in agriculture was calculated by multiplying the previously 
determined price differences for the markets producing partly for feed. This value 
was found by summing the price differences (P1i – P0i) for the agricultural products 
destined for use as feed. The differences were then multiplied by the quantity of 
production in particular agricultural markets used as feed, expressed in tonnes. The 
following markets were taken into account: common wheat, barley, oats, maize, 
rape and potatoes. The resulting value reduces the level of the Farm Receipts Gap 
Estimate for agriculture. The value of agricultural production was adjusted by the 
level of subsidies given directly to agricultural producers (Di). Exchange rate values 
were used to determine the level of payments in countries outside the eurozone.
At the next stage, account was taken of those subsidies which cannot be 
unambiguously assigned to a specific type of agricultural production (F). These 
were calculated using data from the World Bank database84. The value of coefficient 
F was divided into two parts. The first includes those payments which do not relate 
to production subsidies and cannot be ascribed unambiguously to a particular market 
for agricultural products, but are connected to various types of resources and incomes 
of agricultural producers. They were calculated by subtracting from the decoupled 
payments those payments which were previously assigned to payments directly 
coupled to agricultural production. The second element constituted subsidies for 
84 www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.
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indirect consumption, and other payments not included in the earlier payments made 
to farms from the national budget. The sum of these two values gives the coefficient 
F. The final value of the Farm Receipts Gap Estimate was obtained by summing the 
component indicators and dividing by the total value of agricultural production in 
the country in question (Qw), according to the following formula: 
 
PGI
P P Q Z D F
Q
i i i ii
n
w
=
−( )× − +( ) +
×
=∑ 1 01
100%  (2.2)
These calculations make it possible to determine the amount of financial support 
transferred to agriculture. In the overall calculation, the indicator represents an 
attempt to estimate the amount of financial support to agriculture. 
Measuring financial support – dilemmas in evaluating interventionism
The methodology described above for calculating transfers to agriculture is not 
free of significant defects. Nonetheless, the construction described is an attempt 
to reduce some of the imperfections that relate in particular to the valuation of 
price support. The approach based on the concept of economic surplus is criticised 
primarily on the grounds of the excessive restrictiveness of the assumptions adopted, 
and in particular (Alston, Norton, Pardey 1995, Scatasta, Wessler, Demont 2006): 
the assumption that conditions of perfect competition exist everywhere, and the 
ignoring of transaction costs resulting from changes in other markets for products 
or production factors when considering transformations in a given market. Other 
possible defects include an excessive attachment to the analysis of price effects while 
neglecting income elasticity, and the ignoring of transaction costs, full information 
and perfect allocation of markets85. This is a partial analysis, and hence prices 
and production figures from other markets are treated as given data (exogenous 
variables)86. Nonetheless, a change in the financial support given to agriculture in a 
large national market will have an influence on the equilibrium in other markets (and 
also on the level of price support at least, since the reference price will change). Also 
ignored are the positive and negative external effects, and public goods. The changes 
being made to the CAP are increasingly oriented towards public goods (Kułyk 2015). 
In this situation, transfers to agricultural producers need to be linked to an increasing 
degree to payments for environmental and social goods. 
85 In this situation we assume that the changes are homothetic. However, the transpositions 
do not demonstrate uniform elasticity, which leads to responses with different amplitudes. We then 
assume the homogeneity of the entities operating in particular markets.
86 Changes in production and in the level of transfers in large markets, such as those of the 
USA and EU-27, will have an influence on other markets, including on the adopted reference price 
(P0i).
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Conditions of perfect competition also require the adoption of the assumption 
that uniform products, perfect information, full mobility of resources, absence of 
specific restrictions, and large numbers of buyers and sellers do in fact exist. Such 
assumptions are increasingly hard to maintain as a result of changes taking place, in 
particular the increasing degree of monopolisation of structures in processing and trade 
and the supply of production factors to agriculture. These processes are particularly 
visible in conditions of globalisation. Oligopolisation and oligopsonisation (where 
there is a small number of buyers relative to suppliers of agricultural products as 
a result of the concentration of channels of distribution) among intermediaries 
in many agricultural markets mean that analysing the financial support given to 
agriculture based on models of perfectly competitive markets may lead to erroneous 
conclusions, indicating a persistent flow of economic surplus to agriculture (Myers, 
Sexton, Tomek 2010). In fact, under the conditions considered, some of the funds 
transferred to agriculture will flow out to its related structures.
Moreover, under perfect competition, the economic surplus does not appear at 
the level of a single firm, but is shared by the owners of scarce production factors87. 
In the classical model of the producer’s economic surplus, there is also an assumption 
of the producer’s risk-neutrality. However, when producers are faced with the 
problem of price uncertainty and policy changes, they may reshape the whole of 
the distribution produced by the market mechanism. In this case, unfortunately, the 
classical measure of the producer’s surplus does not supply a correct estimate of the 
well-being resulting from interventionism in agriculture or price changes (Bullock, 
Garcia, Shin 2005). This can be shown by many empirical examples. A somewhat 
extreme case is that of South Africa, where a significant variation of more than 25% 
in crop sizes was recorded, causing high-amplitude price changes that were hard 
to predict (Poulton et al. 2006). The cause is generally the low price elasticity of 
the supply of agricultural crops. This effect is further strengthened by the fact that 
the elasticity of demand for agricultural products is generally higher than in the 
case of supply, causing significant instability in domestic markets. Consumers incur 
the costs of such a policy in the form of the transfer of economic surplus, which 
in the first instance flows to agricultural producers. In this way they pay for their 
aversion to risk. External limitations naturally arise with respect to the relationship 
of agriculture with related sectors, related to a number of factors (Kułyk 2013): 
processing capacities, imperfect competition in the processing industry and in trade, 
administrative costs, and the implementation of measures adopted. The assumptions 
adopted are appropriate to a small, open economy. In this view, agriculture creates 
87 Nonetheless, disproportions in farm structures lead to different effects in various classes 
of farms.
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homogeneous products, which are also subject to international exchange. In evaluating 
direct support, it is important whether it is linked to agricultural production or whether 
it constitutes support for the creation of public goods. In the latter case the transfer 
has to be interpreted in an entirely different way, and has at most an indirect effect on 
product prices88. A striving to increase the supply of public goods to society leads to 
a fall in agricultural production and employment, but a significant part of land inputs 
is retained in agriculture. An increase in land-intensive techniques of production in 
agriculture leads to a fall in the value of the Farm Receipts Gap Estimate , although 
in relative (percentage) terms it shows a significant increase (Blandford et al. 2008). 
It is believed, however, that in current conditions the value of such support is 
relatively small, and may be neglected. Considering this phenomenon in the context 
of the methodology of the OECD, it can be noted that overall for OECD countries 
such transfers are estimated at less than 5% of the PSE (Tangermann 2005). Their 
importance is nonetheless increasing year by year (Czyżewski, Kułyk 2011).
It is especially difficult to determine the reference price. According to the findings 
of institutional and post-Keynesian economics, the differences arising between world 
prices and internal market prices cannot be explained only by the applied policy of 
support for agriculture, which deforms those values. The assumption that the Law of 
One Price holds across an entire global market would appear to be false (Ardeni 1989). 
Such an assumption makes calculation easier and the analysis more transparent, but 
neglects a number of adjustments characteristic of imperfect competition. In such 
conditions transfers would be expected to reach agricultural producers directly89. 
In reality, as indicated above, national agricultural markets are often dominated by 
a small number of large buyers, either in the processing industry or in trade (Wise 
2004, Poczta-Wajda 2015). In such markets the prices of agricultural products are 
lowered, while they are raised in the processing or trade sectors90.
The costs incurred by consumers are affected by the size of consumption per 
head of population, taking account of its share in the structure of overall consumption, 
taxes on consumption and the levels of national and world (reference) prices. In view 
of the significant contribution made by the analysed countries to global production 
and consumption (particularly when the values of their agricultural production are 
88 Undervaluation of production due to the weaker bargaining position of agricultural 
producers in the distribution chain and the absence of a true market valuation of the goods 
supplied by agriculture causes undervaluation of agricultural labour inputs, leading to lower 
rates of pay for work in agriculture, as there are numerous factors preventing the transfer of 
labour resources to non-agricultural uses (Lerman, Schreinemachers 2005).
89 Neglecting the administrative costs of such transfers.
90 Also, a fall in prices of agricultural products in certain markets in conditions of globalisation 
does not necessarily mean positive effects of liberalisation. Explanation should also be sought in 
the increased bargaining power of the processing and trade sectors.
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summed), there is a direct link between national and world prices, in accordance 
with the theory of a large open economy (although this is not part of the described 
methodology). The size of production, however, is of fundamental significance 
in view of the low price elasticity of demand. Factors maintaining a high level of 
national prices include, apart from those already mentioned, price discrimination, 
increased importance of the quality of production, and the monopolisation of certain 
markets (for instance, by the introduction of regional products with legally protected 
names).
In the structure of support for agriculture as measured by the Farm Receipts Gap 
Estimate , interventionism in agriculture is best represented by the payments flowing 
directly to farms and coupled directly to agricultural production. Nonetheless, even 
in this case it is necessary to take account of the costs of this transfer, which constitute 
income of intermediaries. It is also necessary to deduct flows relating to payments for 
the supply of public goods91. Price support is the area in which interpretation is most 
difficult, and the proposed solutions (for example, the application of average prices) 
also give rise to many doubts. These relate to multiple factors: state interference, 
the degree of market organisation, level of competition, information asymmetry, 
market infrastructure, level of income and importance of agricultural products, 
and their heterogenisation. It must consequently be assumed that they constitute a 
transfer from consumers, resulting both from state action and from imperfections 
in allocation by the market mechanism, which is also stimulated by the actions of 
private firms in that market. In this case the basis is taken not as the lowest price 
in any of the EU national markets, but as a single average price for the whole EU 
market. This results from the assumption of the high mobility of factors within the 
EU countries. The level of price support is then relatively low, compared to the case 
in which reference prices are broken down by the national market (as is done, for 
example, in calculating the PSE). 
In a standard economic analysis a social well-being function is introduced, used 
to find the optimum point for the division of the economic surplus. If we view the 
results obtained alongside social preferences, we will determine the amount of well-
being that should be designated for the flow of the economic surplus to agriculture, 
in accordance with social expectations. In considerations of financial support to 
agriculture a taxpayer’s economic surplus is additionally introduced. The problem of 
social well-being is then presented in terms of optimisation of the benefits enjoyed 
by three social groups: consumers, agricultural producers, and the state (Lopez, 
Hathie 2000).
91 In this case too, however, account must be taken of the difficulties of separating public 
goods from private goods produced in agriculture and of correctly estimating the value of these 
payments.
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Another important issue is information asymmetry, which leads to the 
inappropriate allocation of resources in agriculture. Hence the mechanisms of 
support require action to ensure the delivery of appropriate information to the 
consumer, allowing a correct valuation of agricultural products or of food products 
in general. Problems of asymmetry may especially concern both scale (quantities of 
resources allocated) and scope (the division of resources) (Chen, Collins 2014). Other 
elements include the educational programmes conducted for various age groups, 
increased controls, and the aforementioned requirements relating to the conditions 
of food production or mechanisms for labelling products to confirm the fulfilment of 
certain requirements. On the other hand, such programmes (particularly the granting 
of a special status to agricultural products by means of certification) often lead to 
the creation of closed groups which obtain above-average income not only due to 
a higher quality of products (which is economically justified), but also due to a 
reduced level of competition, which leads to an increase in the political rent obtained 
as a result of state regulation. 
Processes of globalisation and financialisation, which lead to the oligopolisation 
and defragmentation of structures of supply, processing and trade relating to 
agriculture, have increased their importance in influencing this sector of the economy. 
They may impact price relations to a greater degree. There then occurs an outflow of 
economic surplus to other entities, which is not intended, although to some degree 
it is also a consequence of the measures applied in agricultural policy. In terms of 
the agricultural market in Austria, it is estimated that 40% of the economic surplus 
is unintentionally leaked from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors (Salhofer, 
Schmid 2004). In this situation, an evaluation of the redistribution of income only in 
the relation between the taxpayer and the consumer, on the one hand, and the farm 
on the other hand, leads to an overestimation of the size of farms’ incomes. The 
problem of redistribution of income as a result of financial support to agriculture 
must therefore be viewed more broadly, taking account of the indirect effects of 
such a process. The flow of economic surplus to agriculture stimulates changes in 
the price relations of the products sold and purchased by an agricultural producer. 
These phenomena produce a feedback effect, resulting from the original influx of 
economic surplus to agriculture. 
Variation in the support for agriculture in the EU – an attempted 
assessment
The calculation of the amounts of financial support to agriculture based on 
the Farm Receipts Gap Estimate revealed significant disproportions between EU 
countries (Table 1). The countries that were within the EU structures for the whole of 
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the analysed period gradually reduced the size of their financial support to agriculture. 
However, this process was not uniform. Relative fast reductions were observed in 
such countries as Sweden (51%), Germany (46.2%) and the Netherlands (44.4%), 
while the smallest reductions were found in Italy (8.8%), Belgium (15.4%) and 
Portugal (18.7%). Increases were recorded only among the countries which acceded 
to the EU in that period. In consequence, neglecting the countries which entered the 
EU structures in 2004, the disproportions between countries in the total value of 
support were found to decrease (the standard deviation for mean values in the years 
1995-1997 was 9.1%, while the figure for 2010-2012 was just 5.4%). There is also 
a significant degree of variation between years, resulting primarily from changes in 
the size of agricultural production being the standard of reference for the calculation 
of support (cf. formula 2). 
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Figure 2.8. Changes in financial support to agriculture in selected EU countries
Source: as Table 2.4.
The costs of financial support to agriculture were borne by consumers to an 
ever smaller degree. In the clear majority of cases, the level of that support declined. 
Hence growth in the FRGE value was an effect of increased burdens on consumers. 
Agricultural policy became more and more pro-social, reducing the costs incurred 
by consumers: an increase in transfers from consumers means that as a result of state 
regulation, as well as imperfections in market allocation, they pay higher prices for 
agricultural products than consumers in other countries. This means that agricultural 
products from the area in question became more and more competitive in terms of 
price compared to those from other countries; this was one of the main goals of 
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agricultural policy, and will be maintained in the next financial perspective. The 
mechanism for reducing the costs of financial support borne by consumers involves, 
among other things, the institution of transfers from taxpayers to consumers. A 
reduction in relative prices then becomes possible, at least for some entities, thanks 
to various forms of subsidies to consumption. At the same time this increases 
demand for agricultural products, and thus increases the benefits from the scale of 
production in agriculture. Support for consumption also makes it possible to reduce 
the significance of the demand barrier in agriculture, particularly since a higher level 
of elasticity of demand for agricultural products is found among lower-income social 
groups (Urban, Michałowska 2015). The reduction in the level of price support 
resulted mainly from an increase in reference prices and from a reduction or even 
total elimination of the price gap.
Over the period as a whole, agricultural production in the countries under 
consideration showed constant growth (at an average level of 29.89%), despite the 
reduction in price support and increase in the importance of subsidies not linked 
directly to production (Table 2.5.), in addition to a fall in total support calculated 
as a percentage of production (Figure 2.8.). No relationship is found between the 
scale of reduction of price support and the rate of change in agricultural production 
itself. There was a change in the structure of support, with a marked increase in 
the importance of transfers from the taxpayer, and to a lesser degree those linked 
directly to agricultural production. The rate of growth in subsidies not coupled to 
agricultural production, expressed as a percentage of that production, was highest 
in places where a relatively low level of growth in agricultural production was 
recorded. In this sense it may be concluded that these subsidies represented a kind 
of substitute for the equalisation of lower productivity, making it possible to retain 
resources within agriculture. This is in accordance with the concept of sustainable 
development, according to which in some areas of the EU the productive function 
is dominant, while in others social or environmental functions are more important, 
which makes it possible to retain cohesion across the whole group. The system 
has led to a reduction in disproportions between countries, including those which 
functioned jointly in that structure prior to 2004. This was not a uniform process. 
Divergences in price support (measured by the coefficient of variation) increased 
from 19.18% to 45.01%, but at the same time there was a fall in disproportions in 
transfers not linked to agricultural production, from 24.98% to 16.97%. However, in 
view of the growth in the latter subsidies, the system as a whole exhibited a gradual 
convergence. It is thus possible to speak of an endogenous convergence resulting 
from the time for which countries belonged to the grouping. There were, however, 
still differences between countries as regards the total support and its structure.
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The main beneficiaries of the support mechanism constructed in this way were 
large farms, often being oriented towards obtaining funds transferred to this sector 
of the economy (Boulanger 2010). This is consequently a factor causing additional 
variation in the level of financial support flowing to particular countries. If we accept 
that support for agriculture is supposed to provide fair incomes to farmers, then it 
should not lead to excessive growth in those incomes via budget transfers, but after 
a defined threshold is crossed any further growth in income should be the result 
of funds obtained through market exchange. Naturally a certain difficulty arises in 
connection with public goods, the supply of which is linked to the realisation of 
income that the market does not provide. In other cases we are dealing with an 
increase in the political rent. 
In the mechanism of financial support to European agriculture, farmers’ 
income is supported primarily through direct payments, with the entitlement to 
those transfers being linked increasingly to the fulfilment of conditions, particularly 
environmental ones. This is also a basic element in the European support model 
ensuring a reduction of the risk occurring in agricultural production, as it enables 
a stabilisation of income in conditions of fluctuating revenue from the sale of 
agricultural products. These payments are linked primarily to the resources allocated 
in agriculture, and in this sense this programme is much more transparent than 
measures supporting a mechanism of insurance or subsidies of an anti-cyclic nature 
(as found in the American model). In European agriculture this area is covered by 
the first pillar. There is also seen to be a further increase in the transparency of the 
system resulting from it gradually being made uniform and more transparent. In 
the case of the EU, actions in this regard include the convergence of rates of direct 
payments to farmers in different countries (significant differences still existed, but 
the scale of the disproportions was reduced92). 
As concerns the changes relating to agricultural policy in the 2014-2020 financial 
perspective, note should be taken of the application of degressive thresholds for 
direct payments and an upper limit on such payments (€300,000 annually per farm). 
This mechanism is intended to limit the increasing flow of payments to large entities, 
benefiting primarily from advantages of scale. An element linking the concept of 
sustainable agriculture with industrial agriculture is that EU direct subsidies are to 
be paid only to productively active farmers. Hence it will be agricultural production 
above all that is supported, which may lead to an increase in productivity. However, 
that growth will be checked by stricter requirements for the receipt of such payments. 
In an economic sense, these will constitute limits on the growth of productivity 
92 The increase in rates applies to farmers from countries where the rates were less than 90% 
of the average for the whole of the EU.
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in agriculture in quantitative terms. This does not therefore mean the negation of 
growth in agricultural production, which was one of the chief effects of the industrial 
model. An increase in agricultural production can even be expected, in view of 
the concentration of subsidies among active farmers. An additional obligation is 
introduced with regard to the designation of some land for ecological purposes, as 
well as an obligation to grow a variety of crops (ensuring biodiversity). Another 
differentiated element of support is the proposed one-off annual subsidy for small 
farms (up to €1000 annually). Naturally, in that group account must be taken of 
the reduction in costs linked to the fulfilment of the production requirements, but 
also the elimination of administration charges, which represents additional growth 
in income due to lower costs.
The process of environmental support is realised simultaneously via two pillars 
of the support system. The stimulation of innovative processes and assurance of the 
development of rural areas are realised primarily through the second pillar of the 
CAP. Rewarding innovations on farms is a factor that increases productivity, but 
often also the intensity of agricultural production (including through elements of 
precision agriculture). There is also an element of direct support for the creation of 
interest groups. This applies to support for the formation of producer groups. Such 
institutions exist to different extents among agricultural producers in various countries 
(such as Australia). This direction of change means an increase in transparency as 
regards the existence of those groups, but also an increase in the pressure that they 
are able to apply, leading to the possibility of them obtaining political rents. On the 
other hand, this makes the support process more transparent, and leads to a decrease 
of the asymmetry of information between decision-makers, society and agricultural 
producers. 
Conclusions
The analysis has confirmed the hypothesis that, despite the application of an 
agricultural policy that is in principle uniform, the level of financial support for 
agricultural producers is not uniform between countries. The existing differences 
have slowly decreased as countries remain within the structures of the EU. It can 
also be noticed that these differences are an expression of the fulfilment of various 
functions in the economic systems of EU countries, which should not always be 
linked solely to the production of market goods. 
An increasing convergence has been observed in the levels of financial support 
given to agriculture in the analysed countries, particularly since the time of the 
financial crisis. This applies both to the value of the support and the synchronisation 
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of its variation over time. This implies that it is becoming more dependent on global 
factors, in the conditions of financialisation of the world economy. 
Significant differences were found between countries in the mechanisms 
shaping the structure of transfers. This applies in particular to the two main streams: 
transfers from taxpayers to producers, and transfers from consumers to producers. 
There has been a gradual change in the structure of support, away from transfers 
from consumers in favour of those involving taxpayers. This has resulted both from 
changes taking place in the global economy and the consequent growth in prices of 
agricultural products, as well as from transformations in the role of agriculture, and 
in particular the resources connected to agriculture in the economy. 
The differences in the adaptations made by various countries result primarily 
from differences in the functions performed by the agricultural sector, and more 
broadly by rural areas. Hence, the relation of replaceability between transfers from 
taxpayers and transfers from consumers to producers has been accompanied by 
different adjustments depending on the scale of changes in particular countries. This 
has made it possible to balance various functions of agriculture across the EU, while 
at the same time exhibiting differences at national level. 

Part 3.
National Perspective.
Towards Valuing Political Rents
3.1. Flows of rents as an economic barometer 
for agriculture: the case of the EU-27
(Adam Majchrzak, Sebastian Stępień93)
Introduction 
Agriculture is a sector of the economy in which economic fluctuations are 
particularly marked. They are linked, on the one hand, to features of land as a 
production factor (Majchrzak 2015), and on the other hand, to the low price and 
income elasticity of demand for food products in conditions of forced consumption. 
These conditions of production imply an inefficient, in the Pareto sense, allocation 
of production factors and cause agricultural producers to be particularly strongly 
affected by fluctuations in their economic environment (Czyżewski 2007). In 
the long term, this leads to “drainage” of added value, from agriculture to the 
processing sector, chiefly via a price mechanism – losses in periods of downturn 
are insufficiently compensated by rents in periods of upturn (Zegar 2010). Although 
from the standpoint of the neoliberal paradigm there is no justification for treating 
the agricultural sector in a privileged manner – the point being, after all, to increase 
microeconomic rationality – such an approach ignores the external effects associated 
with agricultural production, both negative ones such as social stratification and 
environmental degradation, and positive ones related to the supply of public goods 
(Czyżewski, Stępień 2011). The interventionist policy and the creation of market 
institutions in the agribusiness sector are intended to adjust for market failures, but 
first it is necessary to establish the scale of those failures. A useful approach in this 
area may be the measurement of flows of economic rents related to fluctuations in 
agricultural prices, in particular the rents resulting from the flexibility of those prices 
(Czyżewski, Matuszczak 2017, Czyżewski 2009a).
The purpose of the present work is, in the first place, methodological. A synthetic 
indicator of the economic situation in agriculture is constructed based on the value 
of flows of economic rents in agribusiness (from and to agriculture) related to price 
changes in the sector and inflation. We define the economic situation as the sector’s 
state of economic activity. Secondly, the developed indicator is tested for all EU 
countries in the years 2005-2012, in order to evaluate the production decisions of 
farms in conditions of flexible prices of sold products. This makes it possible to 
verify to what extent farmers base their decisions on current price information rather 
than acting anticyclically, counteracting the negative effects of price fluctuation. The 
93 Poznań University of Economics and Business; adam.majchrzak@ue.poznan.pl . 
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hypothesis is proposed that an outflow of economic rents in a given year implies a 
fall in the productive activity of farms, but with some delay. The analysis shows that 
the source of rent flows is primarily the variation of sale prices in conditions in which 
cost fluctuations balance out in the long term, and hence where costs can be treated 
as constant. The analysis is based on data from the FADN and the Eurostat. The time 
range, as noted above, covers the years 2005-2012, and the entities analysed are 
representative farms subject to agricultural accounting from defined economic size 
classes in the 27 member states of the European Union.
Economic fluctuation in agriculture – a theoretical approach
A fundamental feature of the economic cycle in agriculture, distinguishing it 
from other branches of the economy, is the significant fluctuation in the prices of raw 
agricultural products. This is particularly marked in conditions of crisis, when the 
prices of food goods, and consequently the incomes of farmers, decrease significantly 
(Sobiecki 2010) (we may note that in non-agricultural sectors, even in case of 
significant slowdown in GDP growth, deflation is rarely observed). If the economic 
situation worsens and the population’s incomes fall, there is a decline in demand for 
food. Due to the low elasticity of agricultural production a surplus supply of goods 
arises, which leads to a significant price reduction. In this situation farmers reduce 
their volume of sales, and the fall in income leads to a decrease in consumption 
by the farmers and their families due to the need to cover current expenditure on 
production. Surplus crop production, for which there is no market demand, is used 
to feed farm animals, which in turn leads to an increase in livestock production and 
supply and a drop in prices. Agricultural prices thus fall to a greater extent than 
prices of industrial goods and services, leading to the “price scissors” effect, to the 
detriment of agriculture94, and further to a decline in agricultural production, greater 
than in non-agricultural sectors. For example, in J. Popkin’s analysis of cyclical 
fluctuations relating to various phases of a technological process, it is noted that in a 
period of recession the level of production of unprocessed goods fell by 15%, while 
production of final goods decreased only by about 10%95.
The consequences of this process include an even greater impoverishment of 
farmers and a partial reduction, or diversification, of their current activity. Excess 
production is also utilised for self-consumption, and the funds saved in this way are 
used for the needs of the farm. This “adaptive servomechanism” ensures in principle 
94 Such a crisis affected Polish agriculture in the years 1928-1935. Prices of agricultural 
products fell by 65%, while at the same time their supply was increasing. The index of prices of 
agricultural products relative to prices of industrial goods fell from 0.69 in 1930 to 0.54 in 1935. 
Cf. (Musiał 2009).
95 The study concerned the US economy in 1960-1975. cf. (Popkin 1984).
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that farms do not go bankrupt, as they can function even while earning a “negative 
income”, supporting themselves through the decapitalisation of assets and non-
farm income (Czyżewski 1995). This primarily applies to small-scale family farms, 
which are the dominant type in the conditions of European agriculture, particularly 
in countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Italy. 
The sensitivity of the agricultural sector to economic changes caused by price 
fluctuations is a result of what may be called the asymmetry of disequilibrium. 
According to that concept, the closer one gets to the start of the technological 
chain, the greater the asymmetry in demand and supply, and this leads to certain 
consequences. In the case of agriculture, every reduction in demand (in conditions 
of economic crisis) for final goods (i.e. the food purchased by consumers) triggers an 
impulse involving a fall in orders for finished goods, then for semi-finished goods, 
and finally for raw agricultural products, which means that the last are susceptible to 
the greatest drop in prices, since their supply is inelastic. In the reverse situation, an 
increase in orders impacts agriculture to the greatest degree, pulling prices upwards96, 
but only to a limited extent in view of the low elasticity of demand. In this case too, 
then, there is an asymmetry in price changes – prices of raw agricultural products 
rise faster than those of final goods – but at the same time there is an increase in costs 
of production (feed, fertilisers, plant protection products, services for agriculture, 
etc.), reducing the positive effects of the higher prices of agricultural products. 
A negative effect of the changes in the economic situation in agriculture, brought 
about by the price mechanism, are the cyclic fluctuations in supply described by 
the so-called cobweb theorem (Ezekiel 1938). This explains the mechanism by 
which market equilibrium is attained subject to a given price and variable relations 
between the demand and supply of a given good. It is assumed that in case of certain 
disturbances a discrepancy may arise between the size of demand and supply. 
According to the originator of the concept, M. Ezekiel, the model is a useful tool for 
analysis if the following three conditions are satisfied (Akerman 1957):
1. Production is completely determined by the reaction of producers to price 
changes in conditions of pure competition. This means that a producer’s plans 
for future production are based on the assumption that current prices will be 
sustained, and that those plans will not have any impact on the market;
96 This pattern was observed even before World War II, even though the socioeconomic and 
institutional environment of agriculture was entirely different then. Such results were obtained by, 
among others, C.L. Bean and V. Timoshenko, who found that the rapid economic growth in the 
United States in 1916-1919 led to a much greater rise in the prices of raw agricultural products 
than in the prices of industrial goods. In turn, during the depressions of 1921 and 1930-1931, 
agricultural prices fell more than proportionally to industrial prices. Cf. (Bean 1927, Timoshenko 
1930).
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2. At least one whole period must elapse between the making of the plan and the 
actual change in production;
3. The current price is determined by the available supply, which in turn results 
from the price in the preceding period.
In other words, the cobweb model is based on three assumptions, which shape the 
cyclic behaviour of prices and quantities. Firstly, there must be a delay between the 
time of the decision and the time of production. Secondly, the production plans of 
economic entities are based on current prices or prices from recent periods. Thirdly, 
current prices are chiefly a function of current supply, which in turn is conditioned 
by the price from the preceding period (Tomek, Robinson 2001).
The dynamic cobweb model is thus described by a delayed supply function, 
assuming that the whole of the production from a given period is sold (without 
stocks or storage), i.e. there is no delay in the demand function. This occurs when the 
producer is compelled, by technological considerations, to take production decisions 
one period before the goods are to be sold, and the sale price in period t is the price 
which exhausts the market, since demand must equal supply. We may note that such 
behaviour of agricultural producers is irrational, if all market participants act in the 
same way. Here, decisions concerning changes in production volumes should always 
provide for anticyclic actions, so as to anticipate the phases of the cycle and in that 
way reduce the market risk and maximise income in the long term. 
Methodology for calculating a synthetic economic indicator 
The methodology for calculating the value of a synthetic economic indicator 
first requires the computation, for farms in particular standard output (SO) classes, 
of the amount of income gained or lost on account of price changes relative to the 
previous year, based on a vector of agricultural products sold by the farm, using the 
following formula:
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where:
∆Rtk is the change in revenue due to price differences in the period t relative to the 
previous year in farms in SO class k;
Qitk is the quantity of product i produced in year t on farms in SO class k;
Pit is the price of product i in year t;
Pit–1 is the price of product i in year t–1;
HICPt(t–1=100) is the inflation rate (Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices);
n is the number of products;
k denotes an SO class of farms;
t denotes a year.
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The indicator provides information as to whether differences in the prices of 
products supplied by farms cause the income of those farms to be increased or 
decreased, and thus whether the price mechanism causes drainage of earnings away 
from the farm, or else reinforces those earnings.
Next, for each country, the value of the economic indicator was calculated using 
the following formula:
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where:
It is the economic indicator for a given country in year t;
∆Rtk is the change in income due to price differences in period t relative to the 
previous year in farms in SO class k;
FRtk is the income in year t from a farm in SO class k;
k denotes an SO class of farms;
k is the number of SO classes.
The indicator takes a value of zero when the price conditions in the agricultural 
sector are “fixed”, that is, when a farm’s income is not adjusted by the price 
mechanism. Positive values mean that market prices are favourable to agricultural 
producers, reinforcing the level of their income – the higher the value, the more 
favourable the situation for producers. Negative values of the parameter indicate 
drainage of earnings from agricultural producers, as a result of prices in agriculture 
and related sectors. 
The next step involved the identification of groups of countries which had 
similar values of the economic indicator in the period under analysis. This was done 
using Ward’s method of cluster analysis based on Euclidean distance, which enables 
the grouping of objects that are most similar to each other and at the same time 
maximally different from others in terms of specified features (Błażejczyk-Majka, 
Kala 2005, Grzelak 2006, Stanisz 2007). This procedure was carried out using the 
Statistica 12 package. Further analysis of the economic indicator values, also taking 
account of changes in income obtained from sales, was carried out on a selected 
group of countries, including one from each cluster. 
Results and discussion
Based on the available source data, it was possible to calculate economic 
indicator values based on prices in European Union countries in the years 2005-2012 
(cf. Table 3.1.). A cluster analysis led to the identification of five groups, as shown 
in the dendrogram (Fig. 3.1.) and graphs (Fig. 3.2.). 
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Figure 3.1.  Dendrogram of the values of the indicator of economic surplus based on prices in 
EU member states in 2005-2012
Source: own compilation (granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/
HS4/00572)
-0.35
-0.25
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
0.15
0.25
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CLUSTER NO. 1
Slovakia Germany Denmark Estonia Lithuania Czech Republic
Figure 3.2.  (continuation on next page)
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Figure 3.2.  Values of the indicator based on flows of economic rents in EU member states in 
2005-2012 (by cluster)
Source: own compilation (granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/
HS4/00572)
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Based on the obtained results it is possible to identify a full economic cycle (two 
consecutive maximum values of the indicator) in 2007-2011 for clusters 1, 3 and 4, 
in 2007-2010 for cluster 2, and in 2006-2010 for cluster 5. The observations indicate 
that the economic rents due to price changes can in most countries be treated as a 
kind of economic barometer (of economic activity in agriculture), although there are 
differences in the strength of reaction of farms to changes in price conditions. 
Table 3.2. Annual changes in production on farms in selected EU member states in 2006-2012
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Germany --- 6% -1% -1% 16% 5%
Portugal --- 9% 4% -15% 3% ---
Poland --- 14% 29% -30% 14% 7%
France --- 4% 3% -10% 12% 5%
Netherlands 15% 7% 9% -6% 13% ---
Source: based on FADN and Eurostat data
In Germany, the year 2007 saw increased production as well as positive values of 
the economic indicator, resulting from the increase in prices of goods supplied by the 
agricultural sector relative to the preceding period. In 2008 the indicator began to fall, 
and the income obtained proved to be lower than in the previous year, in conditions 
of falling production and sales. In 2009 there was a further fall in production and 
in the income obtained by farms, resulting both from the level of supply and from 
unfavourable changes in prices. Only in 2010 (and then in 2011) did production begin 
to rise, accompanied by a growth in prices for raw agricultural products, as reflected 
by the positive value of the economic indicator. It should also be noted that in the 
analysed period the annual change in production and in income did not fall below 
–1.5%, which suggests that the decisions taken by farms were largely rational and 
anticyclic. The unfavourable changes produced by the price mechanism were levelled 
out by adjustments made at the level of individual agricultural producers. Thus, their 
reactions were not in accordance with the cobweb theorem as described previously. 
Fluctuations in the calculated values of the economic indicator in the countries 
of the second cluster were significantly smaller than those observed in the other 
groups. Particularly noteworthy is the absence of a significant worsening in price 
conditions in 2009. Nevertheless, in Portugal, production and income fell in 2009 to 
a much greater degree than in Germany. In this situation, even following the increase 
in production in 2010, it remained at a level of more than 8% below that of 2007. It 
may be concluded that farms in that country adjust to price changes less successfully; 
that is, they react excessively to deteriorating price conditions. This may result from 
a greater fragmentation of production and the absence of appropriate institutional 
solutions.
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The above observation is confirmed by the results obtained for Poland (cluster 
3). In that country the economic indicator takes positive values in 2007, 2010 and 
2011, and negative values in 2008 and 2009. The favourable price conditions of 
2007 led to a marked increase in production in the following year (2008), despite the 
worsening price relations (negative value of the indicator). This had consequences 
in 2009, when apart from the significant fall in prices of raw agricultural products, 
their supply also decreased. As a result, real farm income fell by 30% in that 
year, this being the largest fall among the countries analysed. An upturn followed 
in 2010 due to an improvement in price conditions, which in turn contributed to 
strong rises in production in 2011 and 2012, despite the worsening price relations. 
Overall, Poland exhibited a high degree of variation in both production and income, 
resulting from changes in price conditions, which failed to keep up with the market. 
Farms’ reactions in shaping the level of supply reflected the situation described in 
the cobweb theorem, which from the standpoint of economic efficiency does not 
represent rational behaviour. In these conditions, the hypothesis put forward at the 
outset was not confirmed, and the indicator functioned with a significant delay.
In the other two analysed countries, France and the Netherlands, annual changes 
in production corresponded to changes in the economic indicator, which indicates a 
greater flexibility on the part of producers and a better adjustment to changes in market 
conditions. In this case the hypothesis proposed at the outset was confirmed97.
Conclusions
The main consequence of the changes in the economic situation in agriculture 
is a large variation in sale prices. This variation was confirmed by the calculated 
values of the proposed economic indicator. The largest fluctuations were observed 
among such countries as Germany, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia 
and Lithuania. At the other extreme (with the smallest amplitude of fluctuation) 
were Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta. At the same time, the calculated value of 
the indicator was reflected in changes in production and farm income, although this 
reaction was simultaneous in the case of some countries, and delayed in others. This 
partially confirms the hypothesis that an outflow of economic rents from agriculture 
implies a fall in productive activity, and vice versa98 (in some cases, including Poland, 
the reaction was delayed, as described in the cobweb theorem). 
97 More about the situation of agricultural holdings in the European Union after 2004: 
(Grzelak 2016).
98 In Australia, Spain, Italy and Estonia the variation in production (crops, in this case) was 
greater than the variation in prices. The analysis also shows that in the case of the UK, Australia 
and Canada, for the majority of farms (75%, 72% and 55% respectively) there was a negative 
correlation between price changes and the level of production. For Italy, Estonia and Spain such 
farms accounted for, respectively, 36%, 32% and 25% of the total. Cf. (Gimer , Kimura 2010). 
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It has also been shown that the relationship between the values of the economic 
indicator and the production of raw agricultural products differ between countries. 
In Germany, which belonged to the group of countries with high fluctuations of the 
indicator, the variability of production is relatively low. Even in the most difficult 
period for agriculture (2009) the fall in production there was only 1%, while in 
Portugal it was 15%, and in Poland as much as 30%, despite a smaller fall in the 
economic indicator. In the authors’ view this is a result of the different agrarian 
structures, the scale and technology of production, and differences in the functioning 
of market institutions (integrative links, contracting systems), as well as the reactions 
of the producers themselves.
In conclusion, an analysis of changes in the economic situation based on flows 
of economic rents is an atypical approach, but one which helps to indicate the causes 
of changes in productive activity on farms, and enables a comparison of the scale 
of such changes between countries. This approach may be a useful analytical tool 
for agricultural policy, which is becoming particularly important in the conditions 
of increasing globalisation. Consequently, there is a need for adaptation to the 
mechanisms of globalisation, accompanied by the creation of instruments of 
coordination at supranational level. This has for many years been the objective of 
the European Union in creating the instruments of its Common Agricultural Policy. 
3.2. Public goods in the Common Agricultural Policy 
of European Union countries99
(Katarzyna Smędzik-Ambroży, Marta Guth100)
Introduction
Public goods represent one of the categories of market failure. The concept 
of public goods refers to fundamental, generally available benefits which can be 
enjoyed jointly. Theoreticians differentiate public from private goods in that the 
latter become people’s property after payment is made for them, while with the 
former this is not necessarily the case (Niewęgłowska 2011; Cooper, Hart, Baldock 
2009). These features mean that it is difficult to obtain payment for the provision of 
such goods, which in turn causes a lack of stimuli to provide them (Baldock, Hart, 
Scheele 2014). Hence, putting it simply, one can say that public goods are goods 
which are desired by society but which the market mechanism is not able to deliver. 
According to Paul Samuelson (1954), these goods have the following properties:
• no-one is excluded from the benefits resulting from their use (they are non-
excludable);
• an increase in the number of users neither eliminates nor reduces the possibility 
of the use of a given good by all users (they are non-rivalrous).
The second condition is not as universally accepted as the first. Some scholars, 
such as Knut Wicksell and Mancur Olson, omit it entirely (Fijor 2011). An analysis by 
the OECD (2001) concerning the multifunctional model of agriculture has identified 
the production of public goods as a new function of agriculture. Consequently, 
interest in the subject of public goods created in agriculture has grown in recent years. 
Both public goods and merit goods are produced in agriculture in conjunction with 
the production of market goods (agricultural production) (Jakubowski 2012). The 
literature offers various classifications of the public goods produced in agriculture. 
Jakubowski (2012) lists four types of goods, distinguished by the properties of being 
excludable and rivalrous. In turn, Buchanan (1968) and Head (1962), the authors of a 
report published by the Institute for European Environmental Policy, as well as Duer 
(2012) distinguish three degrees of social use of goods generated by agriculture: low, 
medium and high (cf. Table 3.3.). 
99 This chapter includes parts of the article by B. Czyżewski and K. Smędzik-Ambroży titled 
The Regional Structure of CAP Subsidies and Factor Productivity in Agriculture in the EU28 
(2016).
100 Poznań University of Economics and Business; katarzyna.smedzik@ue.poznan.pl .
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Table 3.3. Classification of goods based on degree of use by society
Degree of use by society
Low Medium High
Private goods Club goods Local public goods Global public goods
Rivalrous Non-rivalrous for a 
small group of users
Non-rivalrous but with a 
high risk of exhaustion 
given an excessive number 
of consumers
Non-rivalrous, with a 
possible risk of exhaustion 
given an excessive number 
of consumers
Non-owners excluded 
from consumption
Limited set of users, 
others excluded from 
consumption
Others may be excluded 
only at high cost
No possibility of excluding 
others from consumption
e.g. agricultural 
products
e.g. private parks e.g. regional landscape, 
local sources of drinking 
water
e.g. climate, biodiversity
Source: Cooper, Hart, Baldock (2009); Duer (2012)
Wilkin (2010) presented a simplified classification of public and merit goods 
in agriculture, encompassing environmental goods, which include biodiversity, 
agricultural landscape, soil conservation and water conditions; economic goods, 
including food safety and food and energy security; and socio-cultural goods, which 
include the economic and social vitality of the countryside, enrichment of national 
culture, and shaping of a local, regional and cultural identity. In different studies 
a distinction is made between global and local public goods. The first category 
includes goods that are universal for all countries, groups of people and generations. 
Examples are the production of oxygen and protection of biodiversity. Because these 
are universal goods and are equally important for all people, reward should be given 
for them according to a uniform system in all countries. Local public goods are 
goods which are consumed at a local level; examples might include the landscape 
and the cultural heritage of the countryside (Małażewska 2015; Brelik 2015). 
In the literature (cf. Carson and Czajkowski 2014; Boyle, Welsh, and Bishop 
1993; Adamowicz 1994; Cameron and Englin 1997; Breffle and Morey 2000; 
Ferrini and Scarpa 2007; Hanley, Kriström, and Shogren 2009; Bateman et al. 2004; 
Carson and Louviere 2011; Czajkowski, Hanley and LaRiviere 2014) several types 
of remuneration for the supply of public goods by farmers are identified, including:
• direct valuation of the supplied goods and payment for them (for example, 
per job created, per hectare of land where erosion has been combated, by 
quantity of carbon sequestered in the soil) (Maciejczak 2009);
• payment for the use of rights of ownership of resources or production factors 
to the extent necessary for the supply of public goods;
• payment for lost income in the case of supply of public goods relating to the 
environment (exclusion of means of production from profitable use);
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• compensation for transaction costs or other barriers in the reallocation of 
resources needed to supply public goods (FAPA 2009).
It should be borne in mind that the creation of a system of remuneration for 
public goods will bring about additional operational costs, including, for example, the 
costs of incentives, consultation, communication, administration, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation. The issue of remuneration for public goods in agriculture 
is therefore a very complex one. The development of a system will certainly require 
the solution of a number of significant problems. The most important of these 
include:
• difficulties with a precise valuation of the public goods supplied by European 
agriculture;
• the need to distinguish between “not harming the environment” and “supplying 
public goods”101; 
• the need to develop a mechanism of coordination of demand and supply 
(negotiation between farmers and society);
• selection of the most appropriate mechanisms motivating farmers to supply 
public goods (FAPA 2009).
Increasing numbers of studies suggest that certain systems of agriculture, 
usually more extensive systems of livestock farming and mixed systems, systems 
of permanent cultivation with a large percentage of semi-wild plants, and organic 
systems, as well as certain agricultural practices encompassed by the concept of 
sustainable agriculture, support a wider range of public goods than industrial systems 
do. There is a wide spectrum of agricultural practices which supply public goods and 
the continuation of which is of key importance if those goods are to be supplied at 
the level required by society. The scale of the supply of public goods in agriculture 
is affected by many factors, of which the most important ones include appropriate 
land management, type of land use and intensification of land management, farm 
structure, including field size and scale of operations, having an effect both on the 
logistics of production and on the structure of the landscape, location factors – the 
location of the farm relative to water courses, more natural elements, groundwater 
resources, easily flammable forests, situation in a coherent landscape, historical 
factors – relics, archaeological values – and socioeconomic structure – e.g. semi-
subsistence farms.
Public goods are produced in agriculture on private land, although land is a 
common national legacy. A part of the benefits resulting from the work of farmers is 
thereby transferred to third parties without any compensation to the farmer. These are 
101 According to RISE, a level of environmental targets should be set that farmers are obliged 
to achieve at their own cost (e.g. cross-compliance), but society may pay the costs of attaining 
higher environmental standards (RISE 2009).
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what are called the external effects of management (Baum, Śleszyński 2009). There 
must therefore be an awareness that without adequate incentives (social outlays) 
public goods are not and will not be produced in optimum quantities – the absence 
of intervention may lead to undersupply, oversupply or even a complete lack of 
such goods. The consequence of such a situation may be an ineffective allocation of 
social resources. National governments and international organisations have several 
ways of regulating the supply of public goods: systems of subsidies, tax mechanisms 
and legal regulations (RISE 2009). According to an analytical report by a thematic 
working group on “Public goods and the public system of intervention” dated 14 June 
2010, “although the term ‘public goods’ is not officially used in the documentation 
setting out the justification for intervention under the regulation on rural development 
(Council Regulation 1698/2005) or in the Community Strategic Guidelines for Rural 
Development (Council Decision 2006/144/EC), many of the priorities identified as 
requiring action are in accordance with that idea, with payments being justified only 
when action goes beyond that required by law. As a result of this, although many of 
the means under rural development policy have the potential to deliver public goods, 
that is not always the basic logic behind the intervention.”.
The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) is the political 
support instrument with clearly the greatest potential to provide active incentive to 
supply public goods, through a deliberate and targeted approach. It delivers by far the 
greatest source of financing as an incentive to provide particular agriculture-related 
public goods in Europe. The degree to which it is used for the delivery of public goods 
is nonetheless strongly dependent on the way in which member states design their 
internal rural development programmes – the actions they prioritise, the eligibility 
criteria they apply, the way in which measures are designed and targeted, and the 
way in which the various systems are implemented. There is one obligatory means 
for the development of rural areas – the agri-environmental measure. However, in 
view of the extensive nature of the objectives of rural development policy, including 
competitiveness, environmental and social goals, and the differences in the degree 
to which economic, social and environmental issues are prioritised in various 
member states, there are large differences between the ways in which the supply 
of environmental and social public goods is treated in particular rural development 
programmes (European Network for Rural Development, 2010).
The goal of the present study was to determine whether in the EU-28 countries 
there are agricultural support models which differ in terms of the contribution 
of the payments for public goods to the total value of the political rent102. By an 
102 The political rent is taken to be the sum of cash transfers (subsidies and payments) to farms 
in the EU under the Common Agricultural Policy (after Bezat-Jarzębowska, Rembisz 2013).
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agricultural support model, the authors mean a structure for such support, reflected 
in the contributions of particular types of Common Agricultural Policy payments to 
the total political rent. In the authors’ view, the significant differences across the EU-
28 relating to, among other things, the supply of public goods (their type, quantities 
and quality) by different countries and regions of the EU (see: Matuszczak 2013; 
Giannakis, Bruggeman 2014) mean that it is not possible for a single agricultural 
support model with identical contributions accounted for by the subsidies for those 
goods to exist in the EU. The authors therefore propose the hypothesis that one can 
distinguish several agricultural support models in the EU-28, differing in terms of the 
contribution of the payments for public goods to the total political rent (Czyżewski, 
Matuszczak 2016). This hypothesis was tested based on the latest data (2012) on 
representative farms in each EU-FADN region. 
Materials and methods
An identification was made of areas within the EU-28 having similar agricultural 
support models, characterised by similar contributions of the payments for public 
goods to the total political rent. For this purpose, an agglomerative cluster analysis 
was performed (using Ward’s method) covering 131 representative farms for EU-
FADN regions, according to the criterion of contributions to the political rent from 
the following grouping variables: X1 – value of subsidies for public goods, being the 
sum of set-aside payments, agro-environmental payments, less favoured area (LFA) 
payments and other rural development payments; X2 – value of subsidies for plant 
and animal production (the sum of other subsidies to plant and animal production 
including the balance of payments and penalties for milk production, subsidies for 
other cattle production and for sheep and goat production); X3 – value of single farm 
and area payments; X4 – value of subsidies for indirect consumption; and X5 – value 
of investment subsidies.
The disjointness of the clusters was verified by evaluating the significance of the 
differences between the average contributions of subsidies to the political rent. The 
assumption of homogeneity of variance of the variables between groups of regions 
was evaluated using Levene’s test and the Brown–Forsythe test. The hypothesis of 
homogeneity of variance in comparable groups for the individual variables X1–
X4 was rejected, except in the case of the variable representing the contribution of 
subsidies for indirect consumption. Therefore, to evaluate the significance of the 
differences between the averages from the samples (clusters), the non-parametric 
Mann-Withney U test (Stanisz 2007) was used. It was confirmed that the clusters 
(identified at a level of approximately 50% of the maximum distance) differ 
significantly in terms of the structure of budgetary subsidies to agriculture, including 
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the contribution of support for public goods (aggregate X1) to the total political rent. 
The computations were performed using the Statistica 10 program. The analysis 
thus covered 131 representative farms for particular EU-FADN 28 regions in the 
year 2012, and concerned the contributions of particular types of payment to the 
political rent received by a representative farm in a given region. Due to the absence 
of information in the EU-FADN statistics concerning the values of subsidies to 
representative farms in the regions Entre Douro e Minho and Trás-os-Montes, these 
were excluded from the analysis. Similarly, the analysis did not include the French 
overseas departments. 
Results
Three clusters of regions were identified, differing in terms of agricultural 
support models, including the contributions of support for public goods (aggregate 
X1) to the total political rent (cf. Table 3). In the most numerous group of regions 
(cluster A) a model was found in which agriculture was supported chiefly by 
single farm and area payments (these accounted for more than 59% of the political 
rent). Farms in these regions also received significant economic benefits from the 
provision of public goods – agro-environmental, set-aside and LFA payments and 
other rural development subsidies accounted for almost 17% of the political rent of 
representative farms in those regions. The next most numerous cluster (B) contained 
regions in which the contribution of public good payments to the political rent was 
clearly the lowest. Farms from the regions in this cluster were supported primarily by 
single farm and area payments (aggregate X3), which accounted for almost 80% of 
the political rent. Meanwhile, in the structure of agricultural support in these regions, 
the contribution of public good payments was clearly the lowest, at less than 9% (cf. 
Table 3.4.). This shows that farms from this cluster receive the least reward for the 
supply of public goods, which is reflected in the model of CAP support implemented 
in these region. Cluster B therefore featured a model in which support for production 
was replaced almost exclusively by direct support to farms. The reverse situation was 
found in the case of farms from the least numerous cluster, which contained only 24 
regions from the EU-28. The model implemented here combined various support 
mechanisms, with payments for plant and animal production as well as single farm 
and area payments making a significant contribution to the political rent. At the same 
time, cluster C featured the highest contribution of public good payments (33%), 
significantly greater than the one recorded in the other clusters (cf. Table 3.4.). This 
shows that farms in the regions making up cluster C performed productive functions 
and at the same time supplied a large quantity of public goods, and consequently the 
agricultural support model implemented in this group of regions might be called the 
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most sustainable. More than the other two models, it combined the microeconomic 
effectiveness of farms resulting from their productive functions with current social 
expectations in the EU, reflected in the support given for the supply of public goods 
by farms. Such an agricultural support model has certainly led to a decline in the 
phenomenon of the “technological treadmill”103 in the area of its implementation; 
hence by means of the structure of the political rent, conditions have been provided 
for the sustainable development of rural areas, in which a particularly important role 
is played by recognition of the importance of the supply of public goods by farms. 
Table 3.4.  Average contributions of particular types of subsidies to the political rent in 2012, 
by cluster (%)
CLUSTER Number of regions X11 X2 X3 X4 X5
A 57 16.78 8.82 59.48 1.55 3.92
B 50 8.75 3.22 79.77 2.08 1.73
C 24 32.88 17.18 27.26 2.30 9.89
Total 131 16.66 8.21 61.32 1.89 4.18
1X1 to X5 – contributions of particular types of subsidies to the political rent, namely: X1 – contribution of 
subsidies for public goods; X2 – contribution of subsidies for plant and animal production; X3 – contribution 
of single farm and area payments; X4 – contribution of subsidies for indirect consumption; X5 – contribution 
of investment subsidies (see methodology)
Source: elaborated by the authors, based on EU-FADN data (granted by the National Science Centre in 
Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
The geographical distribution of the differentiated agricultural support models 
in the EU-28 is shown in Fig. 3.3. Over most of the area of the EU in 2012 a model 
was implemented in which support for agricultural production was replaced by single 
area and farm payments and support for public goods (model A or C; see Fig. 3.3.). 
This is in line with the desired direction of evolution of the European agricultural 
model towards sustainable agriculture, this being most strongly supported in model 
C (which features the largest contribution from payments for the provision of public 
goods). 
103 The technological treadmill involves the following sequence of events: increase in 
production (supply) above demand → fall in prices → change of technology to increase production 
and reduce unit costs → increase in supply → fall in prices, etc. (Kuś 2012). Tangible capital 
investment thus becomes essential for retaining a specified level of effectiveness of agricultural 
production, which becomes a direct cause of the cumulative increase in the intensiveness of 
agriculture. 
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Figure 3.3. Clusters of EU-28 regions in 2012 according to structure of FADN subsidies
Source: by the authors, based on EU-FADN data (granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 
UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
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In most of the regions of the “old” EU member states, however, the model 
implemented in 2012 was model B, oriented exclusively towards direct payments, 
which are treated as a substitute for support for production, and create relatively weak 
stimuli for sustainable development, whereas in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe model A was dominant, which provides an opportunity for the valuation of 
the public goods supplied by agriculture. This is also confirmed by analyses by other 
authors, who have noted, among other things, that direct support goes primarily to 
farms from areas of intensive agriculture (see: Kutkowska, Berbeka 2012; Giannakis, 
Bruggeman 2015). In a small group of regions a highly sustainable model was found, 
combining different forms of support for farms (cluster C). Subsidisation for the 
provision of public goods was found here alongside the maintenance of high subsidies 
for agricultural production and significant direct support (uniform payments). This 
group included most of the island regions of the EU, and the northern part of Europe, 
consisting of the regions of Finland, the Swedish region of Lan and Nora, and the 
regions of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This cluster also included a few regions of 
Southern and Central Europe, mainly mountainous regions (see Fig. 3.3.).
To recap, the groups of the EU-28 regions identified by the cluster analysis have 
been found to differ significantly in terms of the structure of budgetary subsidies 
for agriculture, but only models A and C were to a greater or lesser extent in line 
with the development priorities of the European agricultural model accentuated in 
the new programming period of 2014-2020. This was confirmed by the significant 
support given in these agricultural support models for the supply of public goods. 
Therefore, the results of the analysis make it possible to accept the hypothesis that 
several agricultural support models can be distinguished in the EU-28, differing in 
terms of the contribution of public good payments to the total political rent.
Conclusions
The reforms carried out to date and those proposed since 2013 indicate that the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy is becoming “green”, that is, to an increasing 
degree it is integrating the goals of protecting and preserving the natural environment 
with the economic and social goals of the development of agriculture and rural 
areas. As a result, the importance of public goods in the reformed CAP is constantly 
increasing, particularly in the case of environmental public goods, which include 
water quality, climate protection, soil protection, and the protection of biodiversity 
and the landscape. The degradation of the natural environment caused by an 
increased intensity of production, as well as the threat to food safety, are just some 
of the phenomena that indicate the need for a change in the approach to agricultural 
problems. To sum up the considerations contained in this chapter, it can be stated that 
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the groups of the EU-28 regions identified by the cluster analysis have been found 
to differ significantly in terms of the structure of budgetary subsidies for agriculture, 
but only model A (in which single farm and area payments were dominant, and the 
contribution of public good payments was approximately 17%) and model C (which 
combines different mechanisms of support for farms, with the highest contribution 
from public good payments, at around 33%) were to a greater or lesser extent in line 
with the development priorities of the European agricultural model accentuated in 
the new programming period of 2014-2020. This was confirmed by the significant 
support given in these agricultural support models for the supply of public goods. 
Therefore, the results of the analysis make it possible to accept the hypothesis that 
several agricultural support models can be distinguished in the EU-28, differing in 
terms of the contribution of public good payments to the total political rent. Over 
most of the area of the EU in 2012 a model was implemented in which support for 
agricultural production was replaced by single area and farm payments and support 
for public goods (model A or C). This is in accordance with the desired direction of 
evolution of the European agricultural model towards sustainable agriculture, which 
is most strongly supported in model C (which features the largest contribution from 
payments for the provision of public goods). In most of the regions of the “old” EU 
member states, however, the model implemented in 2012 was model B, oriented 
exclusively towards direct payments, which are treated as a substitute for support 
for production, and create relatively weak stimuli for sustainable development, 
whereas in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe model A was dominant, 
which provides an opportunity for the valuation of the public goods supplied by 
agriculture. 
3.3. Systems of taxation of agriculture in certain 
EU countries. Universal and distinctive features 
and an evaluation
(Marian Podstawka104)
Introduction
Agriculture, as a sector of the national economy, has various distinctive features. 
These result from the economic characteristics of land, one of the basic factors of 
agricultural production, in particular its lack of mobility, relative differences in quality 
and location, and limitations relating to the intensity of production. Agricultural land 
is a production factor given from outside, hence in cost accounting it is not treated as 
subject to depreciation. Moreover, agricultural production is conditioned by natural 
factors, and provides lower effectiveness of inputs and lower profitability than other 
forms of economic activity. Agricultural land is a production factor requiring special 
protection in view of its limited nature. It is the basis for the existence of present 
and future generations. It is therefore necessary to ensure the preservation of its 
productive functions for the future. However, actions related to the protection of 
land require certain expenditure. All of these properties of agricultural land cause 
agriculture to be treated preferentially in systems of taxation. The range of privileges 
granted to agriculture under such systems results from the particular economic, 
social and historical conditions to which it is subject and which make the prediction 
of production effects more difficult in agriculture than in other sectors. Farming 
carries a significantly greater degree of uncertainty than other types of economic 
activity, and this reduces farmers’ willingness to invest. These conditions make the 
retransfer of income to agriculture necessary, and justify the provision of support 
through the tax system. The countries of the European Union have different tax 
systems, even though their public authorities are working for the same goals. Such 
differentiation is the result of the sovereign decisions of individual nations. The 
differences between systems of taxation are the subject of a great deal of discussion 
among economists. According to one view, such differences are disadvantageous, 
generating additional transaction costs and leading to unhealthy forms of competition 
(Zodrow, Mieszkowski 1986) and (Wilson 2004).
104 Warsaw University of Life Sciences (SGGW), Faculty of Economics; marian_podstawka@
sggw.pl .
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A second viewpoint is that tax differences are beneficial, as they lead to the 
rationalisation of public expenditure and reflect the comparative advantages that 
particular EU countries enjoy in the effectiveness of use of production factors in 
agriculture (Wilson, Wildasin 2004) and (Mendoza, Tesar 2005).
The operation of different tax systems in agriculture in EU countries is a normal 
practice which leads to competitive advantages within the sector. One element of 
tax competition is the choice of the base for taxation. In most EU countries, tax is 
levied on the income earned from agricultural activity. A further factor affecting the 
level of taxation and competitiveness of agriculture in individual countries is the 
method used to determine taxable income. EU countries apply a variety of methods 
for calculating farms’ income, from simple estimation methods to those based on 
financial accounting. 
While it is not our purpose here to make a detailed analysis of the determination 
of bases for taxation in agriculture and the consequences thereof, it should be noted 
that the tax system in agriculture is expected (like the tax system in general) to 
perform three basic functions: fiscal, stimulating and controlling. It should also 
take account of the historical conditions of the economic and financial processes 
operating in individual countries. Hence the tax policy of EU countries as applied 
to the agricultural sector is modelled individually depending on the needs and level 
of development of agriculture (Goraj, Naneman, Zagórski 2014). The variable used 
to identify the different levels of development of agriculture in various countries is 
agricultural income. 
The aim of this work is to evaluate the systems of taxation of agriculture in EU 
countries, drawing attention to their common and differentiating features.
Hypotheses:
1. The tax systems applied to agriculture in EU countries are very similar in 
terms of their structure and the elements of construction of particular taxes.
2. In view of the specific economic and organisational conditions applicable 
to agricultural production, resulting chiefly from the land factor, limitations 
stemming from natural factors and the drainage of financial surplus from 
agriculture, it is appropriate to continue to tax agriculture preferentially and 
with differentiation between countries. 
Research methods
The methods used to verify the hypotheses and achieve the research aims 
included comparative analysis, descriptive analysis, expert analysis and numerical 
evaluation.
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The evaluation of the tax systems of the analysed countries was performed using 
the formula below (3.3). It was assumed that the best tax system is one in which no 
taxes are levied, in which case the indicator takes the value 0, while the worst case 
is a system with 10 taxes, when the indicator takes the value 1.
 TSE
no.tx 10
100
=  (3.3)
where:
TSE is the numerical evaluation of the tax system;
no.t. denotes the number of taxes.
The evaluation of minimum and maximum income tax rates was made based 
on the assumption that the most favourable tax for agriculture is one which has zero 
rates, in which case the indicator takes the value 0. The most restrictive is one which 
has both maximum and minimum rates of 100%, when the indicator takes the value 
1. The following formula (3.4) was used:
 TRE
max.rate + min.rate
max.rate min.rate
=
− + −100 100
 (3.4)
where:
TRE is the numerical evaluation of tax rates.
The evaluation of maximum VAT rates was performed using the formula (3.5):
 TRE
Max. VAT rate
VAT =
100
 (3.5)
where:
TREVAT is the numerical evaluation of the maximum VAT rate.
Other evaluations, concerning the manner of calculating the income tax base 
and the tax preferences applied to agriculture, were made using an expert method.
Data were obtained from the Polish and international literature, published 
statistics and websites.
Farm income in EU countries
There is more than one concept of income. It is defined differently in economics, 
in accounting, and in the context of tax law. In economics it refers to the positive 
difference between revenue and the total actual expenditure. Income reflects the 
economic surplus which is the basis for the existence of an economic entity, serving 
to satisfy its consumption and investment needs. Many economists regard income as 
the best object of taxation (Gomułowicz, Małecki 2000). Income was first taxed in 
Great Britain in 1799, and the practice became widespread in Europe in the second 
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half of the 19th century. However, taxable income is a conventional value, defined by 
way of regulation, being the excess of taxable revenue over the costs allowed under 
tax law. Hence taxable income cannot be identified with income in the economic 
sense. Taxable income is one of the most controversial categories in the study of 
finance. This is because tax law may allow the deduction of different types of costs 
and recognise different types of tax-exempt revenue. The most accurate view of 
income taxation may be that given by H. Heller, who evaluates taxable income in 
terms of the ability to pay tax (Heller 2005). He regards income as constituting all 
goods serving to satisfy personal needs, such as the value of goods and services 
produced for one’s own needs, the value of consumer goods of permanent use, and 
the value of housework (cleaning, cooking, etc.). A similar concept of taxable income 
is presented by R.A. and P.B. Musgrave, who take income to mean the increase in 
overall economic wealth (R.A. Musgrave and P.B. Musgrave 1980). They regard any 
increase in wealth, whether regular or irregular, expected or unexpected, realised 
(consumed) or unrealised (saved), as income subject to taxation.
The income of a farm has certain specific features in comparison with other 
professional groups. These result from various conditioning factors, including the 
following:
• a farmer plays the roles of both farm owner and worker;
• in the production process the farm is integrated with the household;
• agricultural income is obtained both in cash (from the sale of goods and 
services) and in kind (own consumption);
• a farm’s income structure may include income from paid work, welfare 
benefits, agrotourism, processing of agricultural products, and the like;
• agricultural income is subject to a high degree of instability.
An evaluation of the income situation of farms is important not only for farmers, 
but also for the EU decision makers who shape the Common Agricultural Policy. 
The collection, processing and analysis of information from the EU is handled by the 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). Figure 3.4. shows in outline the method 
of calculating taxable income from a family farm according to European Union 
law.
According to this scheme, to calculate the income from a family farm, the total 
value of crop, livestock and other production is calculated, and then direct costs 
and general farm costs are deducted to give the gross value added – the surplus 
representing the effects of the engagement of land, labour, capital and management. 
This is reduced by depreciation costs to obtain the net value added, which reflects 
the payment of all production factors: land, capital, labour and management. When 
the net value added is reduced by costs of salaries, rent and interest, the resulting 
figure provides information about the income and tax situation of the family farm.
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Figure 3.4. Calculation of taxable income from a family farm according to FADN
Source: (Floriańczyk, Mańko, Osuch, Płonka 2013)
A characteristic of EU agriculture is its differentiation in terms of levels of 
production and income. Information about the differences in the income situation of 
farms in different EU countries is given in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5. Levels of income of family farms in EU countries (€)
Country
Year
2005 2012
FNIa) FNI/FWUb) FNI FNI/FWU
Belgium 47758 30557 64250 38725
Cyprus 6832 6157 9573 9592
Czech Republic 17940 9533 50501 19035
Denmark 15586 17137 62308 75410
Germany 27944 19604 45381 31985
Greece 14076 12186 11500 12160
Spain 20526 19140 21075 19906
Estonia 15026 7732 25903 16568
France 29518 20056 47403 33116
Hungary 5818 6555 18821 21592
Lithuania 7207 4396 17131 11321
Ireland 18241 17119 22532 19867
Italy 20900 20243 22469 23435
Luxembourg 37405 26944 37284 25692
Latvia 10624 5229 13161 8262
Malta 12569 8898 8560 6940
Netherlands 39917 27639 65913 45801
Austria 23441 16152 27779 21111
Poland 5830 3729 10681 6711
Portugal 8354 3153 12839 10041
Finland 19901 15752 21966 21692
Sweden 11838 9943 16492 14711
Slovakia -12193 7653 -9175 13768
Slovenia 4989 2771 5417 3866
UK 32672 25197 51632 39470
a) FNI (Farm Net Income) – income from a family farm
b) FNI/FWU (Farm Net Income/Family Working Unit) – income from a family farm per fully employed 
person
Source: based on the European Commission FADN data
The data in Table 3.5. demonstrate the significant differences in levels of family 
farm income in EU countries, which in 2005 ranged from a negative income of more 
than €12,000 per farm in Slovakia to a positive figure of almost €48,000 in Belgium. 
Markedly better incomes from agriculture are enjoyed in the “old” EU member 
states such as Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
UK, while lower income levels are recorded in newer member states (Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia).
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Taxation of agriculture in EU countries
Agriculture is subject to various taxes in the countries of the EU, including taxes 
on income, on assets, and on consumption. The various systems are generally similar 
in terms of the types of tax, the rules for determining the base for their calculation, 
and the applied tax rates and preferences.
An assessment will be made here of the tax systems applied to agriculture in 
selected EU countries, including income tax. An evaluation will be made of the rules 
for determining the tax base, and the rates applied. VAT will also be assessed, as well 
as the preferences applied to agriculture in tax policy. Finally, a single evaluative 
measure will be obtained, making an evaluation possible of the agricultural tax 
systems in the selected countries105.
Table 3.6. Structure and evaluation of tax systems in agriculture in EU countries
Country
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Belgium +1 + + + + + + 0.7
UK + +  - + + + + 0.6
Denmark + + + + + + + 0.7
Ireland + + + + + + + 0.7
Netherlands + + + + + - + 0.6
Czech Republic + + + + + + + 0.7
Hungary + + + + + + + 0.7
Germany + + + + + + + 0.7
Spain + + + + + + + 0.7
France + + + + + + + 0.7
Italy + + + - + + + 0.6
Portugal + + - + + + + 0.6
Greece + + - + + + + 0.6
Austria + + - - + + + 0.5
Luxembourg + + - + + + + 0.6
Sweden + + + - + + + 0.6
Finland + + - + - + + 0.5
Poland - - - + + + + 0.4
1+ present
– absent
Source: (Pawłowska-Tyszko, Soliwoda 2014)
105 No evaluation was made of taxes on assets, since these are excessively diverse in terms of 
their types and the elements of their construction.
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Table 3.6. shows that all of the listed countries except Poland have tax systems 
in which agriculture is subject to both individual and corporate income taxes. 
Many of them also apply capital gains taxes; these are absent in Greece, Austria, 
Luxembourg, Finland and Poland. All of the countries listed, including Poland, levy 
VAT on agricultural taxpayers. The most common asset-based taxes are those based 
on the value of real property and on land use, and those charged on transfer of 
ownership. The first category is present in all of the countries in Table 3.6. apart 
from the Netherlands, while the second is absent in Finland. The greatest non-
uniformity among EU countries is observed in the case of taxes on inheritance and 
gifts: these are not applied in such countries as Italy, Austria and Sweden, but occur 
in the remaining countries. 
Table 3.7. shows the differences and similarities relating to the determination of 
the income tax base in agriculture in EU countries.
Table 3.7.  Methods of determining the income tax base for agriculture in EU countries, and their 
evaluation
Country Method of calculating tax base Evalu-ation
Belgium
The tax base is the actual income, including income from rent and lease of 
agricultural property, direct payments, securities and employment, reduced by social 
security contributions on employment contracts, single person allowances, home 
loan interest, alimony, gifts, and farm workers’ salaries. The tax base may also be 
determined on the basis of standard quantities. 
1.0
UK
The tax base is the total income from agricultural activity plus income from savings, 
dividends, employment, real property, deposits, social security, direct payments and 
investment subsidies, reduced by capital expenditure (depreciation is not included in 
production costs) and any losses.
1.0
Denmark 
The tax base is the income from the farm plus personal income from salaries, pensions, 
capital, securities, sale of real property, and direct payments, reduced by social security 
contributions, loan interest and costs of upkeep of a residential building. 
1.0
Ireland
The tax base is the income from agricultural activity plus income from securities 
and from employment, interest on deposits and loans, real property rent, old-age and 
disability pensions, and direct payments, reduced by tax relief on account of stocks 
and investment.
1.0
Netherlands
The tax base is the total income from agricultural activity, direct payments, 
employment, real property, savings and investments, reduced by expenses relating 
to the financial condition of the taxpayer such as alimony, education, health care and 
social security contributions. 
1.0
Czech 
Republic
The tax base (taxable income) is the sum of income from agricultural activity, direct 
payments, capital and rent, reduced by investment tax relief, losses, gifts, and research 
and development allowances. Investment subsidies are not subject to taxation.
0.5
Hungary
The tax base is the income from employment (excluding self-employment), from 
agricultural activity and from real property. Capital gains are not subject to taxation, 
except for those obtained from foreign subsidiary companies. Compensation and old-
age and disability pensions are also not taxed. It is also possible to exclude up to 50% 
of income from taxation as a provision for development.
0.5
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Country Method of calculating tax base Evalu-ation
Germany
The tax base is the total income from employment, EU subsidies, agricultural and 
economic activity, forestry, capital, rent, leasing and services, reduced by social 
security contributions, expenditure on children’s education, alimony, scholarships, 
and losses. 
1.0
Spain
The tax base is the income from employment, production rights, agricultural activity, 
services, dividends, interest, real property, CAP payments and compensation, 
reduced by extraordinary losses.
1.0
France
The tax base is the total income from agricultural, forestry and economic activity, 
employment, capital investments, real property, and beekeeping, reduced by 25% 
in case of keeping financial accounts and use of a national expert, and by lease 
payments and extraordinary losses. EU subsidies are included in the tax base only 
if accounts are kept, but not when the tax base is determined based on standard 
quantities.
0.5
Italy The tax base is a quantity of taxable income estimated many decades ago, originating from agricultural activity, employment, capital and land, reduced by alimony payments. 0.5
Portugal
The tax base is the income from employment, agricultural and economic activity, 
EU subsidies, investments, and benefits and social welfare (old-age and disability 
pensions).
1.0
Poland
Polish farmers are currently not subject to income taxation. It applies only to a 
small degree of income from special types of agricultural production, which may be 
determined according to actual or estimated values. The standards for estimation are 
out of date and lead to small tax bases and consequently low tax burdens.
0.2
Source: (Pawłowska-Tyszko, Soliwoda 2014)
A significant issue having an impact on the assessment of tax policies applied to 
agriculture are the set tax rates. These are evaluated in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8. Income tax rates applicable to agriculture in EU countries, and their evaluation
Country Tax rates in 2015 TRE
Belgium For corporations 24.98-33.00%. Individual rates 25-50%. 0.60
UK For corporations 24%. Separate rates for each type of income, 10-50%. 0.43
Denmark For corporations 23.5%. Individual rates 13.64-55.6%. 0.53
Ireland For corporations 10-25%. Individual rates 20-41%. 0.41
Netherlands For corporations 20-25%. Individual rates 1.95-52% (income from shares taxed at 25%). 0.37
Czech Republic For corporations 19%, for individuals 22%. 0.25
Hungary For corporations 10-19%, for individuals 6-16%. 0.12
Germany For corporations 15-17.5%, for individuals 14-45%. 0.42
Spain For corporations 30%, for individuals 24.75-42%. 0.50
France For corporations 15-33.33%, for individuals 5.5-45%. 0.34
Italy From 23% to 43%. 0.49
Portugal For corporations 12.5-27.5%, for individuals 46.5%. 0.87
Poland For corporations 19%. For individuals 18-22%. 0.25
Source: (Agricultural... 2014)
Table 3.7.  cont.
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Table 3.9. gives an assessment of VAT as applied in selected EU countries. The 
evaluation is made based on the maximum VAT rates applicable to basic means of 
agricultural production. 
Table 3.9. Evaluation of maximum VAT rates in selected EU countries
Country Max. VAT rate TREVAT
Belgium 21% 0.21
UK 20% 0.20
Denmark 25% 0.25
Ireland 23% 0.23
Netherlands 21% 0.21
Czech Republic 21% 0.21
Hungary 27% 0.27
Germany 19% 0.19
Spain 21% 0.21
France 20% 0.20
Italy 21% 0.21
Portugal 23% 0.23
Poland 23% 0.23
Source: based on msp.Money.pl.
Next, Table 3.10. shows an evaluation of the tax preferences applied with respect 
to agricultural activity in the analysed EU countries.
Table 3.10.  Evaluation of tax preferences applied to farmers and agricultural activity in selected 
EU countries
Country
Preferences related 
to estimation of 
taxable income
Preferences related to forms of relief and deductible costs Evalu-ation
Belgium YES
relief is available on account of:
– investment
− pension contributions up to 30% reduction of the tax computed
− charity expenditure, 45% reduction of the tax computed
− children
− individual depreciation
0.5
UK YES/NO
relief is available on account of: 
− loss of income
− investment
− home upkeep costs
− sales of 20% of livestock and agricultural land
0.7
Denmark YES/NO
− one-off individual depreciation
− costs of upkeep of a residential building are deductible (1% 
of its value) 
− pension scheme contributions are deducted from income
− losses of income may be deductible
− investment relief is available; costs include cost of purchase 
of basic herd, depreciation of long-term plantations, 
expenditure on food and accommodation for workers
0.6
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Country
Preferences related 
to estimation of 
taxable income
Preferences related to forms of relief and deductible costs Evalu-ation
Ireland NO
− investment relief is available for stocks
− pension scheme contributions are deducted from income; 
personal relief is available, as well as relief for elderly 
persons and for the purchase of a residential building and 
land
0.8
Netherlands NO
− relief is available for investment in energy-saving and 
environmentally-friendly technologies, and for the 
investment of capital in fixed assets
− depreciation may be determined individually
0.8
Czech 
Republic YES/NO
− individual (one-off) depreciation
− biological assets are not depreciated
− investment relief is available for research and development 
activity
− 5% of income may be deducted for charity purposes
− productive herd not subject to depreciation
− child relief is available, investment subsidies are untaxed
0.6
Hungary YES/NO
− dividends and old-age and disability pensions are untaxed
− losses may be deductible
− relief is available for research and development expenditure
0.7
Germany YES/NO
− housing, investment and personal relief are available, 
pension scheme contributions, training costs, alimony, 
gifts, church tax, fees for tax advice and expenses relating 
to care and accommodation of elderly persons are 
deductible from the tax base
− deductions are available for children and on account of age
− losses and accelerated depreciation are taken into account
− a certain amount (€45,000) from the sale of a farm is 
exempt; investment subsidies are untaxed; basic plantations 
and herds are subject to depreciation
0.6
Spain YES/NO
− social security contributions, assistance, loan interest and 
local taxes are deductible 
− EU subsidies are taxed; losses are taken into account
0.7
France YES
− the tax base is reduced by 20% if financial accounts are 
kept
− EU subsidies are taxed
Italy YES/NO − investment and personal relief are available, as well as relief for children, religious contributions and home help 0.8
Portugal YES/NO − deductions are available for dependents, the birth of a child and education expenses 0.8
Poland YES/NO
− income tax is levied only on special types of agricultural 
production
− relief is available for rehabilitation, purchase of medicines, 
donations to public benefit organisations, Internet access, 
purchase of new technologies, and children
0.6
Source: (Pawłowska-Tyszko, Soliwoda 2014)
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Table 3.11. below shows the overall evaluation of the tax systems of the selected 
EU countries as applied to agriculture.
Table 3.11. Overall evaluation of tax systems in agriculture in selected EU countries
Country
Evaluative indicators for:
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Belgium 0.7 1.0 0.60 0.5 0.21 3.01
UK 0.6 1.0 0.43 0.7 0.20 2.93
Denmark 0.7 1.0 0.53 0.6 0.25 2.49
Ireland 0.7 1.0 0.41 0.8 0.23 3.14
Netherlands 0.6 1.0 0.37 0.8 0.21 2.98
Czech Republic 0.7 0.5 0.25 0.6 0.21 2.26
Hungary 0.7 0.5 0.12 0.7 0.27 2.29
Germany 0.7 1.0 0.42 0.6 0.19 2.91
Spain 0.7 1.0 0.50 0.7 0.21 3.11
France 0.7 0.5 0.34 0.5 0.20 2.24
Italy 0.6 0.5 0.49 0.8 0.21 2.60
Portugal 0.6 1.0 0.87 0.8 0.23 3.50
Poland 0.4 0.2 0.25 0.6 0.23 1.68
Source: own compilation
Table 3.11. shows that among the analysed countries, excluding Poland, the 
differences in the evaluations of the tax systems applicable to agriculture differ only 
slightly. A lower score indicates a tax system that is more preferential to agriculture, 
while a higher score represents a more restrictive system. One may distinguish those 
of the analysed countries for which the value of the indicator exceeded 3.0, namely 
Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In these countries the policy of taxation 
applied to agriculture is comparatively the most restrictive. A second group consists 
of countries with indicator values somewhat lower than 3.0, namely the UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Italy. These countries apply a relatively less restrictive 
tax policy towards agriculture. The third group, consisting of the countries with the 
most preferential agricultural tax policies, includes Denmark, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, France, and of course Poland.
Conclusions
1. Differences exist between countries of the EU in terms of the level of income 
earned from agriculture.
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2. The tax systems applicable to agriculture in the analysed EU countries (apart 
from that of Poland) are very similar to each other. They include taxes on 
income, on assets, and on consumption (VAT).
3. The tax systems of the analysed EU countries differ in terms of some of the 
elements of construction of particular taxes. These differences relate to the 
tax rates, tax-free sums, relief and exemptions.
4. The tax system applied to agriculture in Poland is distinctive in that it does 
not include any tax on income from traditional agricultural production.
5. The numerical evaluation of the tax systems applied to agriculture in the 
analysed EU countries shows them to be very similar to each other. There are 
no marked differences as regards the degree to which they are restrictive or 
preferential.
6. The evaluation of the tax systems applied to agriculture in the selected EU 
countries reveals a distinction between those with the most restrictive tax 
policies (Belgium, Portugal, Ireland, Spain) and those applying relatively less 
restrictive taxation to agriculture (the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands).
7. Taking account of historical factors and the different levels of income earned 
from agriculture in EU countries, it is appropriate to continue the existing 
solutions as regards its taxation. At the same time, consideration might be 
given to the possibility of bringing the tax system applied to agriculture in 
Poland into line with those used in other EU countries.
3.4. Political rents in the EU-27. Comparative analysis
(Bazyli Czyżewski, Anna Matuszczak106)
Introduction
The concept of political rent is defined based on the theory of rent seeking – 
but is it conceptually appropriate to contemporary agricultural policy in developed 
countries? By definition, political rent is inextricably linked to the wastage of resources 
and to exclusive benefits provided to selected social groups at the expense of others. 
No attempts have yet been made in the literature to quantify political rents, even 
though this might lead to an improvement in the effectiveness of public expenditure. 
This, in the authors’ view, is a significant gap. The present chapter aims firstly to 
review the concepts of rents and rent seeking as used in the literature on political 
economy with regard to their appropriateness to the discussion on EU agricultural 
policy. Secondly, the authors attempt to develop a methodology for quantifying 
political rents in agricultural policy, and apply it to a comparative analysis of rents 
from the CAP in all of the EU-27 countries in the years 2005-2012. In this way 
they refute certain widespread myths concerning the CAP, while seeking an answer 
to the research question as to what part of the subsidies paid to agriculture in the 
EU-27 is justified by the concept of payment for public goods or compensation for 
imperfections in agricultural markets, and what part has no objective justification and 
represents a pure political rent according to the rent-seeking theory. This reasoning 
makes it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the allocation of subsidies from 
the CAP between EU countries and between classes of farms, and also to propose 
recommendations for the improvement of that allocation.
Dilemmas of rent seeking in EU agriculture
Rent seeking is not a new phenomenon in economic reality. It involves economic 
entities striving to obtain benefits (primarily financial or material) by exerting 
influence on relevant institutions, such as through lobbying107. More detailed 
definitions refer to active rent seeking, which denotes the expenditure of resources 
by private firms and interest groups for the purpose of obtaining protective forms of 
regulation from those in authority (Sztaba 2002). 
106 Poznań University of Economics and Business; b.czyzewski@ue.poznan.pl, anna.
matuszczak@ue.poznan.pl .
107 The term was first defined by Krueger (1974), although the phenomenon had been 
considered previously by Tullock (1967).
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Rent seeking in EU agriculture, however, does not concern only political 
lobbying. The claim that subsidies and other instruments of the CAP produce 
exclusive benefits for farmers at the cost of consumers is somewhat trivial and not 
entirely accurate. The question would appear to be more complex, as the benefits 
are not always exclusive, in view of the fact that farmers provide certain public 
goods, and moreover agricultural producers need to fulfil certain requirements, 
expending their resources, in order to receive those privileges. According to Tullock, 
rent seeking is profitable only in conditions of perfect competition and absence of 
economies of scale (Tullock 1991; Tullock 1980a). If economies of scale are present, 
the total value of investment required to obtain a political rent is greater than the rent 
itself (Tullock 1991; Tullock 1980b)108. This would mean that small family farms, 
which are not able to generate economies of scale in production, are net beneficiaries 
of political rents, while large farms, for which meeting the CAP’s environmental 
requirements carries a significant alternative cost, may not receive any net rent. In 
other words, the cost of producing the public goods required in exchange for political 
rent exceeds the value of the rent. The present study aims to establish whether this 
theory of Tullock is applicable to agriculture in the European Union.
In the literature, particularly in the field of political economy, political rents 
are considered widely, in terms of both the mechanisms for seeking (competing for) 
them, and their consequences for market processes and well-being. Below we give 
a review of various theoretical and empirical approaches to the concept of political 
rent, particularly those which shed a new light on the problem of rent seeking in 
relation to EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. The following hypotheses may be 
ascribed to these approaches, put forward by the authors cited below (see more 
Czyżewski, Matuszczak 2017):
1) political rents deform market mechanisms and prices;
2) rent seeking creates entry barriers to new firms;
3) the occurrence of natural resources as production factors encourages rent 
seeking;
4) market imperfections determine the distribution of political rents;
5) rent seeking may be complementary to an increase in production (the theory 
of complementarity between rent seeking and production);
6) lower income leads to more risky attitudes in rent seeking.
Researchers quite frequently consider the effect of political rents on prices and 
the related social repercussions (Angrist, Kugler 2008; Deininger 2003), including 
108 “(i)f the organizing of private monopolies, or of influencing the government into giving 
you public monopolies, is subject to diseconomies of scale, then the total investment in rent seeking 
will be less than the total value of the rent derived.” By contrast, “(w)hen there are economies of 
scale... total investment to obtain the rents is greater than the rents themselves”.
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in the agricultural sector. For example, it has been shown (Hvid 2015; Dube, 
Vargas 2013) that a fall in coffee prices in Columbia, which was largely politically 
conditioned, led to reductions in wages, and consequently workers were more ready, 
by way of demonstrating their dissatisfaction, to engage in internal armed conflicts. 
We know, however, that in countries with a developed democratic system and solid 
institutional apparatus those damaged by falls in prices organise in order to exert a 
stronger influence on the politicians and officials who might, by means of regulation, 
change their situation. 
It is debatable, however, whether the second of the aforementioned theses carries 
over to agriculture. It has been claimed (Parente, Prescott 1994; Bardhan 1997) that 
when monopoly rights are very strong, firms do not need to introduce innovations 
to maintain their market share. If firms believe that it is more profitable to allocate 
resources to protecting their existing monopolies than to research and development, 
then rent seeking will lead to a systematic weakening in pro-innovative activity 
(Brou, Ruta 2013). A kind of analogy to the situation of a monopolist is seen in 
the ownership of farmland in most EU countries. The market for agricultural land 
is subject to various regulations which undoubtedly create specific entry barriers 
(Czyżewski, Majchrzak 2014). The present system of area payments not related to 
production (decoupled payments) exacerbates this problem, leading to ossification 
of the agrarian structure. Land becomes still less mobile, because even unprofitable 
farms retain it in order to collect rents. 
Another trend in the literature indicates that countries that are rich in natural 
resources have a tendency to create higher political rents and are more susceptible 
to rent seeking (Wadho 2014). Does the presence of natural resources in agriculture 
encourage rent seeking, in line with theories of political economy (Torvik 2001)? 
Ultimately it certainly does, although the mechanism here is entirely different than 
in the case of fossil fuels or metal ores. The more valuable the natural environment 
in rural areas, the lower the level of agricultural output. This relationship can be 
observed in the case of agriculture, because the market value of the environment is 
determined by its recreational, scenic, touristic and ecological utility (including its 
potential for organic food production). This is linked to lower potential advantages 
of scale and the “profitability” of rent seeking. On the other hand, it is easier for 
politicians to justify the social appropriateness of paying political rents that are 
linked to the condition of the natural environment. Payments for public goods have 
a higher degree of social legitimacy than, for example, attempts to correct the market 
and compensate for the effects of the cyclical nature of agricultural production.
The best-developed line of research is the one concerned with the effect of 
imperfections of the market (imperfect competition) and of agricultural policy 
(imperfect implementation) on the distributional effects (“incidence”) of agricultural 
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policy (Alston, James 2002; Gorter, Swinnen 2002; Swinnen 2010b). It is found that 
only 20% of total market and price support in agriculture in the OECD countries creates 
a net surplus in agriculture, while the remainder flows out to related sectors (OECD 
2000), including to landowners (except for individual farms). This phenomenon is 
referred to by the authors as a “surplus drain” from agriculture, and is particularly 
marked in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Research conducted in 
Poland shows that it occurs regardless of the scale of agricultural interventionism, 
and for example in the years 1990-2003, prior to Poland’s accession to the EU, it was 
equally strong. It can be concluded from this that market imperfections in sectors 
related to agriculture affect not only the division of political rents to agriculture (if 
such exist), but also the division of the surplus resulting from increasing agricultural 
productivity in general. In view of the importance of this problem and the lack of 
adequate research in this area, we will devote the remainder of this paper to it. In 
Western Europe and the USA, where agricultural interventionism has operated 
continually since the 1950s, studies have confirmed that imperfect competition in 
the areas of agricultural food processing and the manufacture of means of production 
and service provision to agriculture has a significant effect on the distribution of 
political rents (McCorriston, Sheldon 1991; Salhofer, Schmid 2004). In turn, it has 
been shown that the net effect of area payments on the profits of single-product farms 
is negative. For example, in extensive grain production, while farms profit directly 
from subsidies and indirectly from the increased efficiency resulting from subsidised 
investments, they lose significantly due to the increase in prices of rent and purchase 
of land, the marginal productivity of which increases, stimulating demand. These 
losses are dominant in the balance of costs and benefits of decoupled payments. 
Mixed farms, however, may gain overall, as payments from the CAP make it easier 
for them to obtain credit.
Diverging from the main line of thought concerning the decrease in overall 
well-being due to the payment of political rents is the “theory of complementarity 
of rent seeking and production” (Teng 2013b). Based on a model formalisation, that 
author challenges the universality of the thesis whereby rent seeking is identified 
with a fall in productivity, and proposes a theory in which increased production and 
rent seeking are not substitutes. These processes become complementary when the 
entities seeking rent are also producers, and their production output at the same time 
constitutes input to the rent-seeking effort. It is not easy to apply this generalisation 
to agriculture (it would be as if farmers paid lobbyists in agricultural products), but 
certain analogies may be noted. If it is accepted that the “products” of agriculture 
include specific public goods, they may also represent a bargaining counter for the 
agricultural lobby and politicians. In this sense the aforementioned complementarity 
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of production and rent seeking also arises in agriculture. This is an issue to which we 
shall return in a later part of our considerations.
The last of the above-mentioned lines of research into political rents refers to 
the relationships between income (in the sense of material status) and the political 
risk of rent seeking (Teng 2013a). Stratification of income leads to a polarisation of 
political views within society. Social groups that have little to lose are ready to make 
risky political choices (Goemans 2000), which may provide them with exclusive 
benefits even at the cost of evident losses in total well-being. This problem applies in 
particular to countries with a fragmented agrarian structure, where semi-subsistence 
farmers are highly susceptible to the influence of populist slogans.
The above review of the literature leads to the important conclusion that political 
rents in agriculture diverge from the essence of the concept of rent seeking, which 
is inextricably linked firstly to the wastage of resources and the loss of overall well-
being, and secondly to exclusive benefits obtained by selected social groups at the 
expense of others. 
• If the resources devoted to rent seeking even partly serve to produce public 
goods, then that part cannot be regarded as wastage (according to the theory 
of complementarity of rents and production). 
• If the payment of political rents to agriculture results in the delivery of any 
public goods, then these benefits are not exclusive. 
• If market imperfections in sectors related to agriculture cause rents and 
economic surplus to be captured by other entities, then it is even more the 
case that these benefits are not exclusive.
The above considerations motivated us to attempt to give a new definition of political 
rent in agriculture, and to develop a methodology for measuring it. There are no 
reports in the literature concerning attempts to quantify political rents, even though 
this might lead to an improvement in the effectiveness of public expenditure. It is 
generally accepted that agricultural incomes are primarily the result of institutional 
actions rather than an action of the market (subsidies account for approximately two-
thirds of agricultural income in EU countries on average). For many years in more 
than half of EU countries the costs of agricultural production have been estimated 
to exceed the revenue generated, and if it were not for the subsidies paid to farms, 
agricultural production would become entirely unprofitable and would have to be 
discontinued. 
We must be aware, however, that the stream of subsidies received by farmers 
does not in its entirety constitute a political rent as hitherto construed. In this study 
an attempt is made to evaluate a new category – the “pure political rent” obtained 
by agriculture in the various countries of the EU-27. To enable this category to be 
considered, it is necessary to distinguish within the total pool of subsidies received 
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by a farmer the payment made for public goods generated by the farm, and the part 
which serves to compensate for the drainage of economic surplus resulting from 
market imperfections, which cause the prolonged opening of the “price scissors” 
in agriculture109. The residual amount can then be regarded as a surplus benefit not 
having any economic justification, and representing the result of rent seeking. 
CAP and compensation for market imperfections
We stated above, based on a review of the literature, that the distribution of 
political rents is dependent on market imperfections in agriculture and related sectors. 
Moreover, market imperfections decide not only about the division of political rents, 
but also about the division of economic rents in general. It is appropriate here to 
define the concept of an economic rent. 
Two different approaches can be found in the literature. The first concerns the 
choice between the provision and non-provision of services by a given factor of 
production. This approach was proposed by J. Robinson, who viewed an economic 
rent as the minimum payment for an engaged factor, which gives it an incentive to 
continue to provide services with defined productivity (Robinson 1948). The second 
is the approach of Pareto, which considers the choice between different forms of 
economic activity: the economic rent is the surplus remuneration of a factor of 
production giving it an incentive to provide services in its current use. This definition 
was made precise by P. A. Samuelson, who described an economic rent as the surplus 
income above the alternative remuneration which a factor might receive in another 
use (Brooke 2010, Samuelson 1951, Pareto 1896). Some economists contest all of 
the above definitions. They consider a rent to be any surplus which might be realised 
without affecting the supply of a given factor of production. A defect of the other 
definitions is the failure to take account of the non-financial benefits from provided 
services. Nonetheless, in economics textbooks it is the Paretian approach that has 
become the norm, and generally the following two definitions of economic rents 
are given: the additional payment received by a production factor above the transfer 
income necessary to provide it with an incentive to provide its services in that use 
(Begg, Fischer, Dornbusch 1993, Kamerschen, Mckenzie, Nardinelli 1992); or any 
long-term payment received for the use of a resource of a factor of production that 
exceeds its alternative cost (Kamerschen, Mckenzie, Nardinelli 1992). In the long-
term, theoretically, economic rents vanish. The mechanism operates in the following 
way: at the first stage there is an increase in the real productivity of specified factors 
109 There are also discussions in the literature concerning the distribution of political rents 
in the context of market failure, for example relating to land, credit, and fishing restrictions 
(Wilen 1989, Holzer, Lepton, François 2012).
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– as a result of the introduction of innovations, for example. These factors provide 
unique services that have not hitherto been valued by the market. Higher productivity 
in the short term thus generates an economic surplus and rents to particular factors. 
At the second stage, however, marginal costs are equalised at a new, lower level, 
including payment for the aforementioned services, including as a result of the spread 
of more efficient technology. Rents become costs, and vanish as a result of a striving 
for effective allocation. This is how an effective market mechanism should function. 
Paradoxically, however, market players themselves attempt to delay the process 
of disappearance of economic rents, because these determine their competitive 
position. Rents are therefore a “forbidden fruit” of the economy – they themselves 
represent market imperfections, but at the same time, in a market economy there is 
a continuous seeking of rents, not only of the political kind. This also means that 
economic rents are a broader concept than political rents, the latter being included 
in the former.
The question arises of whether it is possible to speak of a “negative economic 
rent”. This would be either a negative difference between actual income and the 
income which theoretically persuades factors to provide services, or a long-term 
payment which is lower than the alternative cost. This would appear to be impossible 
from a rational choice perspective. Such a situation arises, however, in individual 
agriculture, when agricultural income is insufficient to pay for the farmer’s own 
labour and the costs of assets and land. Theoretically, in such a situation the 
production factors should not provide services – but if the payment for labour and 
cost of land and assets are not treated in the category of market costs, such a situation 
may persist. Negative rents on individual farms in agriculture represent benefits 
to purchasers of agricultural products. Purchasers here are taken to include all 
recipients – the final consumer as well as suppliers and intermediaries. In a situation 
where the technical efficiency of agriculture is improving (for example as a result of 
innovations), a farm should theoretically produce some economic rent, at least over 
a short period. In conditions of low flexibility of demand for agricultural products, 
or in other words, in conditions of high price flexibility110, and inflexible supply of 
agricultural raw materials, this does not happen. We put forward the thesis, which is 
important for our further considerations, that the high flexibility of agricultural prices 
and the low flexibility of supply of agricultural raw materials result from market 
imperfections in areas related to agriculture (under perfect competition, changes in 
supply should not affect prices). Economic rents in agriculture, whether positive or 
negative, are therefore essentially rents of price flexibility, and we shall henceforth 
110 Tomek and Robinson (2001) define the price flexibility coefficient as (∆P/P):(∆Q/Q), 
where P denotes prices and Q output. For more about the technical efficiency of individual farms 
see (Smędzik-Ambroży 2012).
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refer to them as such. They take positive values in conditions of decreasing supply 
of agricultural products, and negative values when supply is increasing. In this 
latter situation, the negative rents of farmers correspond to positive rents of other 
sections of agribusiness. We should add that price flexibility and supply inflexibility 
are particular characteristics of the markets for agricultural raw materials and food, 
and do not apply, for example, to the first sector of agribusiness (Davies, Goldberg 
1967), namely the manufacture of means of production for agriculture. 
A model of the flow of economic rents in agribusiness
In order to model the flow of rents of price flexibility in agribusiness, it is 
necessary to separate the processes of production and changes in real productivity 
from changes in prices of products and inputs. The change in real productivity in the 
agricultural sector without subsidies can be expressed as follows (3.6):
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where:
Qi is the quantity of product i in successive years (t–1, t);
Fj is the quantity of external input j in successive years (t–1, t);
Pi is the price of product i in year t–1;
Rj is the price of external input j in successive years (t–1, t);
∆TFP is the change in the productivity of factors of production (in money units) 
resulting from the change in real effects and inputs (neglecting the CAP). 
In the above equation, the variable Qi (marked with a box) is determined by 
price expectations. Productivity is understood here as the output produced with 
given inputs. We assume that the second bracket (relating to inputs) in equation (1) 
is constant, in view of the fact that, among other things, the land factor and a number 
of other assets are immobile in the case of agriculture (fixed costs).
In turn, the flow of rents resulting exclusively from the change in prices of sold 
products and externally purchased means of production in agriculture is given by the 
equation (3.7):
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where:
HICP is the inflation rate;
∆ASt is the change in the sector’s economic rents in period t relative to t-1 (the 
drainage or inflow of economic surplus through prices);
other symbols have the same meaning as in equation (1).
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It is assumed that:
∆TFP = expected change in income
∆TFP + ∆At = actual change in income
Price expectations in agriculture relate to the values shown in the boxes (in 
equation 2) for prices of products (Pit), prices of inputs (Rjt) and inflation (HICP). 
We assume that Rjt and HICP are independent of changes in the demand for means of 
production in agriculture and the supply of raw materials, as the markets for inputs 
are more competitive, and agriculture makes a relatively small contribution to GDP. 
Prices of products are equal to the world price plus a national price deviation (3.8):
 Pit = Pglobal + ∆Pnational (3.8)
The national price deviation ∆Pnational is an inversely proportional function of 
national agricultural production, while the world prices Pglobal are independent of it. In 
agriculture, as was mentioned earlier, the problem of flexibility of prices is observed, 
understood as a more than proportional change in agricultural prices in response to a 
unit change in the supply of raw material (Tomek, Robinson 2001). Hence:
 ∆Pnational = b*∆Qit   (b<0) (3.9)
or more precisely:
 ∆Pnational = b*(1/∆Qit)   (b<0) (3.9a)
The hyperbolic function theoretically fits better, because increasingly large increments 
in output (and productivity) in practice bring about slower rather than proportional 
falls in prices (cf. Fig. 3.5.). 
Figure 3.5. Model relationship between national price deviations and changes in output in 
agriculture in conditions of high flexibility of agricultural prices
Source: own elaboration using http://calcoolator.pl/rysowanie_wykresow_funkcji.html (8.07.2016).
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The reason for this is the existence of a profitability threshold, below which 
it is not profitable at all to harvest crops (such as fruit and grains) or sell livestock 
(naturalisation of production), along with the possibility of exporting surpluses 
of agricultural raw materials to regions where the supply is lower. The market’s 
reaction to a fall in production is inverted, and causes an increase in prices. In this 
case, however, the marginal price increments also become smaller and smaller, in 
view of the increasing level of imports, and in extreme cases the use of strategic 
national reserves. Hence:
 Pit = Pglobal + b*(1/∆Qit)   (b<0) (3.10)
If price expectations in world agriculture are adaptive (as would be indicated at least 
by the uncertainty relating to weather conditions), Pglobal is described by the function 
(3.11):
 p p p pglobal t
e
global t
e
global t global t
e
_ _ _ _= + −( )− − −1 1 1λ , where λ ∈ ( , )0 1  (3.11)
pglobal t
e
_  denotes expected world prices in the period t;
pglobal t
e
_ −1 denotes expected world prices in the period t–1;
pglobal t_ −1 denotes actual world prices in the period t–1;
λ is a parameter. 
To conclude, the best situation for farmers is one in which Pit = Pit–1, and it 
is in that direction that they should adjust national output (∆Qit). The correctness 
of those adjustments depends on the constancy of parameter b, which corresponds 
to the price flexibility of demand for agricultural raw materials. Various studies 
indicate that coefficients of price flexibility of demand for food are slow to change 
(Zielińska 1979; Zieliński 2002). The point is to act in an anticyclical manner – that 
is, to increase output and productivity in a period of economic upturn in agriculture 
(rising agricultural prices), and to reduce them during a downturn, and not the 
opposite, as generally occurs in countries with a fragmented agrarian system. In 
turn, the correctness of forecasts of world prices depends on the trends in prices of 
agricultural raw materials and farmers’ access to information about those prices. If 
both conditions are satisfied, namely b = constant and p pglobal t
e
global t_ _= , then ∆ASt 
tends to 0 in the long term, and market imperfections do not affect the distribution 
of economic or political rents.
The second of these conditions is generally not satisfied in countries with 
fragmented agriculture, in particular in the new EU member states of Central and 
Eastern Europe (including Poland). As a result, they experience a long-lasting and 
persistent opening of the price scissors in agriculture, and drainage of surplus from 
the agricultural sector. Hence there is a rich literature in those countries on the subject 
of surplus drainage, while in Western Europe and the United States the problem has 
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not been raised for a long time. It should also be noted that in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, more or less until the 1980s, economic theory was dominated by 
Marxist concepts, including the theory of value based on labour. Under that approach 
it was much easier to determine the value of surplus drainage from agriculture. Today, 
however, there is no agreement among economists as to the theoretical or empirical 
basis for the phenomenon. The problem of drainage of rents is nonetheless taking on 
an ever greater practical importance, because it may hamper the further restructuring 
of agriculture and the process of concentration of resources in that sector. As to 
the statement that “agriculture should shrink, but not weaken” (Woś 2003) there is 
general agreement among economists of various schools. There is debate, however, 
concerning the reasons for the drainage of added value from the sector, and the 
consequent proposed solutions to that problem. Many economists attempt to show 
that the source of the problem is to be found in the inherent features of the market 
economy, which means that the supply-and-demand mechanism depreciates the 
sectors in which market imperfections occur in the form of low coefficients of 
flexibility, immobility and indivisibility of resources, transaction costs, monopolies 
or monopsonies, entry and exit barriers, and external effects. These problems are a 
characteristic feature of the agricultural sector, and became particularly visible in the 
period of political transformation in Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Czternasty, Czyżewski 2004). In such conditions market allocation cannot 
be effective, and prices lose their equilibrising properties. Hence there seems to be a 
need for state intervention to correct the aforementioned imperfections of the market 
mechanism by means of appropriate income retransfers and fiscal and monetary 
policy, with the aim of optimising flows between agriculture and related sectors. In 
the absence of such action, the agricultural sector will gradually be excluded from 
processes of expanded reproduction and market exchange, thus producing a number 
of adverse effects of an economic, social and political nature. This, in brief, is the 
case made by the supporters of intervention in the agricultural sector, which has in 
fact been effected within the framework of the CAP for more than half a century, and 
for significantly longer in certain highly developed countries. 
However, if interventionism and protectionism in agriculture, which have been 
established for centuries (being derived from mercantilism, or even from Platonic 
ideas), are the cause of the low effectiveness of the structures in that sector, and the 
present actions of the EU merely reinforce the status quo (Czyżewski 2009c), then 
market imperfections would be brought about largely by agricultural policy itself, 
which prevents the rationalisation of costs and effective allocation of resources – in 
terms of changes in the area structure, for example – to make them more productive. 
The problem here is one of national policy imperfections or market failure. Supporters 
of this viewpoint argue that the incomes of production factors are shaped by the 
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effective allocation of inputs in various subsystems of the national economy, and 
they challenge the claimed accumulation of market imperfections in agriculture. 
According to A. Kowalski and W. Rembisz, external effects are generated not by 
a defective market, but on the contrary, by an absence of market mechanisms in 
terms of certain products (Kowalski, Rembisz 2005). The market mechanism forces 
an increase in the intensity of agricultural production, which undoubtedly triggers 
negative external effects in the form of degradation of the well-being of the countryside, 
broadly defined – the natural environment, landscape, rural culture, etc. Can the 
market effectively regulate the supply of public goods, as wished by the proponents 
of the concept of imperfections in the policy of interventionism? Supporters of the 
“state failure” concept also deny the problem of information asymmetry, which 
in their view applies to all sectors equally. Attention should nonetheless be drawn 
to the degree of monopolisation in the sectors related to agriculture, which in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe is very high compared with other sectors. A 
similar debate concerns public goods. Are they present only in agriculture, because 
only then are there grounds for agrarian intervention? The current reforms of the 
CAP indicate that agricultural land is a basic public good, because it is inextricably 
linked to the well-being of the natural environment. For this reason EU agricultural 
policy should ensure its durability and renewability, so that it can be passed on to 
subsequent generations in an undeteriorated state.
The solution to state inefficiencies may be liberalisation and deregulation of 
processes of production and exchange in agriculture, setting in motion mechanisms 
of competition leading to permanent structural changes in the sector. Insofar as 
family farms are acted on by market stimuli, and the modern state is able to give up 
the doctrine of food self-sufficiency and national ownership of land, and permit a 
widening of social inequalities, the liberal recipe is entirely justified. 
The final argument of the opponents of state intervention in the agricultural 
sector involves challenging the assumptions concerning the mechanism of drainage 
of added value (Czyżewski 2009b). A surplus of produced added value over realised 
(divided) value is in fact only possible under an input approach based on costs of 
production (Kowalski, Rembisz 2005), which derives from classical economics. The 
theory of value based on labour is considered by some economists not to fit the 
contemporary reality. It can be debated whether in the light of current metamorphoses 
and social awareness of the importance of agriculture, this is not a sector in which 
the input theory should be maintained even at the cost of budget transfers. That, 
however, is a subject for another discussion. 
In the authors’ view, the thesis of surplus drainage is confirmed also in the light 
of modern subjective theories of value, wherein prices are shaped based on the 
rational expectations of market players. This is the objective of the methodology, 
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proposed above, for the quantification of flows of economic rents, whereby real 
changes in productivity (∆TFP) are treated separately from nominal flows (occurring 
exclusively through price changes, ∆A).
Measuring political rents
The value of political rents for a representative farm over a long period lasting 
for n years is computed as (3.12 and 3.13, see more Czyżewski, Matuszczak 2017):
If ∆AS1 + ∆AS2 + ... + ∆ASt < 0
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If ∆AS1 + ∆AS2 + ... + ∆ASt ≥ 0
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where:
PR1...t is the political rent in period 1...t;
t is the number of periods
n is the number of subsidies;
m is the number of payments for public goods
Si is the subsidy paid to agriculture under the CAP;
VPGj is the payment for the public goods supplied by a representative farm according 
to the CAP institutional valuation;
other symbols have the same meanings as in equation (3.6). 
By the above methodology, PRt1...tn was computed for an average farm from 
the EU-FADN representative sample, according to classes based on standard output 
(SO) in the EU-27 countries in the period 2005-2012 (approximately 85,600 farms 
are represented by the EU-FADN sample). For the purpose of estimating the value 
of rents for the whole population of representative farms using the FADN sample in 
a given country, the aggregate values Sitni
n
=∑ 1 , VPGitni
n
=∑ 1  and ∆AStn for an average 
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farm were multiplied by the number of representative farms in the class in question. 
The SO classes are defined based on the value of output corresponding to the average 
situation in a given region for various types of agricultural production. In the EU-
FADN methodology, farms with an SO value in the range €2000-8000 are described 
as “very small”, those over €8000 up to €25,000 as “small”, those from €25,000 to 
€50,000 as “moderately small”, those over €50,000 up to €100,000 as “moderately 
large”, those above €100,000 up to €500,000 as “large”, and those above €500,000 
as “very large”. Price indices and values of HICP for the agricultural sector are taken 
from the Eurostat database.
Long-term political rents in the EU countries related to the gross 
receipts
In accordance with the methodology adopted, political rents were computed for 
farms belonging to various standard output classes over a period of eight years, in the 
“old” and “new” member states of the EU. We recall that the values given represent 
that part of EU agricultural subsidies which has no objective justification either as 
payment for public goods or as compensation for market imperfections affecting 
agriculture (leading to high flexibility of agricultural prices). They therefore have 
the features of political rents to a large extent. The analysis made by the authors 
represents a pioneering attempt to quantify the phenomenon of political rent, and 
refutes many of the myths that have developed around it. 
The sum of political rents in the EU in the period under analysis was estimated 
at close to €350 billion, which is no small amount if compared with the EU’s entire 
budget for the years 2007-2013, which amounted to approximately €860 billion. 
An analysis of the rent realised in a given country over the analysed period as a 
proportion of total political rent in the EU shows that the greatest beneficiaries of 
rent seeking are the countries where agriculture is the strongest, including France 
(which receives almost one-fifth of the total rent), followed by Germany (14.1%), 
Italy (11%) and Spain (10.3%). Hence farmers in just four countries capture more 
than half of the political rents from the CAP. It may be thought that this is linked 
to the lobbying strength of agricultural organisations from those countries and their 
engagement in the creation of agricultural policy. Confirmation of this comes from 
the fact that of the total political rents in the EU-27, the EU-15 countries account for 
as much as 83%, with only 17% going to the remaining member states (Tab. 3.12. 
and Tab. 3.13.). 
Another issue is the contribution of political rents to the production (gross 
receipts) of agriculture in a given country, shown in the penultimate column, 
comparable to the PSE indicator. On average in the EU-27 this contribution is 
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13.63%, and although in the EU-12 it is slightly higher, and in the EU-15 somewhat 
lower than average (Tab. 3.12. and Tab. 3.13.), there are countries in which that value 
is exceeded almost twofold. We shall notice however that it is 40% less than the PSE 
indicator which accounts for 22.6 in the EU. It means that the PSE is erroneous to 
some extent while assessing political rents and its error increases with regard to the 
countries of intensive agriculture (i.e. Belgium, cf. Tab. 2.4.)
The authors analysed the reason why political rents account for more than 25% 
of the production of agriculture in Ireland, 28% in Finland, 26% in Latvia, 24% in 
Lithuania, or 21% in Slovakia. In all of the extreme cases the problem lies in the 
low real productivity of agriculture, and not in market imperfections, which affect 
agriculture in all countries to a similar degree. For example, Irish agriculture uses 
a very large quantity of materials – the ratio of indirect consumption to production 
averages approximately 1 over the year, compared with an EU average of 0.66. 
A similar conclusion applies to agriculture in Finland, Slovakia and Latvia. It can 
be asked whether such extreme differences in the level of subsidisation of low 
productivity from the CAP budget is socially just, in terms of the balance of costs 
Table 3.12. Political rents realised in the EU-15 countries in 2005-2012
Country
Political rent 
(€ bn)
Political rent as % of gross receipts 
from agriculture 
(comparable to PSE and FRGE c.f. Tab. 2.4.)
Political rent of country 
as % of total rents 
in EU-27
Austria 9.45 21.66% 2.7%
Belgium 2.52 5.72% 0.7%
Denmark 7.80 12.04% 2.2%
Finland 7.69 28.75% 2.2%
France 67.26 14.61% 19.3%
Germany 49.29 14.77% 14.1%
Greece 16.75 21.00% 4.8%
Ireland 11.74 25.83% 3.4%
Italy 38.39 10.89% 11.0%
Luxembourg 0.54 21.24% 0.2%
Netherlands 6.42 4.32% 1.8%
Portugal 3.55 7.27% 1.0%
Spain 36.12 12.09% 10.3%
Sweden 5.51 15.23% 1.6%
UK 25.77 15.69% 7.4%
EU-15 total 288.8 13.02% (weighted mean)
82.7%
EU-27 total 349.42 13.63% (weighted mean)
100.0%
Source: author’s calculations based on FADN data (granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 
6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
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and benefits for the community as a whole. What benefits does the EU taxpayer 
obtain by subsidising highly inefficient agriculture in certain countries? Naturally, 
indirect benefits can be found, such as the maintenance of agricultural incomes and 
thereby the livelihood of rural areas, prevention of the depopulation of those areas, 
and assurance of internal demand for food. This may be an indication of how the 
CAP could be more effectively modified so as to achieve the desired effects, or at 
least those relating to the supply of public goods. Perhaps countries with structurally 
inefficient agriculture should supply more public goods than they do at present, 
if they wish to maintain their current ratio of political rents to production, or else 
subsidise their agriculture to a greater degree out of national funds. 
Rents of price flexibility and non-equivalent subsidies in EU-15 and 
EU-12 countries
The next part of the analysis concerns the allocation of rents of price flexibility 
in the years 2005-2012, as well as non-equivalent subsidies, namely those the receipt 
of which is not conditional on the supply of public goods. In practice, this concerns 
chiefly the subsidies from the first pillar of the CAP (uniform area payments and 
supplementary payments), but also the balance of subsidies and penalties for milk 
Table 3.13. Political rents realised in the EU-12 countries in 2005-2012
Country
Political rent
(€ bn)
Political rent as % of gross receipts 
from agriculture 
(comparable to PSE and FRGE cf. Tab. 2.4.)
Political rent of country 
as % of total rents 
in EU-27
Bulgaria1 2.91 12.08% 0.8%
Cyprus 0.34 7.59% 0.1%
Czech Rep. 5.79 18.65% 1.7%
Estonia 0.91 19.94% 0.3%
Hungary 9.62 21.33% 2.7%
Latvia 1.80 26.79% 0.5%
Lithuania 3.51 24.61% 1.0%
Malta 0.09 10.37% 0.0%
Poland 22.36 16.35% 6.4%
Romania 8.85 9.00% 2.5%
Slovakia 3.05 21.30% 0.9%
Slovenia 1.38 15.14% 0.4%
EU-12 total 60.61 15.46% 
(weighted mean)
17.40%
EU-27 total 349.42 13.63% 
(weighted mean)
100.0%
1 2008-2012 in the case of Bulgaria and Romania
Source: author’s calculations based on FADN data (granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 
6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
170 3. National Perspective. Towards Valuing Political Rents
production, and subsidies for external consumption, costs of external factors, 
investment, etc. The presentation of these two values alongside each other makes it 
possible to assess the dynamics of political rent. When rents of price flexibility are 
negative, non-equivalent subsidies serve to absorb the effects of market imperfections 
(Czyżewski, Matuszczak 2017).
As regards the results of the analysis, it is hard to identify any unambiguous 
trend in changes in the scale of market imperfections (measured in terms of the value 
of rents of price flexibility) or non-equivalent subsidies, but the results presented in 
Tables 6 and 7 suggest the following conclusions:
1) The overall variability of non-equivalent subsidies among the EU-27 countries 
is relatively large – the coefficient of variation ranges from approximately 
3% to 34%. It is higher in the new member states of the EU-12 than in the 
EU-15, the respective average values being 24% and 10% (cf. Tables 3.14. 
and 3.15.). It may be concluded that political factors play a greater role in the 
EU-12 countries. This nonetheless has a destabilising effect on agricultural 
output.
2) At the same time this can be considered a manifestation of a political cycle, 
which is expressed by significant fluctuations in the total value of non-
equivalent subsidies, including chiefly supplementary payments, since 
national governments adjust the pool of supplementary payments in a given 
year to the current budgetary and political situation, depending on the current 
capabilities of the national budget. Hence, the popular opinion that CAP 
subsidies have been stable since decoupling is a myth.
3) An exception is uniform payments, the timetable of which in each country is 
determined at Commission level for the entire financial framework. However, 
subsidies for indirect consumption, external production factors and investments 
go primarily to farms in the highest SO classes, where susceptibility to market 
imperfections and drainage through prices is the greatest. In this sense they are 
also conditioned by the economic cycle, because in conditions of worsening 
price relations a larger part of them flows out of agriculture.
4) The above implies that the CAP does not perform an anticyclical function 
(having the economic cycle in mind), because a significant part of the 
subsidies (approximately one-third) decreases in conditions of economic 
downturn, when member states’ budgets deficits are rising. On top of this are 
the irregular fluctuations, from the standpoint of the Community as a whole, 
related to the electoral calendars of particular countries. Hence political rents 
function only to a certain extent as a buffer against economic fluctuations 
in agricultural markets, and “market imperfections” still destabilise resource 
management conditions in agriculture to a significant degree.
3.4. Political rents in the EU-27. Comparative analysis 171
5) The effect of the economic cycle on agricultural markets is manifested in 
the inflow and outflow of economic surplus through agricultural price 
fluctuations. For this reason in 2008 and 2009 the economic rent showed a 
marked decrease, and in some countries there was no rent at all in that year 
(cf. Tables 3.14. and 3.15.).
6) An analysis of the correlation between the amount of non-equivalent subsidies 
and the adverse impact of market imperfections on agriculture (negative rents 
of price flexibility) shows greater differentiation among the EU-15 countries 
(between -0.67 and 0.82) than among the EU-12 countries (between -0.39 and 
0.47). It is possible to distinguish several characteristic groups of countries, 
in which:
• there is no relationship between the two values, as in (for example) Greece, 
Sweden, Lithuania and Malta;
• there is a relatively strong negative correlation, as in Ireland (-0.67) and 
Belgium (-0.59). Such a correlation should be evaluated positively, since 
it implies that a higher drainage of surplus through prices is accompanied 
by higher subsidies, which may cautiously be viewed as an anticyclical 
feature (although it is not clear whether this is intentional);
• there is a relatively strong positive correlation between rents of price 
flexibility and subsidies, as in Finland (0.82), France (0.63), Denmark 
(0.47) and Bulgaria (0.46), which can be interpreted as procyclical action, 
inconsistent with the aims of the CAP.
The question thus arises of how consciously such countries as Ireland and 
Belgium shape their national agricultural policy (in the form of supplementary 
payments and others left to the discretion of the member states) to give it an 
anticyclical character. Admittedly, it is not explicitly laid down anywhere that the 
CAP is to be anticyclical, but this is implied indirectly by other aims, such as the 
stability of agricultural incomes. It is in any case certainly not the intention that 
subsidies, particularly those left to the discretion of individual countries, should be 
procyclical – this would be inconsistent with the overall idea of agricultural policy. 
Hence, if non-equivalent subsidies are to be of a deliberately anticyclical nature, 
then at times when prices are becoming less favourable to agriculture (when there 
is drainage of economic surplus through price flexibility) those subsidies should 
increase. It should be noted, however, that this principle again conflicts with the idea 
of decoupling, since such anticyclical actions could easily bring about a repeat of 
food overproduction, which has already been a problem for the EU. It is therefore 
debatable whether EU agricultural policy should retain its dual nature, with declared 
systemic decoupling on the one hand, but with various doors left open for the level 
of subsidy to be linked to output. These doors are not, however, used consciously by 
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many countries, particularly those of the EU-12. As a result, in the EU-12 most of the 
“coupled programmes” implemented by national governments have an unintended 
procyclical effect (cf. the positive correlation coefficients in Table 3.14.). Perhaps it 
would therefore be better to aim for a complete decoupling of subsidies from output, 
and to restrict the CAP to uniform payments only.
Conclusions
The new approach proposed by the authors is necessary, as it provides an 
indication of how to improve the effectiveness of allocation of support for agriculture 
in individual EU countries. Quantification of the political rent in agriculture enables 
a more rational and socially appropriate distribution of assistance from the CAP in 
accordance with the goals set for agricultural policy in the new financial framework 
after 2014. Although the division of payment envelopes between member states has 
already been decided, since 2014 the CAP has gained flexibility in terms of the 
structure of both pillars and transfers between them. These matters remain in the 
hands of the governments of member states. Calculations show that the structure 
of payments under the first and second pillar in the years 2007-2013 was strongly 
influenced in many countries by the political cycle, not to mention the fact that 
certain programmes had effects that were procyclical and destabilising. The chaos 
existing in this regard weakens the point of “decoupling” that has been implemented 
by the EU since 2003. The problem may be that in many countries breaking the 
link between subsidies and output was reflected more in declarations than in facts, 
and that ways are constantly being sought to “get round” that requirement. Such 
attempts exacerbate the King’s effect, and mean that a large part of the subsidies 
are not capitalised within agriculture, but are captured by related sectors. What we 
have in mind here is the fact that, for example, investment support goes mainly 
to the largest farms, where it is subject to the strongest drainage through price 
flexibility. Redefinition is also required as regards the issue of social fairness in the 
determination of the sizes of national CAP envelopes. The calculations of political 
rents show that historical payments are neither a rational nor a just solution.
Part 4.
Regional Perspective.
How to Measure and How to Support 
Sustainability in Agribusiness?
4.1. Sustainable development in the Pila subregion
(Joanna Strońska-Ziemann, Andrzej Czyżewski111)
Introduction
Of the vast range of published criteria for measuring and evaluating sustainable 
development, most of them are geared to the global or national level (Bühler-Natour, 
Herzog 1999, Graymore et al. 2008). It should be emphasised that sustainable 
development is not, according to the literature, a single, well-defined concept. There 
are numerous perspectives, yet whichever view is chosen, it always entails a normative 
choice of indicators (van Zeijl-Rozema et al. 2008). Two different perspectives on 
sustainable development and its assessment were analysed: UNECE’s measurement 
of sustainable development at the national level, and the Dutch method for measuring 
at the regional level – INSURE.
Sustainability in the literature
According to UNECE, sustainable development is development that could be 
continued for a very long time, meaning increasing well-being for several generations. 
According to that institution, the measurement of sustainable development may be 
based on the concept of well-being, provided that it is broadened beyond its traditional 
scope in economics. Therefore, instead of focusing on consumption defined as 
enjoyment of goods and services purchased in the market, it should be construed as 
enjoyment of any good or service that contributes to well-being, including things freely 
provided by nature like forest products and beautiful sunsets. It should also include 
the enjoyment of the benefits of human rights or psychological fitness as forms of 
consumption. There are two opposing views on the relationship between short- and 
long-term well-being and sustainable development. The first, called the integrated 
view, holds that the goal of sustainable development is to combine the well-being 
of the current generation and the potential for the well-being of future generations. 
According to the second, the future-oriented view, the main concern of sustainable 
development is to ensure the potential for the well-being of future generations. Yet it 
is important to emphasise that it is wealth per capita, not the total wealth of society, 
that should not decline over time. Although increase of wealth does not guarantee 
sustainability of development, deterioration of capital stocks per capita would make 
sustainable development impossible. Sets of indicators depend on priorities and data 
111 Poznan University of Economics and Business; j.ziemann@euroconsultant.pila.pl .
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availability among countries – everywhere a strong relationship between policy and 
indicators can be noticed. Thus, it is important to set appropriate sustainability goals, 
as then adequate indicators might be selected; obviously the clearer the goals, the 
clearer the indicators. The criteria to be used when making decisions on indicators 
should include objectivity and ease of use (Reed et al. 2006), availability of time series, 
and inclusion in official government-formulated sustainable development indicator 
(SDI) lists (Herrera-Ulloa et al. 2003). There are also further criteria that should be 
included such as simplicity, scope, quantification, sensitivity, and timeliness (Kelly, 
Moles 2002). When indicators are chosen it is important to decide on the weight that is 
assigned to each factor. Some analysts believe that all indicators have equal importance 
(this view is expressed in reports of the European Commission 2005a, 2007, Provincie 
Limburg (België) 2006, IISD, JRC 2009), whereas others use participatory processes 
to rank indicators by importance (Kelly, Moles 2002, Mickwitz, Melanen 2009). In 
order to make a reliable assessment of sustainable development, not only should a set 
of indicators be chosen, but they should also be optimally combined (cf. Grosskurth, 
Rotmans 2005, Wiek, Binder 2005). Therefore regression analysis is commonly 
used (Putzhuber, Hasenauer 2010) to seek out weakly correlated indicators (Herrera-
Ulloa et al. 2003). Broad consistency among countries can be observed; for example, 
most sustainable development indicator sets include an indicator on greenhouse gas 
emissions. Within the European Union there is an inevitable convergence among 
the national indicators used, because the indicators used by newer member states 
are influenced by those adopted by older member states, which usually had better-
established national indicator sets. Sustainability is measured based on a very 
broad view of consumption and consequently of capital, i.e. five equally important 
individual stocks: financial capital (stocks, bonds and currency deposits), produced 
capital (machinery, buildings, telecommunications and other types of infrastructure), 
natural capital (natural resources, land and ecosystems providing services such as 
waste absorption), human capital (an educated and healthy workforce), and social 
capital in the form of functioning social networks and institutions. According to this 
perspective, the measurement of sustainability is indeed viable, as it can be precisely 
determined whether a particular form of capital per capita is increasing or declining 
over time and whether there are inevitable tradeoffs which should be weighted while 
development proceeds. 
At the regional level, indicators usually do not tell us much about how well 
a system is progressing in terms of the goal of sustainability, as it is difficult to 
take account of the specific regional situation. According to some researchers, the 
measurement of sustainable development based on national-level data might fail to 
capture critical issues at the regional level (Bühler-Natour, Herzog 1999, Herrera-
Ulloa et al. 2003, Reed et al. 2006). Yet it is important to assess sustainability at 
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the level of regions which have an optimal size for successfully implementing 
sustainable development: they are small enough to be of direct interest to residents, 
and large enough to possess critical mass for creative solutions (Zilahy, et al. 2009). 
Also, such a unit of analysis incorporates processes that go beyond the regional 
level (McManus 2008). However, since values might differ significantly across 
regions, Stevenson and Ball (1998) suggest using materials that allow for variability 
instead of applying generic standards. In the view of some researchers, sustainability 
should be determined by values of the local community which fit within the broad 
framework of the triple bottom line (people, planet, profit – i.e. social, environmental 
and economic aspects) or the Brundtland definition (Stevenson, Ball 1998, Reed 
et al. 2006, Wallis 2006). Consequently, tools used to assess progress have to be 
developed within the context of the local landscape (Wallis 2006). The INSURE112 
project was launched to develop meaningful indicators of sustainable development at 
the regional level. It has the aim of designing a generic approach for the assessment 
of sustainable development without following the standard approach of predefining 
a universal indicator set. However, it did not design a context or goals for each 
region, but showed how important it is to define them when measuring sustainable 
development. INSURE operationalised the step of setting goals and context by using 
an existing political expression of sustainable development.
Based on these two methodologies it might be concluded that, while a generic 
approach may be applicable to analyses at national level, no such standard approach 
using a predefined universal indicator set is possible in the case of regions. Therefore, 
although some general approach might be followed, it is necessary to design certain 
individual indicators appropriately to the problems of a particular region. The 
sustainability of development of the Pila subregion was assessed based on elements 
of both the UNECE and INSURE methodologies. From the UNECE methodology 
the availability of time series and the strong link between sustainability goals and 
indicators were maintained; also the simplicity and quantification of data were taken 
into consideration. It was decided that all indicators would have equal importance, 
therefore no weights were applied. After indicators available at municipality level 
had been chosen, the commonly applied regression analysis was used to seek out 
weakly correlated indicators. The five individual stocks mentioned in UNECE’s 
methodology – financial capital, produced capital, natural capital, human capital and 
social capital – were combined into four equally important components: financial and 
produced capital together formed an economic component, natural capital formed 
an environmental component, social and human capital together created a social 
component, and the part of produced capital concerning infrastructure formed a 
112 Flexible Framework for Indicators for Sustainability in Regions, Using System Dynamics 
Modelling
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spatial component. However, the INSURE methodology was also taken into account 
in the choice of indicators – values fit within the framework of the triple bottom 
line (people, planet, profit – i.e. social, environmental and economic aspects). 
Accordingly, the indicator of development for each municipality included the four 
above-mentioned components and was intended to determine the differences between 
municipalities in the subregion, i.e. to quantify the deviation of each municipality 
from the median value of the subregion. Initially, the reference point was planned to 
be the mean value for the subregion, but due to the danger of a strong distortion of 
the mean by extreme values, the median value was used instead. 
Regional sustainable development indicators
Due to problems related to the simultaneous comparability of several variables, a 
multivariate analysis was used. A separate taxonomic analysis was carried out and the 
overall indicator for each of the 11 subcomponents was assessed. Based on the results, 
a comprehensive evaluation of the components and subsequently an overall assessment 
of sustainable development were performed. The partial indicators were treated as 
diagnostic features of development; therefore the taxonomic analysis of the whole 
component comprised an analysis of the aggregated indicators of each component. 
Furthermore, to enable a comparative analysis, a synthetic indicator of the achieved level 
of development was assessed, this being a function combining the partial information. 
Consequently, the data were standardised from 0 to 1, and then the standardised sums 
method was used based on the formula for the synthetic Perkal index (4.1): 
 s zi ijnj
m
= ′
=∑
1
2 1
  (4.1)
where:
′zijn is the standardised value of the j-th feature in the i-th object, calculated using the 
formula (4.2):
 ′ =
+
z
x x
sijn
ij j
j
 (4.2)
where n is the number of objects.
Considering the level of delimitation chosen for assessment, there were many 
problems associated with gathering data. These were mainly caused by the lack 
of relevant information in official statistics at the NUTS 5113 level, insufficient 
aggregation of sectors, and delays in the publication of data from general censuses. 
In consequence, the indicators had to be adjusted and adapted to the real possibilities 
of obtaining data.
113 Classification of territorial units according to the Council of Ministers Ordinance (Journal 
of Laws of 2000, No. 58, item 685). NTS 5 is the municipal level.
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Table 4.1. Components of regional sustainable development in the Pila subregion
Environmental 
component 
Operating 
environment
Use of water supply system (dm3) per capita
Stocking density (SD) on 100 ha of arable land
Percentage of population served by municipal wastewater treatment plants
Percentage of homes with gas supply
Percentage of homes with central heating
Attractiveness 
Ratio of forest land to total area
Rate of linkage to the general public
Number of tourists accommodated per 1000 inhabitants
Environmental 
protection 
Ratio of national and landscape parks and nature reserves to total area
Expenditure on environmental protection to total expenditure
Average municipal budget expenditure on environmental protection per 
inhabitant in 2004-2006 (PLN)
Social 
component
Demographics 
Proportion of working age population
Age dependency ratio (people)
Feminisation rate (%)
Factor attractiveness of migration per 1000 population
Natural increase per 1000 population
Education
 Percentage of adult population with higher education
Average test result on completion of primary school (points)
Social activity
Turnout in elections
Proportion of councillors with higher education
Library books per inhabitant
Average municipal budget expenditure on culture and protection of 
national heritage per inhabitant
Living 
conditions 
Percentage of homes in newly constructed buildings
Average municipal budget expenditure on social welfare per inhabitant
Proportion of people living on unearned sources of income
Percentage of population using water supply
Economic 
component
Economic 
activity
Registered unemployment per 100 people of productive age
Total number of farms per 100 hectares
Number of individual farms per 100 hectares
Employment rate (people of working age)
Employment among women (aged 17-60)
Agricultural 
sector
Percentage of individual farms over 1 ha producing mainly for the market
Percentage of farmers with higher education
Average total GR area
Percentage of individual farms engaged in non-agricultural activities
Finances of 
municipalities
Average municipal revenue per inhabitant
Average revenue from personal and corporate income tax per inhabitant
Funds for financing municipalities’ tasks from other sources per inhabitant
Ratio of capital investment to total budget expenditure of municipalities
Non-agricultural 
sector
Percentage of non-agricultural sector employment in the service sectors
Ratio of private to public entities
Spatial 
component
Level of urbanisation 
Density of road network
Source: own compilation based on Bołtromiuk (2011). The components were comprehensively analysed and 
assessed
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The economic component
The economic component was described by 16 partial variables, aggregated 
into four subcomponents – agriculture (4 variables), non-agricultural (3 variables), 
economic activity (5 variables), and municipal finance (4 variables) – covering 
all aspects of the economic activity of the population in municipalities of the 
subregion. Agriculture was described by four variables, all of which are stimulants. 
The percentage of individual market-oriented farms of size larger than 1 ha showed 
the level of development of agriculture, while the percentage of users of individual 
farms with higher education reflected the level of human capital among farmers. 
The average area of a farm provided information on the degree of fragmentation 
of farms in the subregion, which of course also reflects their economic viability 
and survivability. The percentage of individual farms running non-agricultural 
businesses showed the willingness of farmers in the subregion to seek additional 
sources of income as well as the level of entrepreneurship in rural areas. Non-
agricultural sector variables included the degree of servitisation of the economy, 
linked to the role of services in the local economy as well as the structure of 
employment in 2002. Another variable – private entities delivering public services to 
public entities providing such activities (education, health, social welfare) – showed 
the contribution of local entrepreneurs in providing more sophisticated services and 
their ability to initiate such projects. This variable also provides information about 
the level of unmet needs of the local community in terms of those services, as well 
as their awareness of specific organisational regulations and laws. The number of 
entities per 1000 residents showed the level of entrepreneurship and diversification 
of local farmers. Economic activity was measured by five variables, of which one 
– unemployment per 100 people of age 17-60 – was a destimulant. It was initially 
planned to calculate the percentage of people working in agriculture, but it was 
impossible to obtain information on the number of people employed in agriculture 
in 2010114. In consequence, this variable was replaced by the number of farms per 
100 ha in total, complemented by a variable showing the number of individual farms 
per 100 ha. Both variables were necessary due to the relatively high proportion of 
farms with a legal form not allowing them to be classed as individual entities. The 
indicators reflected the economic activity of residents of the analysed municipalities, 
as a decreasing number of farms indicated improvement of the economic viability 
of the remaining ones, as well as an increase in the level of employment outside 
114 Since 2005 data have been aggregated, with agriculture combined with forestry, hunting 
and fishing, which distorts the data on employment in agriculture itself. An analysis for the years 
1992 and 2002 led to the conclusion that the number employed in agriculture per 100 ha decreased, 
and only in the case of cities an increase was recorded, due to the decrease in arable land and fairly 
stable numbers of people employed in agriculture.
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agriculture. Another variable, the employment rate, showed the level of activity of 
the population of working age, and the last, employment among women, reflected 
how many professionally active women work in non-agricultural sectors, which is 
an important factor in the labour market especially in rural areas. The last group 
of variables describing the economic component – finances of municipalities – 
consisted of four variables, all of which are stimulants containing information on 
expenditure and revenue of local budgets. The first variable, average municipal 
revenue per inhabitant, illustrated the wealth of the analysed municipalities, while 
the second, average revenue from personal and corporate income tax per inhabitant, 
reflected the affluence of inhabitants. It should be noted that these variables do not 
reflect the situation of typical agricultural communities, because farms do not pay 
income tax. Funds for the financing of municipalities’ tasks from other sources per 
inhabitant showed the effectiveness of local authorities in raising funds from sources 
other than the state budget to implement various tasks. This variable is especially 
important at the present time, when municipalities have the possibility of obtaining 
funds from the EU. The last of the variables describing this component – the ratio of 
capital investment to municipalities’ total budget expenditure – reflected the role of 
investment for local authorities and their willingness to raise standards of living and 
meet the needs of the local community.
The social component
The social component was described by demographics (6 variables), education 
(3 variables), social activities (3 variables) and living conditions (11 variables). The 
greatest problems with obtaining data from official statistical collections throughout 
the entire period related to education. This is because data describing the educational 
level of citizens are only collected in censuses, and at the last census they were not 
aggregated at municipal level. It was also impossible to obtain data on the results of 
tests on completion of primary school for 1996, as this preceded the reform of the 
education system.
The first subcomponent was described by the percentage of population of 
working age, which reflected the proportion of the population of the municipality 
aged 18 to 59 years in the case of women and 18 to 64 in the case of men. This shows 
the proportional share of potential labour resources in society. It is complemented by 
the demographic load factor, which represents the non-working-age population per 
100 people of working age. Thus, both groups are presented – the potential labour 
resources, and that part of the population which is not involved in the production of 
national income, but only in its division. Another indicator, the rate of feminisation 
(%), gives the ratio of women to men. Factor attractiveness of migration per 1000 
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population shows the areas of outflow and influx of people in relation to the flow of 
people changing their place of residence. The natural increase per 1000 people and 
the number of marriages per 100 people present demographic trends in the subregion 
as well as a population forecast. Education was described by three variables, 
illustrating the level of education of various age groups in society. The percentage of 
highly educated adults reflected the better-educated part of the population. Another 
variable, the percentage of children attending pre-school, showed the level of early 
schooling, which is very important in rural areas, as pre-school-age children there 
usually stay at home rather than take advantage of institutional education. The 
average test result on completion of primary school for the years 2002 and 2010 
reflects the quality of education in primary schools in the subregion. The social 
activity of the adult population eligible to vote was described by the turnout in 
elections. The proportion of better educated councillors on the legislative bodies of 
municipalities illustrated the quality of the governing class in the subregion. Another 
variable – number of NGOs per 1000 population – shows the willingness of the local 
community to cooperate and associate into formal organisations. Unfortunately, this 
is not a perfect indicator, as it indicates only the number of registered organisations, 
not taking into account their actual operation or completed projects. The next 
variable, the number of events per 1000 population, measures the development 
of culture in the subregion. Budget expenditure on culture per capita shows how 
important cultural development is for the local authorities. Living conditions were 
described by a large number of variables, so this is an element which is measured 
in detail and most accurately. The first variable was library books per inhabitant, 
which describes how well the reading needs of inhabitants are met. The percentage 
of apartments in newly constructed buildings out of the total number of inhabited 
dwellings, assuming that new homes have better facilities and a higher standard than 
those in old buildings, reflects the increase in the standard of living and wealth of 
inhabitants. Average municipal budget expenditure on social welfare per inhabitant 
is a destimulant, indicating the level of welfare assistance provided to residents. 
Another destimulant in this subcomponent – the percentage of people living on 
benefits – indicates the proportional size of the non-working population. The next 
variable, UFA115 per person (m2), reflects the standard of living of the inhabitants 
of the subregion. The number of people per home is strongly connected with the 
previous variable and reflects the standard of living of society. Municipal investment 
per person illustrates the interest of local authorities in improving the quality of life, 
for example by maintaining greenery, order on the streets and lighting. The number 
of people per pharmacy reflects the community’s overall access to medicines and 
115 Usable floor area.
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pharmaceutical advice. The last variable – the percentage of the population using 
the water supply system – indicates improvement in the living conditions of the 
population in the subregion.
The environmental component
The factor of attractiveness of the environment caused the most problems in 
measuring the environmental component, as there was no information available 
concerning the attractiveness of the subregion’s terrain in the analysed period. The 
measurement was made using the classical model applied in such an analysis: pressure-
state-response (PSR). The first variable – use of the water supply network (dm3) per 
capita – represented the pro-ecological attitudes of residents. Another – stock density 
per 100 ha of arable land – was a destimulant and showed the impact of agriculture 
on nature. The next variable – percentage of population served by municipal sewage 
treatment plants – measures the development of pro-environment infrastructure, 
including both sewage treatment plants and the connected sewage system. The 
length of operational sewerage in m2 per person shows the condition of the waste 
disposal infrastructure and the length of the network connected to sewage treatment 
plants, thus it is a variable complementary to the previous one. The percentage of 
homes with central heating reflects the standard of living, while the percentage of 
homes equipped with gas heating is a complementary variable to the previous one 
and reflects the ecological attitude of inhabitants of the subregion. On the other hand, 
it may also indicate the wealth of the inhabitants, since gas heating would appear 
to be a more expensive but also a convenient solution. Data on air pollution proved 
to be extremely difficult to obtain. Overall dust and gas emissions were analysed; 
however, the availability of data for only some cities and major differences in values 
between years resulted in the abandonment of this variable in further analyses. The 
attractiveness of the environment was described by such indicators as the ratio of 
forests to total area, which indicates areas of dense forests that are disadvantageous 
for agricultural use. The contribution of permanent grassland to total agricultural 
land pointed to the intensity of agricultural land use. The last variable describing this 
component – number of tourists accommodated per 1000 inhabitants – reflects tourist 
attractions in the subregion, as well as the development of tourism infrastructure 
in municipalities. Unfortunately, data were available only for nine municipalities, 
and so a comprehensive assessment of this factor was impossible. Environmental 
protection was described by such variables as the ratio of national parks and nature 
reserves to total area, reflecting the policy concerning the protection of the surface 
of the subregion. The ratio of expenditure on environmental protection to overall 
expenditure, and average municipal budget expenditure on environmental protection 
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per inhabitant, are variables reflecting the importance of environmental protection 
for the local government, as well as directions of disbursement of the budget related 
to the implementation of EU projects.
The spatial component
The spatial component was described by two variables116 – the ratio of urban 
to rural population, indicating the level of urbanisation of the subregion, and road 
network density, determined by the ratio of the length of municipal roads to the area 
of the municipality.
Levels of components
Each component separately, as well as the synthetic indicator of sustainable 
development, were examined for each of the rural municipalities of the subregion 
in the three analysed periods – the pre-accession period (1996 and 2002) and post-
accession period (2010). The same variables and measurement methods were 
adopted, which ensured a full comparability of the sustainability of development 
in the municipalities of the subregion in the entire analysed period. The component 
values for 1996 are presented in the table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Component indicators in 1996
Municipality
Environmental 
component
Social 
component 
Economic 
component 
Spatial 
component
Synthetic 
indicator
Pila subregion 0.42 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.30
Budzyń 0.32 -0.04 0.12 1.31 0.43
Chodzież -0.19 -0.14 0.07 -0.37 -0.16
Margonin 0.76 0.10 0.35 0.14 0.34
Szamocin 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.27
Czarnków -0.41 -0.28 -0.47 1.66 0.13
Drawsko 0.65 -0.17 -0.08 1.00 0.35
Krzyż Wielkopolski 0.49 0.07 0.41 0.53 0.38
Lubasz -0.33 0.17 0.43 -0.58 -0.08
Połajewo -0.36 -0.13 -0.42 -0.51 -0.36
Trzcianka 0.82 0.56 0.41 0.49 0.57
Wieleń -0.21 -0.23 0.00 0.15 -0.07
Białośliwie 0.29 0.18 0.12 -0.56 0.00
Kaczory 0.73 0.03 0.06 -0.59 0.06
Łobżenica -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00
Miasteczko Krajeńskie -0.02 0.36 -0.22 -0.58 -0.12
Szydłowo -0.11 -0.40 -0.20 -0.58 -0.32
Ujście 0.07 -0.15 0.60 0.19 0.18
116 Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain data on, among others, railway network density, 
GDP per capita, or, for example, parameters related to innovation.
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Municipality
Environmental 
component
Social 
component 
Economic 
component 
Spatial 
component
Synthetic 
indicator
Wyrzysk -0.31 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.05
Wysoka -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 0.01 -0.11
Damasławek -0.52 -0.15 0.39 -0.51 -0.20
Gołańcz -0.20 0.04 -0.01 0.96 0.20
Mieścisko 0.04 0.07 -0.15 -0.55 -0.15
Skoki -0.02 -0.09 0.32 0.13 0.08
Wapno -0.52 0.02 -0.19 -0.36 -0.26
Wągrowiec -0.67 -0.52 -0.30 -0.55 -0.51
Jastrowie 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.52 0.20
Krajenka -0.22 0.19 -0.30 0.21 -0.03
Lipka -0.33 -0.15 -0.26 -0.58 -0.33
Okonek -0.09 -0.03 -0.20 0.07 -0.06
Tarnówka 0.26 -0.32 -0.42 -0.60 -0.27
Zakrzewo -0.04 0.09 -0.39 -0.57 -0.23
Złotów -0.54 -0.29 -0.36 -0.58 -0.44
Source: Own calculations based on Central Statistical Office data (Local Data Bank)
As can be seen from the above table, in 1996 the Trzcianka municipality turned out 
to have the highest values for the environmental and social components. Expenditure 
on environmental protection per capita was very high in this municipality, and the 
development of infrastructure and forest cover were also higher than in other parts of 
the subregion. In terms of the economic component the highest level was recorded in 
Ujście, distinguished by a high level of entrepreneurship, employment, and income 
levels from personal and corporate income tax.
Table 4.3. Component indicators in 2002
Municipality
Environmental 
component
Social 
component 
Economic 
component 
Spatial 
component
Synthetic 
indicator
Pila subregion 0.07 -0.05 0.31 0.12 0.11
Budzyń 0.06 0.05 0.25 1.38 0.44
Chodzież 0.53 0.18 -0.01 -0.41 0.07
Margonin 0.37 0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.11
Szamocin 0.14 -0.34 -0.16 0.16 -0.05
Czarnków -0.41 -0.03 0.10 1.75 0.35
Drawsko -0.08 -0.06 -0.39 0.69 0.04
Krzyż Wielkopolski 0.28 0.02 -0.06 0.28 0.13
Lubasz -0.20 -0.16 0.10 -0.62 -0.22
Połajewo -0.05 0.45 -0.36 -0.56 -0.13
Trzcianka -0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.27 0.08
Wieleń -0.27 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09
Białośliwie -0.07 0.24 -0.02 -0.61 -0.12
Kaczory 0.60 -0.06 0.03 -0.64 -0.02
Table 4.2. cont.
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Municipality
Environmental 
component
Social 
component 
Economic 
component 
Spatial 
component
Synthetic 
indicator
Łobżenica 0.12 0.22 0.06 -0.12 0.07
Miasteczko Krajeńskie -0.44 0.02 -0.43 -0.63 -0.37
Szydłowo 0.13 0.26 -0.21 -0.62 -0.11
Ujście 0.49 0.28 -0.05 0.01 0.19
Wyrzysk -0.06 -0.44 -0.04 -0.07 -0.15
Wysoka 0.27 0.08 -0.23 -0.12 0.00
Damasławek -0.23 -0.12 -0.05 -0.56 -0.24
Gołańcz -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.66 0.14
Mieścisko 0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.59 -0.19
Skoki 0.09 -0.14 0.26 0.01 0.05
Wapno -0.12 -0.45 0.07 -0.40 -0.23
Wągrowiec -0.72 0.25 -0.13 -0.59 -0.30
Jastrowie -0.16 0.19 -0.21 0.28 0.02
Krajenka 0.13 -0.14 -0.33 0.01 -0.09
Lipka -0.36 -0.11 -0.25 -0.63 -0.34
Okonek -0.37 -0.23 -0.34 -0.09 -0.26
Tarnówka 0.67 -0.13 -0.44 -0.65 -0.14
Zakrzewo 0.03 0.01 -0.20 -0.61 -0.19
Złotów -0.44 0.01 -0.40 -0.63 -0.36
Source: Own calculations based on Central Statistical Office data (Local Data Bank)
The table above shows indicator values in 2002. The highest values for the 
environmental component were recorded for Tarnówka (with a value nine times 
higher than in the subregion as a whole), where low stocking density (SD) on 100 
ha of arable land, a well-developed infrastructure network and a high proportion 
of protected areas were recorded. For the social component the highest value was 
obtained by Połajewo (almost 10 times greater than the average), with a high 
percentage of children aged up to 6 years attending pre-school, and a relatively low 
municipal budget expenditure on welfare. In terms of the economic component, the 
highest values were recorded in Budzyn and Skoki, both of which had high rates of 
entrepreneurship.
Table 4.4. Component indicators in 2010
Municipality
Environmental 
component
Social 
component 
Economic 
component 
Spatial 
component
Synthetic 
indicator
Pila subregion -0.01 -0.06 0.10 0.11 0.03
Budzyń 0.86 -0.10 0.43 1.38 0.64
Chodzież 0.22 0.27 0.16 -0.41 0.06
Margonin 0.70 0.35 0.42 -0.03 0.36
Szamocin 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.11
Czarnków -0.21 -0.26 -0.40 1.75 0.22
Table 4.3. cont.
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Municipality
Environmental 
component
Social 
component 
Economic 
component 
Spatial 
component
Synthetic 
indicator
Drawsko -0.18 -0.03 -0.18 0.69 0.08
Krzyż Wielkopolski 0.11 -0.22 -0.31 0.27 -0.04
Lubasz -0.22 0.22 0.30 -0.62 -0.08
Połajewo -0.13 -0.20 -0.37 -0.56 -0.31
Trzcianka -0.15 0.04 -0.07 0.27 0.02
Wieleń -0.22 -0.12 -0.24 -0.03 -0.15
Białośliwie -0.29 0.30 -0.31 -0.61 -0.23
Kaczory 0.54 0.13 -0.10 -0.64 -0.02
Łobżenica -0.25 -0.38 -0.06 -0.13 -0.20
Miasteczko Krajeńskie -0.39 0.38 -0.42 -0.63 -0.26
Szydłowo 0.60 -0.13 0.24 -0.62 0.02
Ujście 0.01 -0.27 -0.05 0.01 -0.08
Wyrzysk -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.07 -0.22
Wysoka -0.09 -0.39 -0.43 -0.11 -0.25
Damasławek -0.14 0.07 -0.16 -0.56 -0.20
Gołańcz 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.66 0.23
Mieścisko -0.54 -0.17 -0.18 -0.59 -0.37
Skoki -0.47 -0.16 0.23 0.02 -0.10
Wapno -0.15 -0.17 -0.24 -0.40 -0.24
Wągrowiec -0.29 -0.22 -0.07 -0.59 -0.29
Jastrowie -0.30 -0.05 -0.44 0.28 -0.05
Krajenka 0.57 0.04 -0.30 0.00 0.23
Lipka -0.50 -0.10 -0.19 -0.63 -0.35
Okonek 0.00 -0.08 -0.20 -0.06 0.01
Tarnówka -0.23 -0.23 -0.26 -0.65 -0.34
Zakrzewo 0.09 0.11 -0.29 -0.61 -0.18
Złotów -0.57 -0.23 -0.05 -0.63 -0.37
Source: Own calculations based on Central Statistical Office data (Local Data Bank)
In the final year of analysis, in terms of the environmental and economic 
components, the highest values were recorded in the municipality of Budzyn, which 
had an outstanding network infrastructure, a high level of municipal investment, 
a high ratio of private to public entities, a high level of entrepreneurship and high 
budget income from personal and corporate income tax. In terms of the social 
component the highest values were obtained by Miasteczko Krajeńskie, which was 
characterised by a relatively high birth rate and the highest number of marriages.
Table 4.4. cont.
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Conclusions
Based on the results of the methodology described above for evaluating regional 
sustainable development, maps were prepared showing the units with the highest 
and lowest values of the indicator.
Figure 3.6. Synthetic indicator values in 1996, 2002 and 2010
Source: Own calculations based on Central Statistical Office data (Local Data Bank)
To conclude, throughout the entire period municipalities in the northern and 
south-eastern parts of the Pila subregion were described by lower values. On the 
other hand, stable high values of the synthetic indicator were recorded in the southern 
parts of the subregion (the municipalities of the Chodzież powiat) and in the north in 
the municipalities of the Czarnków-Trzcianka powiat. The methodology enables not 
only an assessment of sustainability, but also a comparison of synthetic indicators in 
the entire analysed period. The observed relationships are largely consistent with the 
diversity of the educational region Pila (Polcyn 2014).
4.2. Human capital in agribusiness as a factor 
in sustainable development – problems of measurement 
in the case of firms in the agri-food sector
(Firlej Krzysztof, Karolina Palimąka, Mateusz Mierzejewski117)
The historical context
The European Council summit of May 2000 set out directions to be taken in 
the continued development of a united Europe. This development would be based 
on a more effective use of human resources. This was a decision influenced by the 
significant advantage in economic development enjoyed by the United States, whose 
economy was based to a large extent on using human resources more effectively. 
Differences in development also resulted from such factors as the faster ageing of 
the European population (in 2000 the percentage of the EU’s population being of 
productive age was 66%, compared to around 75% in the United States (Niklewicz 
2011) and the divergence in the quality of intellectual capital (the proportion of 
graduates in the United States was approximately 17% higher). The concept of 
long-term economic development that resulted from the actions of the European 
Council moved the main emphasis to human capital understood in a variety of ways, 
innovations and inventions, and not to savings which might determine paths of 
further progress.
However, the objectives of the Council’s original concept were not realised, 
partly due to the weakness of political leadership, polarisation of the interests of 
member states, and the excessive number of goals and priorities together with the low 
level of responsibility assigned to individual members of the community. Another 
problem was the absence of appropriate overall indicators serving the implementation 
of certain measures, such as GDP per capita based on PPP, labour productivity, rate 
of employment, rate of employment of older persons, R&D spending as % of GDP, 
etc.
In response to the ineffectiveness of the Lisbon concept, social consultation was 
carried out in 2009-2010, which led to the formulation of the Europe 2020 strategy, 
which is based on three priorities (European Commission 2010b): 
• intelligent growth – based on education, innovation and scientific research;
• sustainable growth – movement to a low-emissions economy;
• inclusive growth – linked to poverty reduction and job creation.
117 Cracow University of Economics; krzysztof.firlej@uek.krakow.pl .
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Based on the agreed priorities, the final objective is to achieve five goals relating 
to employment, innovation, education, poverty reduction, climate and energy, being 
directly linked to the improvement of the competitiveness of the economy as a whole 
(European Commission).
Agriculture and the knowledge-based economy
Agricultural enterprises make up a sector which is most often associated with 
traditional forms of enterprise based on the three basic factors: land, capital and 
labour. At present, those enterprises are subject to pressure to introduce innovative 
production methods and new practices. The tasks most commonly set for agriculture 
include seeking new sources of means of production, the implementation of 
innovative production technologies, the establishment of contacts with new markets, 
and reorganisation of the sector’s related industry (Wójcik 2011). In the case of 
Polish agriculture, attention is also drawn to the important role played by the process 
of creative destruction which generates new solutions and structures (Schumpeter 
1960), posing a difficult challenge to an agricultural system which is fragmented, 
lacks efficiency (Poczta, Mrówczyńska-Kamińska 2008) and is characterised by a 
relatively low level of education (Kozera 2011) (that is, human capital). Significant 
in this context is not only the level of education but also its quality (Hnatyszyn-
Dzikowska, Polcyn 2015).
In academic work relating to consulting in the agricultural sector, five categories 
of farmers are identified (Kania, Drygas, Kutkowska, Kalinowski 2011): innovators 
(approximately 2.5% of the population), pioneers or early imitators (13.5%), the 
early majority (34%), the late majority (34%) and latecomers (16%). The division 
between these types reflects the difficulties with the transfer and acquisition of 
knowledge in agriculture. Knowledge is expected to lead to the development of 
communities, their economies and enterprises, and knowledge resources combined 
with creativity, efficient innovative processes and a “culture of innovation” provide 
conditions for a measurable increase in their competitiveness (Firlej, Żmija 2014). 
The market economy has begun to force farmers and firms in the agricultural and 
food sector to operate according to new rules, where key importance is attached to 
such economic categories as competition, efficiency and profit (Firlej, Rydz 2012). 
This issue is related to the concept of a knowledge-based economy, since the proper 
management of innovation, as well as the speed of diffusion of knowledge in the 
sector (correlated with the strength of links between its component entities), testifies 
to agriculture’s state of economic advancement. 
The results of research carried out in Poland in 2011 by K. Firlej led to several 
conclusions about the situation as regards the use of knowledge, which, although it 
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is starting to become a determinant of the development of firms in the food industry, 
is often not utilised to the planned extent. It should be noted that the respondents 
regard knowledge management as a positive contributor to the functioning of firms 
in conditions of a market economy, which strengthens their competitiveness and 
helps to modernise their system of management. A survey of companies engaged in 
the production and distribution of food products, included in the WIG-Food stock 
market index, showed that (Firlej, Żmija 2014): 
1. knowledge, information and their quality and currency are factors that 
strengthen firms’ success, expressed in improved competitiveness and market 
position;
2. the use of computerised methods in a firms’ everyday operations helps to 
utilise qualifications and skills and manage the firm’s capital in an organised 
manner; 
3. intellectual capital and corporate governance should be treated as significant 
contributors to the value of a firm (since a properly constructed and functioning 
system of corporate governance can ensure properly directed development 
prospects for the capital market, which will bring about development of the 
economy as a whole (Firlej 2011); 
4. in the building of firms’ competitiveness, it must be seen as essential to provide 
management of the organisational climate and culture and the important role 
of the organisation’s social responsibility (Firlej 2008).
Intellectual capital has been called the “wealth of an organisation” (Stewart 1997, 
Sveiby 1997) or the “organisation’s treasure” (Dzinkowski 1999) and is perceived 
as a factor driving the global economy of the future and at the same time a key to 
success in the 21st century. Pioneers in defining the concept of human capital include 
T.W. Schultz, G.S. Becker and J. Mincer, while in the case of intellectual capital a 
key figure is K.E. Sveiby, who in 1987, as part of the “Konrad group”, attempted 
to define intellectual capital and develop methods for measuring it. Reviewing 
the successively modified concepts of intellectual capital, we may generalise by 
stating that it refers to hidden assets of a firm, not shown on the balance sheet, 
representing the acquired knowledge of members of the organisation that is used 
to create valuable and unique relations. Intellectual capital combined with financial 
capital in fact creates a firm’s market value. It includes such components as human 
capital, structural capital, social capital and relationship capital.
In Skrzypek’s approach, intellectual capital combines three groups of resources:
1. customer capital, the customer base, relations with customers, customer 
potential;
2. organisational capital, process capital, culture and innovativeness;
3. human capital, starting value, relationship value, value of potential.
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Intellectual capital is a source of competence, intelligent vigour, strength, wealth, 
competition, efficiency, effectiveness and productivity, which in the conditions of the 
knowledge society represents a significant opportunity for a firm to achieve success 
(Skrzypek 2007).
It must be regarded as a matter of particular importance to examine the 
intellectual capital of a firm, with regard to both the transformations taking place 
in organisations, and the identification of the intangible assets of individual entities. 
Many methods of measuring intellectual capital have been proposed in the literature, 
and these, according to Karl-Erik Sveiby for example, can be divided into four 
groups (Sveiby 2010): 
1. Market capitalisation methods (MCM), which involve the computation of the 
difference between a firm’s market value and the book value, such as Market-
To-Book Value, Tobin’s q index. 
2. Return on assets methods (ROA), where the average pre-tax profits for a 
period are divided by the average value of a firm’s tangible assets in the same 
period. The resulting ROA value is compared with the average for the sector. 
The difference, multiplied by the average value of tangible assets, gives the 
value of average annual profit from intangible assets. The total intellectual 
capital is obtained by discounting this value by the firm’s average cost of 
capital or a similar discount rate. Methods of this type include Economic 
Value Added (EVA™) and Calculated Intangible Value.
3. Direct intellectual capital methods (DIC), which enable the identification of 
components of intellectual capital and the estimation of their monetary value. 
Such methods include Human Resource Costing and Accounting (HRCA), 
and the Dynamic Monetary Model.
4. Scorecard methods (SC), which enable the identification and measurement of 
individual components of intangible assets or intellectual capital using non-
monetary indicators. They include the Skandia Navigator, IC Rating™ and 
Intellectual Capital Statements.
Selected market capitalisation methods
Market capitalisation methods allow one to determine whether there is a 
difference between the book value and the market value of a given firm. The value 
of a firm’s intellectual capital is identified with that difference (Dobija 2003). The 
market value is the true value of a firm, and hence by comparing it with the book 
value one may establish whether the market considers its real value to be higher or 
lower than the latter. 
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The MV/BV method
This index-based method was proposed by T. Stewart (1997), who adopted the 
assumption that a firm’s intellectual capital is the difference between its valuation 
by the market and its book value (Jarugowa, Fijałkowska, 2002). A key assumption 
is the assertion that a firm’s market value is the sum of its book value and the value 
of its intellectual capital (Nita 2013). The next stage of measurement under this 
method involves comparing these two values, making it possible to determine the 
part of the book value that represents the real value of a firm. It should be noted 
that this indicator does not give a concrete value for a firm’s intellectual capital, but 
provides information as to whether or not a given firm possesses intellectual capital 
(Hofman, 2011). The market value used in this method may be calculated in two 
ways (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006):
1. For stock market listed companies, their value is the number of traded shares 
multiplied by their current value (or average value for a given period).
2. In other cases the market value is computed by a comparative method, 
involving calculation of the value of a listed company with similar results 
and profile of operations.
To compute the indicator MV/BV it is also necessary to determine a firm’s book 
value, namely the book value of its net assets, obtained by subtracting the book 
value of outside capital from the firm’s total assets. The value of outside capital is 
computed as the sum of long-term and short-term liabilities, provisions, accruals 
and deferred income (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). Another possible way 
of determining a firm’s book value is by identifying it with the value of the firm’s 
equity. 
The MV/BV model thus takes the following form:
 
MV
BV
share price no of shares
assets outside capital
=
×
−
.
  (4.3)
From the point of view of the concept of intellectual capital, an indicator value 
greater than 1 may be interpreted as showing that the accounting books fail to record 
certain assets that may increase the firm’s real value (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 
2006). The result therefore indicates the presence (or in the case of a value less than 
1, the absence) of intellectual capital in the firm (Hofman, 2011). Assuming that the 
difference between the market and the book value is dependent on this intellectual 
capital, the value of the indicator enables one to identify a situation in which a firm 
is making use of intellectual capital in its operations (Urbanek, 2008). 
This measure is easy to interpret and facilitates the observation of changes 
taking place in the market (Urbanek, 2008); however, with regard to difficulties in 
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determining the particular values required for its computation, it is recommended for 
use only when analysing stock market listed companies (Urbanek, 2008). 
Criticism of the MV/BV indicator focuses on three points. The first is the 
identification of the value of intellectual capital with the difference between book 
value and market value (Nita, 2013). It is pointed out that intellectual capital is 
something more than an excess of value. If that were not the case, then the value 
of intellectual capital would be a consequence of the applied accounting policy 
(Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). A further objection is that the method 
ignores factors such as seasonal variation, speculation and so forth, which have an 
impact on a firm’s market value (Jarugowa, Fijałkowska, 2002). Finally, criticism 
is directed at the methodology itself, in which a comparison is made between ex 
post values (book values) and ex ante values (stock market predictions), which casts 
doubt on the representativeness of this method (Palimąka, Gumieniak, 2014). 
Tobin’s q index
This index was developed in 1969 by the Nobel prizewinning economist 
J. Tobin (Sopińska, 2010), who wished to create a tool to make it easier to take 
investment decisions independently of macroeconomic values (Sopińska, 2010). 
Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of tangible assets 
(Jarugowa, Fijałkowska, 2002). One of the methods of calculating this index is the 
model of K. Cung and S. Pruitt, which defines the market value as the sum of the 
components of the firm (market value of ordinary shares, book value of preference 
shares, book value of long- and short-term liabilities, book value of inventories) less 
the book value of current assets. According to this approach, Tobin’s q is given by 
the following formula: 
 Tobin s q MVCS BVPS BVLTD BVINV BVCL BVCA
BVTA
' =
+ + + + − ,  (4.4)
where:
MVCS is the market value of ordinary shares;
BVPS is the book value of preference shares;
BVLTD is the book value of long-term liabilities;
BVINV is the book value of inventories;
BVCL is the book value of current liabilities;
BVCA is the book value of current assets; 
BVTA is the book value of total assets (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006).
The authors take the replacement cost of tangible assets (which theoretically 
should be closer to the market value) to be the equivalent of the total book value of 
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assets (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). As in the case of the MV/BV method, in 
view of its simplicity and comprehensibility, this indicator is commonly used to value 
intellectual capital (although this is not its only application). A value greater than 1 is 
interpreted as meaning that the firm has a higher than average return on investment, 
generating higher profits, this being explained by the fact that appropriate use is 
being made of intellectual capital (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006).
Despite the application of the replacement cost of fixed assets and the closeness 
of the value of the indicator to market quantities, some significant issues related to 
the q methodology remain unresolved. As in the market-to-book value case, Tobin’s 
q index is dependent on the market value, and despite the levelling of differences 
between the two forms of value (book and market), the values obtained may still not 
reflect the actual values of intangible assets (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). 
As with the MV/BV method, Tobin’s q may be used to monitor changes in the values of 
intellectual capital in a firm over a number of years (Jarugowa, Fijałkowska, 2002). 
It is also possible to compare the results of firms in the same sector having similar 
tangible assets (Urbanek, 2008).
Tobin’s indicator is based on the assumption that a company’s intellectual 
capital is expressed as the difference between its market value and its book value 
(in this case the replacement value of the firm’s assets, which is closer to the market 
value). It is simple to calculate, widely used, and in a certain sense objective, but 
it is too simplified for the results obtained to be regarded as a reliable measure of 
the value of intellectual capital. This does not change the fact that it helps direct the 
view taken of a firm, for instance by investors. Tobin’s q is an index-based method, 
hence an interpretation of the result allows one only to state whether a given firm 
makes effective use of its intangible assets, and to identify whether a firm is capable 
of generating above-average profits (Jarugowa, Fijałkowska, 2002).
Selected return on assets methods
In return on assets (ROA) methods, average pre-tax profits are compared with 
the average value of the firm’s tangible assets, and the index is then compared with 
the average return on assets in the sector in which the firm operates (Pilková at all, 
2013). The difference is then multiplied by the average value of tangible assets, 
returning a value claimed to represent the average annual profit from intangible 
assets (Pilková at all, 2013). Finally, that value is discounted by the average cost of 
capital or rate of interest, to produce a result representing the firm’s intangible assets 
or, equivalently, intellectual capital. Such methods are based on the theory that a 
firm’s profits or losses are dependent on the existence of intellectual capital within 
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the enterprise, even though it does not appear in its financial statements (Pilková at 
all, 2013).
The EVATM method 
The roots of the EVATM method go back to the late 19th century, when A. Marshall 
and others wrote about a concept that later came to be called the residual profit (Nita 
2007). It is on this method that the whole concept of economic value added is based. 
The residual profit differs from the book profit in that it takes account of not only 
the cost of outside capital, but also the cost of equity (Nita 2007). In the EVATM 
method this is achieved by, among other things, applying the weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC). 
The EVATM method is a product of the New York consulting firm Stern Stewart 
& Co. It was proposed just over 20 years ago (in 1994) by one of the founders of 
that company, G. B. Stewart, and is an extension of the concept of residual profit 
(Nita 2007). Economic value added is based on the assumption that added value 
exists when the rate of return on capital exceeds its cost (Sopińska, 2010). It is used 
to determine the value of a firm, and owes its place in the literature on measuring 
intellectual capital (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006) to its use in identifying 
the effective (or ineffective) utilisation of intellectual capital in a firm (Frączek, 
2012).
The EVATM model is viewed very favourably by economists as a tool for 
calculating a firm’s added value, but not so positively when applied as a method 
for calculating intellectual capital or possible changes therein. According to P. 
Stressmann, a proponent of the use of this indicator to find the value of intellectual 
capital, obtaining a capital surplus following the satisfaction of certain claims of 
the providers of capital, as the residual value was defined by Stressmann (Urbanek, 
2008), must be an effect of the positive use of the firm’s intellectual capital, in view 
of the theory that “no system may output more than it received as inputs” (Urbanek, 
2008). Stressmann estimates the value of intellectual capital (knowledge) by means 
of the ratio of the EVA value to the cost of capital of knowledge, which he compares 
with the rate of interest on the firm’s long-term debts (Urbanek, 2008).
Many authors dispute this approach, arguing, among other things, that the EVA 
surplus may also to some degree be generated by tangible assets. Reference is also 
made to the fact that, as in the case of market capitalisation methods, book values are 
used in the determination of a future value (the value of intellectual capital is a kind 
of indeterminate future value, or at least not a past value, as in the case of at least 
those appearing on the balance sheet). 
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EVA, traditionally understood, is the operating profit after tax minus the product 
of capital invested and the weighted average cost of capital, as given by the following 
formula (Dobija, 2003): 
 EVA = NOPAT – IC * WACC (4.5)
The value NOPAT represents the profit actually attained by investors, which 
may be calculated as the product of the capital employed in the business and its rate 
of return (ROI); it is insensitive to decisions concerning the financing of assets, and 
reacts to operational factors (Nita, 2007).
In the literature on issues relating to human capital, the above formula has 
been “adopted” for the process of “management of value through human capital” 
(Dobija, 2003) and takes on various forms. Nonetheless, the EVA formula found 
most frequently in the literature relating to intellectual capital is a model that takes 
account of the value of capital invested, the rate of return on invested capital and the 
weighted average cost of capital (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). 
Based on the literature, it may be concluded that the only advantage of the 
EVATM method as an indicator of the value of intellectual capital is its strong link to 
the market value of a firm, while its main fault is that it fails to cover a wide range of 
intangible assets (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). EVATM was developed for 
the determination of the value of a firm, and for this reason it is considered defective 
as a means of measuring intellectual capital. When one views a firm in terms of 
value added and the value of shares, one overlooks factors which are very important 
from the standpoint of intellectual capital, such as employee productivity, customer 
satisfaction and financial market reputation (Palimąka, Gumieniak, 2014). 
In summary, when classified as a tool for measuring the presence of intellectual 
capital in a firm, this method fulfils its task only in terms of certain fundamental 
assumptions, including that a firm’s value added is the result of the possession and 
effective utilisation of only that one intangible component of assets. 
The EVATM model is most often used in practice to reflect a company’s value 
added from the perspective of its perception by shareholders. This will not have 
a direct link with intellectual capital (Iazzolino, Laise 2013), although one cannot 
entirely exclude the possibility that this result has some influence on the management 
of intellectual capital. 
The CIV method
In the CIV (Calculated Intangible Value) method, rather than analysing the 
market value, account is taken of the return on assets (ROA) (Fijałkowska, 2012). 
The CIV model is based on the assumption that the value of a firm’s intellectual 
capital corresponds to its ability to outperform an average competitor having similar 
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material assets and operating in the same sector (Fijałkowska, 2012). This method 
was first used for tax purposes, namely in determining the market value of a firm’s 
intangible assets (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). The model was developed 
by NCI Research in the 1930s, at the time of prohibition in the United States (for the 
calculation of values of intangible assets lost as a result of that measure) (Sopińska, 
2010). It was intended to be useful for firms wishing to obtain outside financing 
(credit, loans) and having operations based to a significant degree on knowledge 
(Urbanek, 2008). Other sources claim that the method was initiated by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), whose ruling 68-609 (with certain adjustments) is still in 
effect today (Dobija, 2003).
In 1995, for the purpose of measuring intellectual capital, T.A. Stewart modified 
the existing CIV method, and since that time a seven-step method has been used 
to determine the approximate value of a firm’s intellectual capital. The principal 
dependent value in the model is the ROA for the firm and for the sector in which it 
operates. If the firm’s ROA exceeds that of the sector, it is concluded that the firm 
possesses intellectual capital (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). The converse 
result is interpreted as meaning that the firm makes poorer use of intellectual capital 
than its competitors. 
The result obtained by seven computational steps defines the value of the 
intangible assets possessed by the firm (understood as intellectual capital), enables 
managers to compare the firm with its competitors, and provides information as to 
whether investments in intangible assets are profitable for the firm (Dobija, 2003). 
The CIV methodology is based on a series of seven steps, which give a final 
result called the intellectual premium. In the first step the average pre-tax profit for 
the past three (or five) years of the firm’s operations is computed (Nita, 2013). Next, 
based on the balance sheet, the average value of tangible assets is determined for the 
same period (Sopińska, 2010). The third step involves calculating the average ROA 
for the analysed period, being the quotient of the previous two values – the ratio of the 
average gross profit to the average value of assets Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 
2006). At the next stage the average ROA is calculated for the sector in which the 
firm operates (again for a period of three or five years) (Nita, 2013). In the fifth step 
the “excess return” is calculated, by subtracting the product of the results obtained 
at the third and fourth stages from the average pre-tax profit (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, 
Kicińska, 2006). The next step is the calculation of the intellectual premium, namely 
the profit on intangible assets. For this purpose the average rate of taxation in the 
analysed period is computed, and this is then multiplied by the result from stage 
five, namely the excess return (Sopińska, 2010). The amount of the premium is the 
difference between the excess and the result obtained at this stage (Nita, 2013). In 
the last step, the present value of the computed premium is determined by dividing it 
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by an appropriate discount rate (Sopińska, 2010). The discount rate applied may be 
the cost of capital for the firm in question (Nita, 2013). 
The “intellectual premium” obtained at the last stage reflects the average 
profit obtained thanks to the firm’s possession of intellectual capital, relative to its 
competitors in the same sector (Nita, 2013). The value is interpreted as an answer to 
the question of how much the firm would gain thanks to the intellectual capital that 
it possesses (relative to firms in the sector) (Kasiewicz, Rogowski, Kicińska, 2006). 
An increasing value of the indicator shows that the firm is increasingly capable of 
creating future intangible profits, whereas a decreasing value implies the ineffective 
use of intellectual capital through investment in tangible assets (Urbanek, 2008).
The required values are taken from the firm’s financial statements for the three 
(or five) preceding years, as well as from capital market data (the average rate of 
return on assets in the sector) (Sopińska, 2010), and it is this availability of data 
that is considered the main advantage of the CIV model. It may be used to compare 
competing firms, and hence is an effective benchmarking tool; however, when 
comparisons are made it must be borne in mind that, for example, every firm has a 
different investment cycle. Such differences can affect the final result, and hence it 
must be remembered that a smaller value does not always imply poorer utilisation 
of intellectual capital, but may be a signal that the firm has embarked on a costly 
investment programme (Urbanek, 2008).
A significant problem when measuring the value of intangible assets is that 
expenditure on such assets is recorded as a cost, thus diminishing the firm’s profit – 
this contradicts the assumption that company income rises thanks to the utilisation 
of intangible assets (Urbanek, 2008). It should be noted that the method under 
discussion has two significant weaknesses. The first is the use of averaged values, 
which distort the resulting picture of capital, while the second is basing the present 
value on the discounting of the “intellectual premium” by the firm’s cost of capital. 
Hence it is necessary to use the cost of capital in a particular industry in order to 
level the resulting difference, and this again involves averaged values (Jarugowa, 
Fijałkowska, 2002).
In summary, CIV is often regarded as one of the methods that best reflects firms’ 
intellectual capital (Fijałkowska, 2012). The seven-step calculation provides the 
value of the “intellectual premium” identified with intangible assets or intellectual 
capital. Despite the fact that, because of averaging, the final value is not as precise 
as the values of individual components on the balance sheet, the method provides a 
simple way of obtaining a value for a firm’s intellectual capital (Sopińska, 2010). It 
is also significant that the CIV model is based on easily accessible data (not requiring 
“digging” within the firm itself).
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The case of KSG Agro SA, Industrial Milk Company SA and Kernel 
Holding SA – characteristics of the companies
To illustrate the possibilities of applying the described methods, three companies 
from the agricultural and food sector were selected, each of which is included in the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange’s WIG-Food index. 
KSG Agro SA is a Luxembourg-based group of businesses operating in the 
agribusiness sector, engaged principally in the production of grains (maize, wheat, 
barley, soya, rape) and vegetables, and in supplying food products to retail chains. 
KSG Agro SA is the fastest expanding agricultural company in Ukraine, and its 
chief strategic goal is to reinforce its leading position in the market and to develop 
its operations through innovative solutions, so as to become the largest vertically 
integrated holding company in central Ukraine. The company operates in almost every 
segment of the agricultural market, including production, warehousing, processing 
and sale of agricultural products. In 2015 its assets included 94,000 hectares of 
cultivated land (www.ksgagro.com/Po/). It has been listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange since May 2011. 
The second company, the Luxembourg-based Industrial Milk Company SA, 
also operates in Ukraine. It is an agricultural firm, whose chief areas of activity 
are concentrated on grains, oil-bearing plants and potatoes (cultivation, storage and 
processing) as well as dairy farming. It is one of Ukraine’s largest milk producers, 
and one of the country’s ten largest agricultural firms. In 2014 the company harvested 
crops from 136,700 hectares of land (www.imcagro.com.ua). It began operating in 
2007, and has been listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange since May 2011. 
The last of the three, the Luxembourg-based Kernel Holding SA, is another 
Ukrainian holding company. Like the first two companies, Kernel Holding SA 
operates on the food market in the agribusiness sector. Its operations date back to 
1995; it became Kernel Holding SA in 2005, and is now among the largest companies 
in the agricultural sector in Ukraine. Its main lines of business include the production 
and export of bottled sunflower oil, and wholesale trading in cereals (wheat, barley 
and maize). The operations of Kernel Holding SA encompass almost every area of the 
food industry – the complete process of manufacturing and supplying oils and fats of 
plant and animal origin, including production, refining, bottling, and sale of bottled 
and unbottled oils domestically and abroad, as well as the cultivation, harvesting, 
storage and sale of cereals and oil-bearing seeds (www.kernel.ua). In contrast to 
the previous two companies, Kernel Holding SA was floated on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange in November 2007. 
Measurements of intellectual capital were performed for each of these groups 
using financial data for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, taken from financial 
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statements available on investment websites. The tables below present the values 
used in the relevant formulae for the companies in those years.
The calculations described here serve to examine whether each method gives a 
true picture of the analysed company’s intellectual capital, whether the comparison of 
market value to book value is a legitimate technique, and whether the interpretation 
of the results as proposed in the literature is appropriate for the practical application 
of each method, as well as other similar questions noted in the theoretical section. 
The MV/BV and Tobin’s q methods in the case of KSG Agro SA
Assuming that the results obtained under the MV/BV model or by Tobin’s q 
index can be interpreted based on the concept of intellectual capital, the results 
obtained for KSG Agro SA imply that the company does not possess a high level of 
assets of that type. It might be concluded that its business is based on tangible assets; 
but when the given values are interpreted as an answer to the question of whether 
the company is adequately valued by the market, it will certainly be concluded that 
according to the MV/BV method the market (except in the final analysed year, when 
the results were affected by the political situation in the country of operation) values 
the company to the level of its real worth, while Tobin’s q index implies that the 
market value is even higher than the company’s book value. The obtained results are 
presented in Tables 4.5. and 4.6.
Table 4.5. MV/BV index for KSG Agro SA
Item 2012 2013 2014
Company share price118 (US$) 5.41 3.53 1.19
Number of shares119 14 925 500.00 14 926 600.00 14 926 000.00
Total book assets (US$) 203 770 000.00 237 270 000.00 88 390 000.00 
Outside capital (book value) (US$) 123 270 000.00 188 550 000.00 106 780 000.00
“Intellectual capital” 1.00 1.08 -0.97
Source: based on data from the financial statements of the KSG Agro SA group
The presented interpretation of the results in Table 4.5. is borne out only in 
theory. In reality it is unlikely that the firm does not possess any intellectual capital, 
as would be implied by the values that are less than 1. According to the description 
of the operations of KSG Agro SA, the company uses innovative methods and has 
an appropriate organisational culture and structure, technologies and other similar 
components of intellectual capital (human capital, structural capital). According to 
118 Based on the average zloty/dollar exchange rate for each year: 2012 – 3.2581; 2013 – 
3.1614; 2014 – 3.1537.
119 Data from the bankier.pl website, http://www.bankier.pl/gielda/notowania/akcje/
KSGAGRO/wyniki-finansowe/skonsolidowany/roczny/standardowy, accessed on: 22.11.2015.
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the concept of intellectual capital, results below 1 can as a last resort be explained 
as a situation in which the company does not base its operations on the creation of 
intellectual capital, but in a certain sense on tangible assets. 
Tobin’s q, which to some extent brings the book value closer to the market 
value, gave a significantly better picture of the business than the result obtained from 
the MV/BV model. According to the calculated values, in the period under analysis 
KSG Agro SA was valued by the market on average at one-and-a-half times its worth 
as implied by its book value. This would indicate the existence of hidden value in 
the firm. Despite the fall in the market value of its shares, the company is capable 
of obtaining above-average profits and makes effective use of its intangible assets 
(Table 4.6.). 
Table 4.6. Tobin’s q index for KSG Agro SA
Item (US$) 2012 2013 2014
Market value of ordinary shares 80 762 579.09 52 691 449.47 17 748 028.57
Book value of preference shares - - -
Long-term liabilities 11 060 000.00 28 250 000.00 11 030 000.00
Short-term liabilities 83 340 000.00 48 590 000.00 77 900 000.00
Inventories 9 630 000.00 6 500 000.00 11 260 000.00
Book value of current assets 15 740 000.00 22 690 000.00 14 980 000.00
Replacement cost of tangible assets = total 
book value of assets 88 390 000.00 71 310 000.00 76 360 000.00
“Intellectual capital” 1.91 1.59 1.35
Source: based on data from the financial statements of the KSG Agro SA group
The final results obtained by the market capitalisation methods are affected not 
only by factors related to intellectual capital, but above all by external factors such 
as the market share price, dependent on the moods and preferences of investors, 
the market and political situation, and other phenomena which affect investment 
decisions and consequently the market value of the company, which also depends on 
the number of shares issued and the market price per share. 
The example of KSG Agro SA shows the great significance of the averaged 
financial data used in the calculations, as well as data from the market. This is 
confirmed, for example, by the year 2014, when because of the political turbulence 
in Ukraine that was then affecting the markets, the company recorded negative 
equity, and its market value declined relative to the previous year. This confirms the 
doubts relating to the use of market values, which are intended to reflect the effective 
utilisation of intangible assets but are also affected by external factors, as well as 
book values, which depend, for example, on the type of accounting used.
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The MV/BV and Tobin’s q methods in the case of Industrial Milk 
Company SA
The results obtained for Industrial Milk Company SA imply that the firm does 
not possess assets of the type under consideration. The results given in Tables 4.7. 
and 4.8. are interpreted, according to the concept, as reflecting an absence of values 
resembling intellectual capital and the fact that the business is based on tangible 
assets. It can certainly be concluded (given theoretical assumptions) that according 
to the MV/BV method and Tobin’s q index, the market (unlike in the case of KSG 
Agro SA) values this company below its real worth. The example of this company 
shows how highly theoretical the considerations are concerning the reliability of 
applications of the methods proposed in the literature for measuring intellectual 
capital. 
Table 4.7. MV/BV index for Industrial Milk Company SA
Item 2012 2013 2014
Company share price (US$) 3.83 4.61 2.72 
Number of shares 31 300 000.00 31 300 000.00 31 300 000.00 
Total book assets (US$) 116 840 000.00 187 400 000.00 102 810 000.00 
Outside capital (book value) (US$) 118 550 000.00 209 630 000.00 156 770 000.00 
“Intellectual capital” -70.06 -6.48 -1.58
Source: based on data from the financial statements of Industrial Milk Company SA
The results obtained using the MV/BV method and Tobin’s q index in the case 
of KSG Agro SA showed that in the analysed period that company was adequately 
valued by the market, at least partly due to its intellectual capital. The example of 
Industrial Milk Company SA gives a less positive picture than the previous case.
Table 4.8. Tobin’s q index for Industrial Milk Company SA
Item (US$) 2012 2013 2014
Market value of ordinary shares 80 762 579.09 52 691 449.47 17 748 028.57
Book value of preference shares  –  –  – 
Long-term liabilities 45 100 000.00 48 010 000.00 67 790 000.00 
Short-term liabilities 68 390 000.00 156 810 000.00 85 960 000.00 
Inventories 63 530 000.00 139 050 000.00 82 960 000.00 
Book value of current assets 116 840 000.00 187 400 000.00 102 810 000.00
Replacement cost of tangible assets = total 
book value of assets 244 500 000.00 361 870 000.00 183 800 000.00 
“Intellectual capital” 0.58 0.58 0.83
Source: based on data from the financial statements of Industrial Milk Company SA
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In this case the company is valued at below its book value, although over a 
period of three years that situation underwent a gradual change. As was noted in the 
previous example, such an extreme situation is not possible in reality – every firm 
has intellectual capital among its assets to a greater or lesser degree. 
The MV/BV and Tobin’s q methods in the case of Kernel Holding SA
The case of Kernel Holding SA is entirely different from that of the first two 
companies. The results here indicate that the value of intellectual capital decreased 
year by year. The company was initially valued by the market at above its value, 
according to the MV/BV model, while in Tobin’s q model, which uses a value closer 
to the market value, the company was valued at close to its real value only in the first 
year, and that situation deteriorated in 2013 and 2014. 
Table 4.9. MV/BV index for Kernel Holding SA
Item 2012 2013 2014
Company share price (US$) 20.50 16.90 9.39 
Number of shares 79 683 410.00 79 683 410.00 79 683 410.00 
Total book assets (US$) 2 116 390 000.00 2 361 630 000.00 1 919 020 000.00 
Outside capital (book value) (US$) 936 710 000.00 1 026 150 000.00 889 360 000.00 
“Intellectual capital” 1.38 1.01 0.73
Source: based on data from the financial statements of Kernel Holding SA
The example of Kernel Holding SA (Tables 4.9. and 4.10.) again confirms the 
inadequacy of the proposed models for measuring intellectual capital – even as a 
means of obtaining rough values. The data in Tables 4.54.10 indicating the relationship 
between the market and book values can only be regarded as approximations, and 
also subject to the stipulation that they should be interpreted with the possibility of 
inaccuracies in mind (as in the extreme cases among the examples given).
Table 4.10. Tobin’s q index for Kernel Holding SA
Item (US$) 2012 2013 2014
Market value of ordinary shares 1 633 703 922.87 1 346 691569.76 748 138 031.62 
Book value of preference shares  –  –  – 
Long-term liabilities 426 860 000.00 275 720 000.00      260 010 000.00 
Short-term liabilities 446 160 000.00 700 080 000.00 597 360 000.00 
Inventories 563 520 000.00 517 230 000.00 482 360 000.00 
Book value of current assets 1 118 400 000.00 1 090 090 000.00 872 530 000.00 
Replacement cost of tangible assets = total 
book value of assets 2 116 390 000.00 2 361 630 000.00 1 919 020 000.00
“Intellectual capital” 0.92 0.74 0.63
Source: based on data from the financial statements of Kernel Holding SA
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It is necessary to reiterate the observation made in the case of KSG Agro SA – 
the results obtained using market capitalisation methods are strongly affected by the 
collected data and their source, by significant averaged values, by the situation of 
the market in which the firm operates, by the political situation, and by the applied 
accounting standards and similar factors. 
The EVATM method in the case of KSG Agro SA, Industrial Milk 
Company SA and Kernel Holding SA
In considering the models analysed above, note should be taken of the 
corresponding results obtained by the EVATM method. In the case of KSG Agro 
SA (Table 4.11.) the previous models indicated a positive situation, and the results 
appeared to confirm that the company possessed intellectual capital. By contrast, 
the EVATM method fails to show this, and in fact indicates that the company’s “value 
added” is negative. Based on the assumptions related to the concept of intellectual 
capital, it is concluded that KSG Agro SA does not have such capital, although a 
positive finding is that over the three years of analysis the company’s value added 
showed an increase. The negative results are interpreted as indicating a lack of capital 
to cover the costs of generating profits.
Table 4.11.  Measurement of the intellectual capital of KSG Agro SA by the EVATM method
Item 2012 2013 2014
EBIT (operating profit) (US$) 18 250 000.00 -9 150 000.00 2 250 000.00
T (average tax rate)120 21% 19% 16% 
WACC121 15.1% 15.4% 15.50%
Equity (US$) 80 500 000.00 48 720 000.00 -18 390 000.00
Interest-bearing liabilities (short- and long-
term loans, short- and long-term derivative 
financial instruments) (US$)
94 860 000.00 157 650 000.00 106 919 988.48
“Intellectual capital” (US$) -12 061 860.00 -39 192 480.00 -11 832 148.00
Source: based on data from the financial statements of the KSG Agro SA group
The situation of Industrial Milk Company SA (Table 4.12.) is an example where 
the company is found to have “value added” even though the previous methods 
failed to show positive relations between market and book value or the existence 
120 KSG Agro SA operates in Ukraine, hence the different tax rates; it should be noted, 
however, that agricultural production companies in that country, rather than pay tax on profits, are 
able to take advantage of a more favourable system based on a fixed agricultural tax, subject to 
certain conditions. For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that the company pays standard 
corporation tax.
121 Due to difficulties in accessing information, the weighted average cost of capital was 
taken to be the average for companies in the food sector, based on reports of analysts. 
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of intellectual capital. The example of Kernel Holding SA (Table 4.13.) reveals an 
analogous situation to that of KSG Agro SA.
Table 4.12.  Measurement of the intellectual capital of Industrial Milk Company SA by the 
EVATM method
Item 2012 2013 2014
EBIT (operating profit) (US$) 23 740 000.00  37 650 000.00 45 790 000.00 
Average tax rate122 0.21 0.19 0.16
WACC 15.10% 15.40% 15.50%
Equity (US$) -14 030 000.00  39 950 000.00   31 700 000.00 
Interest-bearing liabilities (short- and long-
term loans, short- and long-term derivative 
financial instruments) (US$)
80 643 000.00 139 987 000.00          106 947 000.00 
“Intellectual capital” (US$) 8 696 037 2 786 202 16 973 315
Source: based on data from the financial statements of Industrial Milk Company SA
Table 4.13.  Measurement of the intellectual capital of Kernel Holding SA by the EVATM 
method
Item 2012 2013 2014
EBIT (operating profit) (US$) 258 750 000.00 190 690 000.00 117 820 000.00 
Average tax rate123 0.28 0.28 0.28
WACC 15.10% 15.40% 15.50%
Equity (US$) 1 179 680 000.00 1 335 480 000.00 1 029 660 000.00 
Interest-bearing liabilities (short- and long-
term loans, short- and long-term derivative 
financial instruments) (US$)
739 786 000.00 730 681 000.00 456 241 000.00 
“Intellectual capital” (US$) -103 539 366 -180 891 994 -145 484 255
Source: based on data from the financial statements of Kernel Holding SA
The CIV method in the case of KSG Agro SA
The CIV method is based on company data from the three years preceding the year of 
analysis. For this reason (in Table 4.14.), and in view of the availability of financial 
data, results are presented only for 2014, three years after the company was first 
listed on the Exchange. 
122 Based on the same assumptions as in the case of KSG Agro SA.
123 The company operates in Ukraine, but is based in Luxembourg, and hence is subject to a 
different tax rate than KSG Agro and Industrial Milk Company.
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Table 4.14. The companies’ intellectual capital in 2014 by the CIV method
Item KSG Agro SA Industrial Milk Company SA
Kernel Holding 
SA
Average pre-tax profit (for the three preceding 
years) (US$) 3 183 333.33 20 736 666.67 74 730 333.33 
Average value of tangible assets (for the three 
preceding years) (US$) 127 406 666.67 167 927 016.67 1 599 110 666.67 
ROA (quotient of the previous two figures) 2.50% 12.35% 4.67%
Average ROA for the sector (for the three 
preceding years) 3.06 3.06 3.06 
Excess = avg. pre-tax profit – (avg. ROA for 
sector * avg. ROA) (US$)  3 183 333.33 20 736 666.63 74 730 333.32 
Average tax rate for the three preceding years 0.22 0.22 0.28 
Avg. tax rate * excess (US$) 689 722.22 4 492 944.44 20 924 493.33 
Discount rate (alternative cost of capital) 15.3% 15.3% 15.3%
“Intellectual capital” (US$) 598 025.05 3 895 616.56 18 142 624.27
Source: based on data from financial statements 
The results obtained using the CIV model lead to a different interpretation 
than those presented above. The main purpose of the model is to show how much a 
company would gain, on average, if it fully utilised its present level of intellectual 
capital. From the results obtained, and their analysis over time (if the data permit 
this) an evaluation is made of the potential of the firm’s intellectual capital. The final 
result – the “intellectual premium” – is the firm’s potential average earnings based 
on its intellectual capital, taking account of the situation of all firms in the same 
sector. According to the above data it can be concluded that KSG Agro SA is able to 
generate over US$0.5m profit more than at present if it fully utilises its resources of 
intellectual capital. This company is relatively new to the Polish capital market, but 
its results in subsequent years will show whether it is improving its ability to generate 
further profits from its intangible assets, or whether it is using them ineffectively. 
The value of the capital called the “intellectual premium” accounts for only a small 
part of the company’s current book value, overlooking the fact that in 2014 KSG 
Agro SA’s book value was negative, which clearly shows how the appropriate use 
of a firm’s intellectual potential can affect its final results. Comparing the analysed 
companies, the lowest level of utilisation of intangible resources is found in the case 
of Kernel Holding SA, which, if it made full use of those resources, could achieve 
over US$18 million higher profits than at present. The second-ranked company 
in terms of non-utilisation of resources is Industrial Milk Company SA, while the 
company making the best use of its intangible wealth is KSG Agro SA. 
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Conclusions
Intellectual capital is a significant distinguishing factor for firms in the present-
day economy. Knowledge, its related elements and overall utilisation affect the 
results that a company attains. Appropriate management in this area can bring about 
further successes for a firm in which processes of this type are present. One of the 
tools of management is knowledge of the values that are to be managed. The models 
described in this paper are only the most popular methods of measuring intellectual 
capital; all of them have their advantages and disadvantages. Unfortunately, due to 
the lack of a single universally accepted definition of intellectual capital, no concrete 
requirements have been established as regards the measurement of intellectual capital 
and the manner in which it is reported. The analysis presented here has led to the 
following conclusions:
• The methods selected for analysis – Market-To-Book Value, Tobin’s q 
index, Economic Value Added (EVA™) and Calculated Intangible Value – 
belonging to the first two groups in Karl-Erik Sveiby’s classification, and 
selected methods from the group based on market capitalisation, proved to 
be useful in identifying trends or the effectiveness of the use of intellectual 
capital in companies in the agricultural and food sector. 
• The proposed methods, widely described in the literature, are largely based 
on values taken from the financial statements of the analysed companies, and 
on the market value, which is also affected by external factors beyond the 
firm’s control. 
• The market value is affected not only by the opinions of potential investors, 
but by many other factors, which can lead to significant controversy regarding 
methodologies of this type. 
• The implementation of common uniform analytical models for the companies 
operating in a given market may enable not only a better management of 
capital in individual firms in the agricultural and food industry, but also the 
identification of shortcomings which need to be addressed to improve the 
competitiveness of their management.
4.3. The effects of payments for public goods 
on farmland prices under SAPS
(Bazyli Czyżewski, Radosław Trojanek124) 
Introduction
The opinion has become widespread in the subject literature that agricultural 
subsidies, particularly those of the decoupled type, are capitalised in the value of 
agricultural land. As a result, landowners obtain higher land rents. If they are farmers, 
then this entails an increase in the economic power and liquidity of farms, insofar 
as land capital can serve as collateral to obtain credit. These mechanisms have been 
well studied in the case of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), which operates in 
the countries of Western Europe, as well as various support programmes operating 
in the United States, as detailed in the literature review. There is, however, a lack 
of research concerning the drivers of the value of agricultural land under the Single 
Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), which operates under the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There are reasons to believe 
that the impact of agricultural policy as well as other factors on land values is different 
under this system. The basic difference between the SPS and the SAPS is that in the 
SAPS system there are no disposable entitlements to payments, and every hectare 
of land fulfilling specified conditions receives the same subsidy (both basic and 
supplementary). Thus in addition to the single area payment (SAP) a land user may 
additionally receive supplementary payments – for example, for cereal production, 
for Less Favoured Areas (LFAs) and/or on account of environment subsidies (ES) 
– to a predefined amount. Theoretically, the right to subsidies belongs to the user 
of agricultural land, but in practice they are generally taken over by the owner. In 
these conditions, considering that at the start of each planning period the subsidy 
for each hectare is known, and there is no limited pool of entitlements to payments, 
the market is theoretically able to discount the incidence of agricultural policy in 
land prices a long time in advance. This happened after 2004, when as a result of 
Poland’s accession to the EU the prices of land in all categories and locations rose 
sharply, and since then they have continued on a strong upward trend, discounting 
the expected political rents. This process could operate without significant barriers, 
because although the market for agricultural land in Poland is subject to regulation, 
124 Poznań University of Economics and Business; b.czyzewski@ue.poznan.pl, r.trojanek@
ue.poznan.pl .
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that regulation is effectively limited to granting the right of pre-emptive purchase 
to the government’s Agricultural Property Agency (ANR) and placing certain 
restrictions on the purchase of land by foreigners. It is hard to say, however, to 
what extent at the present time agricultural policy, and payments for public goods 
in particular, cause differences in land prices and are capitalised in the value of 
agricultural land. The authors have attempted to fill these gaps in the literature by 
carrying out a study of the drivers of agricultural land values in a leading agricultural 
region of Poland. The study was preceded by an examination of the literature on 
potential drivers of agricultural land prices in various conditions. The aim of the 
study is to establish how the payments for public goods contribute to land values in 
the SAPS system. The authors propose the hypothesis that the key factors for land 
values are location-specific factors identified according to the economic functions 
of a given area. The public goods aspect is of particular interest, since theoretically 
no market mechanisms for their valuation should exist. According to economic 
theory, the market alone is not capable of ensuring an optimum supply of a public 
good, always producing a deficit instead (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). However, 
not all types of CAP subsidies carry a tangible effect in the form of public goods. 
The concept of a public good here is something of a generalisation. It includes not 
just utilities with the attributes “non-rivalrous” and “non-excludable” – namely pure 
public goods (Buchanan 1968; Head 1962) – but also common goods. Although it 
is debatable whether support from the first pillar of the CAP leads to the creation of 
public and common goods, a certain step in this direction is provided by the principle 
of cross-compliance. Nonetheless, a number of programmes under the second pillar 
of the CAP, directed towards the development of rural areas, undoubtedly lead to 
the direct creation of new common goods or care for existing ones, for example in 
less favoured areas (LFAs), which generally contain valuable natural features. We 
can therefore assume that the following have the attributes of public goods: agri-
environmental payments, subsidies for LFAs, and area payments.
Evidence for the contribution of public goods to the land value 
There is a thesis in the subject literature, according to which public goods and 
environmental amenities are responsible for a divergence between the market values 
of land and its use value. This thesis can be proved with hedonic approaches that 
investigate land attributes at the transaction level.
Mainstream economic theory says that farmland values are determined by the 
discounted stream of expected returns (Burt 1986; Featherstone and Baker 1987; 
Capozza and Helsley 1989). There have been only a few attempts to estimate demand 
for public goods for which market data do not exist, including some environmental 
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amenities in rural areas (Czajkowski et. al. 2014; Carson and Czajkowski 2014). 
The results of Delbecq et al. (2014) show that farmland values are only partially 
explained by agricultural returns. Those authors identified multiple non-agricultural 
attributes of farmland contributing to its market value, which fall into three groups: 
population and urban influence, recreational and natural amenities, and locational 
characteristics. There are also those which include features of public goods, like the 
availability of recreational water or tree cover. However, only the following variables 
attained statistical significance: development potential, population intensity, tree 
cover, hunting licences, distance to golf course, distance to nearest college, and 
median household income (Polcyn 2015). There was shown to be a divergence 
between market value and agricultural use value. The value of agricultural land in 
excess of its use in agricultural production provides an empirical measure of the 
nonmarket goods and services provided by agricultural lands. However, when high 
natural amenity value or urban pressure is absent, “the value in excess” is also used 
as a measure of asset price bubbles (Delbecq et al. 2014). This excess value, no 
matter what its origins, is considered as a base for the tax treatment of agricultural 
properties (O’Dea 2013; Sherrick and Kuethe 2014). There is evidence that in many 
areas throughout the United States, the market value of farmland has exceeded its 
use value in agricultural production (Barnard 2000; Flanders, White and Escalante 
2004). Farm real estate accounts for more than 80% of the total value of all farm 
assets. For that reason, farmland prices are perceived as a key determinant of farms’ 
financial condition (Briggeman et al. 2009; Nickerson et al. 2012). Recent empirical 
findings suggest that farm profitability will decline in the coming years in favour of 
the non-agricultural return component of values (Delbecq et al. 2014), which will 
become a very important factor in farms’ financial health. Since the non-agricultural 
drivers of economic surplus very often have the nature of public goods, the labour and 
land markets in agriculture might suffer from the free-riding phenomenon (Kaminski 
et.al. 2012). Farmland provides various public goods, such as biodiversity, climate 
regulation, rural culture and open space, as well as features that indirectly impact 
food quality and human health. Wasson et al. (2013) argue that parcel-level attributes 
that comprise recreational and visual values are essential to explain agricultural land 
value. Failure to include amenity attributes in the set of explanatory variables of 
farmland value results in failure to fully account for land price variation. According 
to the above-cited authors, amenity premiums as well as penalties play a large role, 
especially in amenity-rich areas. For example, in western Wyoming (US), amenity 
values constitute 5% to 60% of a parcel’s value (one-third on average). However, 
several European studies contradict this observation. According to Nilsson and 
Johansson (2013), agricultural environmental payments in Sweden have a negative 
influence on land prices. They argue that municipalities receiving agri-environmental 
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support have very sensitive environments which are difficult to cultivate. A similar 
conclusion was reached in previous studies by Rutherford et al. (1990).
The hedonic approach is probably the way of investigating land value drivers 
that has been most explored in the literature. In this approach one does not focus 
on a specific type of value determinants (e.g. agricultural returns, rural amenities, 
property rights), but considers all possible qualitative variables that count for a 
potential buyer at the transaction level. (For the methodology of hedonic analysis, see 
Palmquist and Danielson 1989; Faux and Perry 1999; Nivens et al. 2002; Miranowski 
and Hammes 1984; Ma and Swinton 2012; Maddison 2000). Hence, the area, soil 
quality, environmental “quality”, agricultural practices, location of plots, distance 
and access to markets and to the nearest city, and connectivity to roads have all been 
found to affect land values (Troncoso et al. 2010; Carreño et al. 2012; de la Fuente et 
al. 2006; Gavier-Pizarro et al. 2012; Leguizamón 2013; Bárcena et al. 2004; Pengue 
2005a), as well as land tenure (owned or rented), which impacts fertilisation, the 
adoption of conservation practices, long-term land improvements, and indirectly 
returns (Choumert and Phélinas 2015). Choumert and Phélinas (2015,) found that 
plots rented (by either individuals or companies) have a lower value relative to plots 
owned, when all other factors are similar. This supports the idea that owned land 
may be subject to better conservation practices than rented land.
Methodology for hedonic regression
The first documented use of hedonic regression dates back to 1922, when G. 
A. Hass developed the farmland price model. As he published the results in the 
form of a technical report, the real influence of this research on the popularity of 
the hedonic method was far from significant (Colwell and Dilmore 1999). In 1926, 
Watt conducted a similar study of farmland prices, while in 1928 Waugh analysed 
vegetable prices. However, it is Andrew Court who is considered to be the father of 
the hedonic method. In 1939, he examined the influence of the attributes of cars on 
their prices. The first researcher to use the hedonic method to analyse the real estate 
market was probably Ridker (1967), who aimed to identify the influence of pollution 
reduction on house prices (Coulson 2008). The theoretical framework of the hedonic 
method was developed by Lancaster (1966).
The essence of the hedonic method lies in the assumption that the price of 
heterogeneous goods may be described by means of their attributes. In other words, 
this method may be used to estimate the value of particular attributes of a given 
product. In order to identify the influence of individual features on the value of a 
specific good, econometric equations are constructed. The price of a given good is the 
response variable, while its quantitative and qualitative attributes are the explanatory 
variables. The equation may be written as follows (4.6):
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where:
P is the price of a good;
β is the regression coefficient;
X is an attribute of a good (value driver);
u is a random error.
The key issue in hedonic methods is the choice of the form of the regression function. 
The log-linear (natural logarithm) form of the regression function is most frequently 
used for studying changes in the real estate market in empirical research. In line with 
this approach, we employed the following equation (4.7):
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where i = 1,...,n are the transactions in the sample, Pi is the price of real estate (i.e. 
agricultural land), Xk is the kth attribute of the land (cf. Table 4.15.), and Zm are the 
M policy variables (dummy variables for different combinations of subsidies on a 
plot). 
This function represents a fixed effects coefficient regression model. In the 
studied population, however, the problem of clustering arises, and price functions 
may have a different position and gradient depending on the type of rural areas to 
which they relate, as is also indicated in the literature review (for example, pro-
environmental subsidies are capitalised in the value of land differently in tourist 
regions than in typical agricultural regions). Therefore, in the study, a random quota-
based selection was made to obtain a sample of 653 agricultural land transactions 
from a four-year period (approximately 10% of all transactions in the area studied), 
proportional to the prevalence of each of four types of rural areas (described below) 
in the Wielkopolska region. This is considered to be a leading region in terms of 
agricultural production125, agrotechnology and the development of agribusiness in 
Poland, and this ensures a full cross-section of the attributes affecting land prices, as 
well as theoretically ensuring that speculative motives in land purchasing decisions 
are of low significance. Relations between demand and supply in the market for 
agricultural land in Wielkopolska can be described by the term “land hunger”. A 
strong and unique feature of this study is the description of each transaction (of 
which 90% are private transactions) by means of a set of 16 features including use 
values, amenities, and payments for public goods (under the EU CAP) – for details 
125 15% of gross agricultural output, including 10% of crop output and 20% of animal output, 
where average total output per Polish region is about 7%.
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see Table 4.15. In the opinion of the authors, the scope of the study, in terms of the 
area and features covered, is fully sufficient to enable its objectives to be attained. 
Table 4.15. Explanatory variables in the log-linear regression for agricultural land prices
No. Variables Description of variables used in the model
1. Type of rural area Three types of area: competitive agriculture, peripheral, 
agrotouristic. Each area type is a proxy for a specific set of land 
use attributes and rural amenities. 
2. Year 2010-2013; dummy variable; YES/NO
3. Surface area Total area of land purchased, in ha
4. Distance to the nearest city km
5. Distance to the largest city in the 
powiat (NUTS 4)
km
6. Land productivity coefficient Valuation according to type of agricultural complex, developed 
by IUNG, Puławy, taking account of crop yield; a proxy for 
agricultural return; may also be treated as a lowest-level grouping 
variable.
7. Division A dimensionless, ordinal indicator; the more plots contained in the 
property, the lower the value.
8. Shape A dimensionless, ordinal indicator: rectangle/trapezium/triangle/
irregular
9 Perimeter m
10. Shape coefficient Includes variables 9-11, according to the formula 40*π*(area/
perimeter^2)
11. Building permission Dummy variable; YES/NO
12. Distance to the nearest buildings m 
13. Proximity of asphalt/dirt road Dummy variable: asphalt/dirt
14. SAPS area payments only Dummy variable: YES/NO; in the SAPS area payments per ha are 
equal for each parcel, which meets the GAP conditions.
15. SAPS area and LFA payments Dummy variable: YES/NO; in the SAPS LFA additional payments 
per ha are equal for each parcel.
16. SAPS area, LFA and 
environmental payments
Dummy variable: YES/NO; in the SAPS additional environmental 
payments per ha are equal for each parcel participating in a given 
support programme.
Source: based on data from registers of features and values of properties maintained by county (powiat) 
authorities, land register information from the National Geoportal, and agricultural soil maps from the 
Provincial Geodetic and Cartographic Repository.
As noted above, three types of rural areas were distinguished, based on a 
typology developed for the Wielkopolska region (Raport pełny z badania 2014), and 
for each of them a separate price function was calculated (4.7):
1) Areas of competitive agriculture, with economically strong farms that 
provide the main source of income for the population (often featuring 
mixed agriculture). These areas have lower population density than the city-
integrated areas, and they include small towns and villages as an integral part, 
providing administrative and supply services to agriculture.
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2) Peripheral areas, where farms with low economic power are predominant, 
with high levels of long-term and hidden unemployment, poverty and social 
exclusion. In these areas the condition of the technical, economic and social 
infrastructure is poor and continues to decline. Also the population density is 
low and still decreasing. 
3) Agrotouristic areas, with large areas of forests, lakes and valuable resources 
of nature, with a well-developed infrastructure for rural tourism. Recreational 
values (environmental rent) undoubtedly increase the value of agricultural 
land here, and a significant proportion of the land (approximately 20%) 
constitutes Natura 2000 areas, including landscape parks, national parks and 
forests.
There are several reasons for the choice of the log-linear function (Malpezzi 
2003). Firstly, the log-linear model allows the added value (for example, the value 
resulting from a higher standard) to change proportionally to changes in the size 
and other attributes of the dwelling (in the case of a linear function, for example, 
improvement of the standard will have the same influence on the value of a dwelling 
with a floor area of 30 m2 and one with an area of 100 m2, whereas in the case of 
the log-linear function this influence will be differentiated). Secondly, the estimated 
regression coefficients are easy to interpret. The coefficient of a given variable 
may be defined as the percentage change in the value of a dwelling caused by a 
unit change in a value driver. Thirdly, the log-linear function often eases problems 
connected with the variability of a random component.
Land plots are heterogeneous in nature. This heterogeneity can create 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the estimation of the price function. Indeed, 
we detect heteroscedasticity in our models (according to White’s test). Therefore, 
we estimate a robust model, employing GLS (a backward stepwise method) and 
addressing unobserved land attributes to the agricultural policy variables Zm. We 
have also reduced the problem of time, using dummy variables for each year over 
the period 2010-2013. Due to the high number of independent variables available, 
multicollinearity may be a serious concern. We recall that multicollinearity leads 
to unstable coefficients and inflated standard errors. We used Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) to detect it. The VIF values in our model do not exceed 1.2 (and 
mean VIFs do not exceed 1.16, cf. Table 4.16.–4.18.), which is in line with the most 
conservative rules of thumb that the mean of the VIFs should not be considerably 
larger than 1 (Chatterjee and Hadi 2006). The estimated models are quite well fitted, 
since they explain 60% to almost 90% of the price variations, depending on the 
type of rural area. We can assume that the unobserved variation reflects the effect 
of speculation on land prices (besides unmeasured characteristics), which differs 
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between rural areas with different functions. The marginal effects for the models are 
presented in Tables 4.16.–4.18.
Results for hedonic regression
Above all, it must be noted that the market for agricultural land in the 
Wielkopolska region shows a great deal of variation: the mean price of a purchased 
property was approximately 103,000 PLN (median 60,000 PLN) with a standard 
deviation of 128,000 PLN, which gives a coefficient of variation of 1.24. The price 
per hectare is less variable: its mean is approximately 26,000 PLN (median 24,000 
PLN) with standard deviation 16,000 PLN (coefficient of variation 0.6). Neither of 
these two variables has a normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk tests lead to a rejection of 
the hypothesis of normality at p<0.0001); they both exhibit right-handed asymmetry 
(strongly in the case of prices per property). In this situation it was found that the set of 
explanatory variables at the transaction level, omitting the location-specific factors, 
explain the variation in prices of agricultural properties and in prices per hectare to 
only a small degree (the coefficient R2 was below 0.3). This can be partially ascribed 
to speculation in the land market and the significant demand disequilibrium, but it 
is the location-specific factor that has a key impact: a rural area type. The solution 
to this problem is therefore either the use of multilevel (hierarchical) modelling, or 
the calculation of separate functions for different locations. An observation of the 
sample divided according to that criterion showed that the rural area type not only 
affects the position and gradient of the regression function, but also changes the 
sign of some regressors. We therefore decided to compute four log-linear models of 
the prices of agricultural properties for each area type, and to compare them. These 
models have a normal distribution (for p>0.01) and give a good fit (R2 between 0.6 
and 0.88) – cf. Tables 4.16–4.18. The problem of collinearity does not occur in these 
models. As noted above, the parameters were calculated using the GLS method, in 
view of the heteroscedasticity.
The model for agrotouristic areas shows the best fit (R2=0.88, cf. Table 
4.16.), which may indicate that speculative motives in land purchase transactions 
are relatively uncommon here. Also of lowest significance here is the area of the 
property purchased, since an increase in the area by 1 ha increases the price by just 
11% (see the EXP column in Table 4.16), compared with over 30% in the case of city-
integrated and peripheral areas. Moreover, it is only in this model that an increase in 
distance from a city has a positive effect on the land price, since this increases the 
environmental rent – by approximately 6% for each kilometre further from the city. 
Similarly, proximity to a dirt road produces an increase in price. Only in this model 
was it found that the production value of the agricultural complex was statistically 
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significant, with a positive effect on price. The strongest positive influence on price 
comes from the possibility of building, which increases the price of a property by 
as much as 30%. This is logical if it is assumed that land purchases in such areas 
are made with a view to investing in hotels, holiday homes or residences. Most 
interesting, however, is the fact that properties with the possibility (confirmed in 
practice) of receiving additional LFA and environmental payments had approximately 
20% lower prices. This shows, firstly, that the limitations on farming use connected 
with obtaining payments of that type have a negative effect on land rent, and also 
restrict opportunities of earning from rural tourism. This does not reflect well on the 
construction of the scheme of payments for public goods under the CAP, since in 
agrotouristic areas it should be complementary, not substitutive, with respect to the 
multifunctional development of the countryside. The conclusion can also be drawn 
that these payments are too low and fail to compensate for the opportunity costs of 
pro-environmental management. Attention should also be drawn to the free term, 
Table 4.16. Regression results for agrotouristic rural areas
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Log land price 
coefficients EXP for coefficients
standard 
errors p value
const 10.8032 49177.92 0.216956 <0.0001 ***
year 2012 (yes) -0.25981 0.771196 0.128072 0.0472 **
area (ha) 0.104701 1.110379 0.00640357 <0.0001 ***
building permission (yes) 0.268605 1.308138 0.11088 0.0186 **
distance to the nearest city (km) 0.062951 1.064975 0.0245442 0.0130 **
land productivity (coeff.) 0.007726 1.007756 0.00268565 0.0056 ***
dirt road proximity (yes) 0.171264 1.186804 0.0961178 0.0801 *
area&LFA&env. payments on plot (yes) -0.2339 0.791439 0.124572 0.0655 *
Observations 65
R-squared 0.879069
Adj R-squared 0.864218
Mean for dependent variable 12.11319
Standard dev. for dependent variable 0.924049
VIF mean1 1.146429
Doornik-Hansen2 8.36531, p = 0.015258
Shapiro-Wilk 0.956666, p = 0.0230445
Lilliefors 0.103088, p ~ 0.08
Jarque-Bera 11.5959, p = 0.00303376
1 Variance Inflation Factors; VIF(j) = 1/(1 – R(j)^2); it should not exceed 10
2 The last four rows present statistical tests for the normality of the residuals’ distribution (we reject H0, that 
the distribution is normal, when p < 0.01)
Source: own computations using gretl 1.10.1 software based on data from table 4.15. (see more Czyżewski, 
Trojanek 2016; granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572).
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which on the assumption that the other regression coefficients are equal to zero, 
indicates the approximate “intrinsic” value of the land. In this case we have several 
dummy (zero-one) variables, the residual variants of which are contained in the free 
term. This applies to each of the four models, and so it is possible to compare the free 
terms to determine the relative intrinsic value of land in the various types of locations. 
It is encouraging that this is highest in the agrotouristic areas, which feature valuable 
resources of nature, followed by city-integrated areas (rent from urbanisation), and 
then typical agricultural areas; it is lowest in peripheral areas.
The model for peripheral areas (c.f. table 4.17.) features the strongest marginal 
effect of area on the price of a property – an increase by 1 ha causes the price to 
rise by 33%. Moreover, as could be expected, distance from the nearest city and 
from buildings are key factors in such areas. A 1 km increase in the distance from a 
city lowers the price by approximately 3%, while the same increase in the distance 
from buildings lowers the price by around 20%. In terms of the objective of the 
Table 4.17. Regression results for peripheral rural areas
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Log land price 
coefficients EXP for coefficients
standard 
errors p value
const 10.1534 25678.26 0.0822652 <0.0001 ***
year 2010 (yes) -0.21872 0.803545 0.113505 0.0548 *
year 2011 (yes) -0.12735 0.880425 0.0559672 0.0235 **
area (ha) 0.285049 1.329827 0.01146 <0.0001 ***
distance to the nearest city (km) -0.02922 0.9712 0.00648758 <0.0001 ***
distance to buildings (m) -0.00024 0.999763 7.07341e-05 0.0009 ***
area payment on plot (yes) 0.209708 1.233318 0.054653 0.0001 ***
area&env. payments on plot (yes) 0.307492 1.36001 0.0818652 0.0002 ***
Observations 355
R-squared 0.676785
Adj R-squared 0.670265
Mean for dependent variable 10.95707
Standard dev. for dependent variable 0.800178
VIF mean1 1.076143
Doornik-Hansen2 5.7928, p = 0.0552216
Shapiro-Wilk 0.993156, p = 0.106296
Lilliefors 0.041126, p ~ 0.15
Jarque-Bera 4.48144, p = 0.106382
1 Variance Inflation Factors; VIF(j) = 1/(1 – R(j)^2); it should not exceed 10
2 The last four rows present statistical tests for the normality of the residuals’ distribution (we reject H0, that 
the distribution is normal, when p < 0.01)
Source: own computations using gretl 1.10.1 software based on data from table 4.15. (see more Czyżewski, 
Trojanek 2016; granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572)
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study, however, the most interesting fact is that this is the only area type where area 
payments, and paradoxically environmental payments, perform their intended role 
and are capitalised in agricultural land prices. The receipt of area payments (SAP) 
increases the price of a property by approximately 23%, while the receipt of both 
area and environmental payments increases the price by around 36%.
Table 4.18. Regression results for rural areas with competitive agricultural production
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Log land price 
coefficients EXP for coefficients
standard 
errors p value
const 10.3617 31624.9 0.228027 <0.0001 ***
year 2010 (yes) -0.54426 0.580271 0.151515 0.0008 ***
year 2012 (yes) -0.472928 0.623175 0.226307 0.0419 **
area (ha) 0.158104 1.171288 0.023218 <0.0001 ***
distance to the nearest city (km) 0.0326636 1.033203 0.0101866 0.0024 ***
shape_coeff. 0.0525118 1.053915 0.0264091 0.0524 *
area&LFA payments on plot (yes) -0.465631 0.627739 0.191535 0.0188 **
Observations 56
R-squared 0.711919
Adj R-squared 0.676644
Mean for dependent variable 11.35700
Standard dev. for dependent variable 0.952673
VIF mean1 1.170833
Doornik-Hansen2 8.33389, p = 0.0154995
Shapiro-Wilk 0.944521, p = 0.0121777
Lilliefors 0.107954, p ~ 0.1
Jarque-Bera 10.4555, p = 0.00536549
1 Variance Inflation Factors; VIF(j) = 1/(1 – R(j)^2); it should not exceed 10
2 The last four rows present statistical tests for the normality of the residuals’ distribution (we reject H0, that 
the distribution is normal, when p < 0.01)
Source: own computations using gretl 1.10.1 software based on data from table 4.15. (see more Czyżewski, 
Trojanek 2016; granted by the National Science Centre in Poland, OPUS 6 UMO-2013/11/B/HS4/00572).
The model for areas with competitive agricultural production (c.f. table 
4.18.) is distinguished by the significance of the property shape coefficient (including 
division into plots). This can be explained by the observation that large plots of 
regular shape make agrotechnical operations easier. It is also interesting to note that 
a 1 km increase in the distance to a city increases the land price by 3%. This can 
be explained by the theory of inverted von Thünen rings (Sinclair 1967; Wigier 
2012), according to which production and yield per unit area of land increase with 
increasing distance from the urban centre and decreasing impact of urbanisation. As 
a result, the value of land with typical agricultural uses in the vicinity of towns is 
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inversely proportional to its market price. This theory would appear to be valid for 
rural areas of this type, particularly since the profitability of agricultural production 
is dependent on its scale, and farms with larger areas are found at a greater distance 
from towns. The greatest surprise is the fact that in this model the receipt of LFA 
payments causes a very large (38%) decrease in the price of agricultural properties. 
It can be accepted that LFAs by definition contain less profitable agricultural land, 
but the purpose of the scheme is to compensate for the difficulties resulting from the 
unfavourable farming conditions. It can be concluded from this that the scheme is 
not fulfilling its role.
Conclusions
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the 
effect of payments for public goods under the SAPS on land prices:
• There is a very large variation in prices, and prices are strongly affected by 
speculation, which has driven the upward trend since the introduction of area 
payments in 2004. The impact of speculation is relatively small in areas with 
agrotouristic features.
• The location-specific factor “type of rural area”, based on land functions, is 
of key importance. An observation of the sample divided by this criterion 
showed that it changes not only the position and gradient of the regression 
function, but also the sign of some regressors. The area type determines 
whether particular use values, such as area or shape coefficient, and amenities, 
such as possibility of building, as well as payments under agricultural policy, 
affect the land price.
• Agricultural policy, in particular payments for public goods (SAP, LFA, ES), 
has a very large significance (marginal effects) for the value of agricultural 
land compared with other parcel-level attributes of properties.
• Payments for public goods (SAP, LFA, ES) are capitalised in land prices 
only in peripheral areas. Elsewhere they fail to perform their role, and are 
even associated with the decapitalisation of the value of land. Particularly in 
agrotouristic areas these schemes should be complementary and not substitutive 
with respect to the multifunctional development of the countryside. As early 
as in 2004 the SAPS system initiated an upward trend in agricultural land 
prices in all categories and locations, hence expectations as to increases in 
land prices are already discounted. Therefore, in most places at present, SAP 
support is not a differentiating factor for land value, in view of its general 
availability and low requirements, and the other payments do not compensate 
for the opportunity costs related to alternative ways of deriving rent from 
land.
4.4. EU Common Agricultural Policy and the 
development of agrotourism: a case study
(Agnieszka Brelik126, Aleksander Grzelak127)
Introduction
Rural areas are undergoing an evolution in terms of the functions that they perform. 
While in the 1980s it was productive (agricultural) functions that still dominated, at 
the present time touristic and recreational functions are increasing in importance. 
This is reflected in the importance ascribed to the latter functions in the development 
strategies of municipalities (Powęska 2005). Consequently, there is a growth in interest 
in the development of agrotouristic activity, both among farms and at local authority 
level. These activities are also supported by instruments of the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). It is assumed that the economic activation of rural areas 
and diversification of income sources are factors behind the development of those 
areas. Furthermore, agrotouristic activity favours the creation and quantification of 
public goods, and these in turn, by a mechanism of positive feedback, stimulate 
interest in agrotourism.
The particular characteristics of rural areas in various regions of Poland justify 
the need for the development of various forms of agricultural and non-agricultural 
activity, which play an important role in the economic development of the countryside 
and the creation of new jobs (Bogusz and Paluch 2011). The West Pomeranian region 
is particularly predisposed to the development of agrotouristic activity, in view of its 
environmental qualities. The main goal of this study is to determine the relationships 
in terms of how the support provided under the CAP to farms offering agrotourism 
services impacts their income position. Two research hypotheses are proposed:
1. Support for agrotouristic activity has a significant effect on the level of income 
from agrotourism;
2. Among the EU’s CAP instruments it is direct subsidies that have the greatest 
impact on total income (from agricultural and agrotouristic activity).
The number of farms engaged in non-agricultural economic activity, including 
agrotourism, varies to a large extent between Polish regions. The largest numbers 
of such farms are found in the regions of West Pomerania (16.5%) and Pomerania 
(15.4%), and the smallest numbers in Podlaskie (10%) and Lubelskie (10.2%). With 
126 West Pomeranian University of Technology; Agnieszka.Brelik@zut.edu.pl . 
127 Poznan University of Economics and Business; agrzelak@interia.pl .
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this in mind, the analyses in the present study were based on a survey carried out in 
2012 in West Pomerania.
Methodology
A questionnaire-based survey was carried out in 2012 in 43 municipalities of 
West Pomerania in which farms engaged in agrotouristic activity had achieved an 
economic size greater than 4 ESU, as significance was attached to the element of 
economic activity resulting from agricultural production. The number of such farms 
in the province of West Pomerania was close to 190. The survey was carried out 
among the full population, but due to refusals and errors made in the filling out of 
documents, the analysis was restricted to 150 interview questionnaires. The survey 
provides significant conclusions relating to the studied phenomena in Poland as a 
whole, for farms engaged in agrotouristic activity and having an economic size above 
4 ESU. Individual balance sheet and profit and loss account items were calculated 
according to the FADN agricultural accounting methodology. The research was carried 
out using estimation methods by qualified interviewers working for Agricultural 
Advisory Centres – inspectors having many years of experience in the conduct of 
such surveys. This made it possible to obtain statistical data of a relatively high 
reliability and formal correctness. The research tool was an interview questionnaire, 
the correctness of which in terms of form and content had been verified in pilot 
studies carried out in 2011 on a sample of 40 farms offering agrotourism services 
and in the course of consultation with the Agricultural Advisory Centre staff.
A variety of research methods were used in the work: descriptive analysis of 
the studied phenomena, comparative analysis, structural analysis and analysis of 
regression.
Public goods in the development of agrotourism128
Existing models of agriculture, which focus primarily on the production function, 
viewing agriculture solely as a supplier of food, have come to be re-evaluated in 
the light of seeking other directions for its development. Such a model leads to an 
excessive intensification of the productive functions of agriculture or the outflow 
of resources to other uses not in accordance with existing needs. This produces 
numerous adverse external effects, as well as a reduction in the supply of public 
goods to non-agricultural sectors of the economy. On the other hand, there is now an 
ever increasing social need for the realisation of a wide range of objectives which 
might be achieved by reducing dysfunctions of the market mechanism (Czyżewski 
and Kułyk 2011). This requires an entirely different research perspective with respect 
128 This chapter is based on a previous article (Brelik 2015).
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to the agricultural sector and rural areas, including agrotourism. For this reason the 
proper valuation of resources engaged in agriculture, through taking account of non-
productive agricultural functions, leads to a reduction of pressure for the intensity 
of their use and in consequence reduces the creation of negative external effects. 
This revaluation results from the creation of additional sources of income, including 
those mediated by the state.
Global public goods are goods which are universal for all countries, groups of 
population and generations. The supply of such goods includes, for example, the 
production of oxygen, carbon sequestration (important for the prevention of climate 
change), protection of biodiversity (genetic, of species and of ecosystems), water 
protection, assurance of food safety, and conservation of the natural landscape. 
Because these are universal goods and equally important to all people, reward 
should be given for them according to a uniform system in all countries. In the 
case of local public goods (consumed at local level), reward for their supply should 
also be made at local (national or regional) level. These include, among others, 
natural and cultural landscapes. The landscape, in view of disturbance to its capacity 
for self-regulation, requires protection to enable it to maintain its balance and its 
characteristic features. The uniqueness of Poland’s agricultural landscape is made 
up of the cultural heritage of the countryside and the creation of conditions for 
recreation and leisure (agrotourism). The possibility of having contact with nature 
is partly paid for through the purchase of private goods (farm holidays). Here, this 
represents the danger of the transformation of a public good into a club good (Baum 
and Śleszyński 2009).
Public goods, by increasing the value of the landscape and quality of life in 
rural areas, can be expected to provide motivation for the creation of agrotourism 
farms based on their value. They therefore enable better use of the labour factor 
and diversification of economic activity, while also increasing the revenue of local 
authorities (such as municipalities). Support for the process of delivering public 
goods, under this analysis, represents the creation of attractive employment in 
rural areas for highly qualified workers in the fields of agriculture, horticulture, 
food processing and services for the food sector. It is therefore a source of benefits 
enjoyed both by private entities operating on the basis of public goods, and by entire 
communities which obtain additional income in a variety of forms (at the various 
stages of the division of municipal revenue – primary, secondary and final). There 
is a danger resulting from the unequal benefits obtained by entities located in a 
municipality on account of the existence of public goods. Such a danger is noted in 
some of the studies referring to the model under consideration (e.g. Esteban and Ray 
1999, Khwaja 2004). In this situation, entities receiving above-average benefits will 
increase their engagement of production factors. This may to some extent disturb 
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the equilibrium (environmental, for instance) and at the same time make the entire 
mechanism for the valuation of costs of supplying public goods more complex.
Agrotourism, as a tool for the development of municipalities, being in symbiosis 
with the multifunctional development of rural areas, should fulfil a basic function 
enabling the diversification of the local economy. Factors affecting the experience of 
tourists on farms are dependent to a large degree on the level of touristic attractiveness, 
natural values and quality of tourist products offered in a given locality – namely 
those called free goods, public goods and external effects. The quality of public 
goods primarily impacts not only the range of tourist services offered and the quality 
of tourists’ experience, but above all the quality of life of the population.
The creation of desirable products by farmers leads to a number of external 
effects which are not expressed in market transactions. Hence, apart from market 
commodities, agrotourism also creates non-commodity products which, although 
they lack a market value and price, have the nature of public goods. External effects 
of agricultural management may also be undesirable for the surroundings. This 
occurs when agrotourism is accompanied by damage to the environment caused 
by irrational management of wastes. Hence the concept of multifunctional use 
of farmland and non-production functions in agriculture requires the creation of 
tools for the evaluation of the nature of those functions, their valuation, and the 
finding of appropriate methods of rewarding owners of agrotourism farms for their 
contribution to the renewal and shaping of the natural and cultural environment of the 
countryside, the rural landscape and an open, clean and friendly rural space (Poczta-
Wajda, Kałowska 2016). Agrotourism as an integral part of a system of sustainable 
rural development may provide an important justification for the support of activity 
of this type in rural areas. Such measures are in line with the paradigm of sustainable 
development of agriculture and of rural areas. 
The Common Agricultural Policy and the development of agrotourism
The Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC was originally oriented chiefly 
towards increasing the productivity of farms and the level of agricultural production. 
In the 1980s, production surpluses proved to be one of the chief problems in the 
functioning of markets for foodstuffs. Despite an increase in the productivity of the 
engaged factors of production, and the implementation of technological progress, 
the average level of agricultural incomes remained below parity. Only with the 
MacSharry reforms of 1992 did a reorientation of agricultural policy take place. 
More attention was paid to the fact that agriculture is intrinsically connected with 
rural areas. Its development is also a determinant of the quality of life of the rural 
population. Mechanisms were therefore introduced to encourage farmers to offer 
agrotouristic services as an alternative to agricultural activity. Further changes to the 
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Common Agricultural Policy reinforced this trend by giving additional emphasis to 
environmental issues and to the creation of public goods by agriculture. The latter 
are particularly likely to be produced by farms engaged in agrotourism. Assuming 
that such farms create and conserve public goods (including landscape, biodiversity, 
rural culture, tradition, food safety and food security), speculative capital has a lower 
tendency to engage in this process than do family farms. 
The trends outlined here are expected to make rural areas more vital, 
multifunctional and thus also attractive to urban residents as a place to stay and 
spend free time. From this perspective, agrotourism may be perceived as an element 
of protection of the integrity of natural and socio-cultural resources (Bianchi 2011). 
It has even been suggested (Zegar 2002) that the future of rural families will largely 
depend on the creation of jobs in rural areas outside agriculture itself. This implies 
that the development of agrotourism may play an important role both in shaping 
the attractiveness of rural areas and in improving the income position. It is pointed 
out in this context that the development of agrotouristic initiatives is favoured by 
the support given for such purposes from EU funds, including under the LEADER 
programme (Anthopoulou 2000).
Poland’s accession to the EU led to an improvement in the income position 
of rural inhabitants and the vitality of rural areas. In 2004-2013, funds for the 
development of agriculture and of rural areas were provided under the SAPARD 
pre-accession programme, the Rural Area Development Programmes (PROW 2004-
2006 and 2007-2013) and the sectoral operational programme “Restructuring and 
Modernisation of the Food Sector and Development of Rural Areas 2004-2006”; 
additionally, both agriculture and rural areas received support from the national 
budget. These funds directly supported farmers’ income (direct subsidies), as well as 
modernisation programmes (including the modernisation of farms), socio-structural 
actions (programmes of structural rents and land integration), the development of 
agrotourism and other forms of non-agricultural activity (differentiation towards 
non-agricultural activity), environmental programmes (e.g. environmental payments, 
transfers for bringing farms into line with EU standards and improvement of farm 
animal welfare), and the development of infrastructure in rural areas. These accelerated 
structural transformations in rural areas, and increased incomes, investment and 
the quality of agricultural production (particularly in the case of milk, poultry and 
horticultural production). They were of great importance in adapting the agricultural 
sector and rural areas to the new conditions of functioning within the EU. 
In the initial period of Poland’s membership of the EU, support for the 
development of agrotourism was provided through the sectoral operational 
programme “Restructuring and Modernisation of the Food Sector and Development 
of Rural Areas 2004-2006”, under the measure titled Diversification of agricultural 
and related activity to ensure variety of activity or alternative sources of income. A 
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total of 891 projects were approved in the area of agrotourism, as well as 270 more 
relating to tourist and recreational services. These accounted for 27% of all projects, 
and apart from “minor services for residents of rural areas” constituted the category 
most frequently financed under that measure. Beneficiaries were mainly (76%) owners 
of smaller farms, i.e. those of economic size up to 4 ESU (Chmurzyńska 2007). This 
resulted from the seeking of additional sources of income by such farmers.
Under the Rural Area Development Programme (PROW) 2007-2013, support for 
agrotourism and rural tourism was possible primarily under axis 3: Quality of life in 
rural areas and diversification of the rural economy. In total that axis accounted for 
approximately 19% of the funds allocated under the PROW 2007-2013. It included 
two measures providing direct support for agrotourism: Diversification towards 
non-agricultural activity, addressed to the farming population, and Creation and 
development of micro-enterprises, relating to the rural population and rural entities. In 
the first, 7.2% of the projects implemented (883 out of 12,300) related to agrotourism, 
but in the second this figure was just 0.2%. The low level of interest under the second 
of the aforementioned measures indicates that the development of existing agrotourism 
operations is strongly preferred over the setting up of such operations from scratch 
(Siemiński and Poczta 2014). The most popular categories of products (under the 
Diversification measure) were those related to services to farms or forestry, services to 
the population, and construction works and services (for the Creation and development 
of micro-enterprises measure). The development of agrotourism at local level could 
also be financed under the Leader programme, and by local authorities under the 
Renewal and development of the countryside measure, which provided opportunities 
to promote and increase the attractiveness of tourism infrastructure. There were also 
opportunities for agrotourism to be financed not only from the CAP funds, but also 
under Regional Operational Programmes at provincial level. Actions in this area 
supported the development and promotion of tourism infrastructure.
The largest numbers of beneficiaries of support given for the development of 
agrotourism out of EU funds in 2004-2013 were found in the regions Lubelskie, 
Małopolskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Wielkopolskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie, 
and the smallest numbers in Opolskie and Lubuskie. This may give a preliminary 
indication that it is not only the potential of the natural environment that determines 
the activity of entities in this area, but also the structure of farms, linked to the 
fragmentation of agriculture, which provides an incentive to seek additional 
sources of income. According to a survey129, the support funds received were used 
129 A survey carried out in 2011 by ARiMR (Agriculture Restructuring and Modernisation 
Agency) among a sample of 463 beneficiaries of EU support for agrotourism, including 213 from 
PROW 2007-2013 and 250 from the sectoral operational programme and SAPARD. Results: 
Wsparcie agroturystyki/turystyki wiejskiej przez ARiMR, ARiMR, Warsaw 2012.
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by beneficiaries chiefly to adapt residential buildings to touristic purposes (64%), 
develop land around houses (40%), purchase touristic and recreational equipment 
(33%) and fit out additional rooms for guests (31%). It is notable that the persons 
running farms that receive support for the development of agrotourism have a 
relatively high level of education (36% are graduates, and 46% have completed 
high school). This results from the fact that the development of this form of activity 
requires knowledge, qualifications and also “soft skills”, which are acquired during 
high school and especially college education. It should also be noted that many 
beneficiaries (90%) indicated in the cited survey that there was too much bureaucracy 
related to obtaining EU funding for the support of agrotourism. 
In the 2014-2020 budgetary perspective, the development of agrotourism is 
realised under the sixth PROW priority Social inclusion, reduction of poverty and 
promotion of economic development in rural areas, under the measure Development 
of farms and economic activity, submeasure Assistance for business start-up for 
non-agricultural activity in rural areas. Beneficiaries must be natural persons. This 
submeasure has been allocated a total of €414m in the budget, with a maximum 
possible grant of 100,000 PLN. There is also a possibility of support for agrotourism 
under the Leader programme. In that case, subsidy will be given only to local 
authorities in connection with the development of public and non-commercial 
tourism infrastructure. Support for tourism-related actions can also be sought under 
the measure Basic services and renewal of localities in rural areas. According to 
some researchers (Siemiński and Poczta 2014), opportunities for support for the 
development of agrotourism will probably be less favourable in this period. This 
is due to the greater concentration of support for the development of areas related 
to agrotourism, namely infrastructure, through local authorities. On the other hand, 
the absence of tourism infrastructure in the region seems to be the greatest barrier 
to the further development of agrotouristic activity. Hence, the present changes to 
the CAP have the aim of meeting those needs, enabling making better use of the 
existing touristic potential of particular regions. It can be stated overall that the CAP 
instruments relating to the development of agrotourism have led to an improvement 
in the tourist base and infrastructure and a better matching of services to tourists’ 
needs, creating an impulse for the further development of the tourist and recreational 
functions of rural areas130.
130 This is also confirmed by the results of other studies which show that, for example, 
in the powiats of the Polish Carpathians, the use of assistance funds by agrotourism farms was 
widespread, particularly in the case of farms with marginalised agricultural production (Bogusz 
and Kiełbasa 2014). 
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Empirical research
The sociodemographic structure of the surveyed farms was evaluated using the 
following variables: gender of farm owners, number of family members, educational 
level of the respondents, and age of farm owners. The largest groups of respondents 
consisted of persons with high school education aged 46-55 (29%) and with vocational 
education aged 56-65 (17%). Graduates accounted for 9% of the respondents in the 
46-55 age range. High rates of agrotouristic activity among farmers were recorded in 
the age ranges 46-55 (51%) and 56-65 (37%). This may result from the fact that, firstly, 
such people have a stable material and family situation, particularly older persons 
who are no longer bringing up children and are more willing to devote their free time 
to receiving tourists. Secondly, they have living conditions suitable to receive guests. 
They are also seeking additional sources of income (besides agricultural activity; 
and the products produced on the farm significantly increase the attractiveness of 
the agrotouristic services offered, determining their unique rural character), and they 
have concrete professional ambitions – they wish to realise their own interests. 
Farm area is a factor that leads to differences in the levels of income from 
agricultural production. The question arises of whether this is also a factor affecting 
the income of agrotourism farms. In the survey, with regard to the specific nature of 
the activity of such farms, they were classified in the following area ranges: up to 5 
ha, above 5 to 10 ha, above 10 to 20 ha, and over 20 ha (Fig. 4.1.). 
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Figure 4.1.  Histogram showing the breakdown of the surveyed farms carrying on agrotouristic 
activity by area of used land (n=150)
Source: based on the survey results
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The largest number (37%) of surveyed farms engaged in agrotouristic activity 
had sizes of 10-20 ha, while 32% had areas up to 10 ha, and 31% above 20 ha. It can 
therefore be stated that, compared with the national standard, these were relatively 
large farms, although on the other hand, this structure matches the overall situation 
in the region of West Pomerania. The average size of a farm among the surveyed 
agrotouristic units was 14.97 ha, and the coefficient of variation of farm size was 
54%. This results from the significant differences between the surveyed farms 
in terms of area of agricultural land used, including outlier observations, which 
increased the mean131. 
The condition of agrotourism farms and the quality of the services provided 
are dependent on the experience of the persons engaged in that activity. Among the 
surveyed farms in West Pomerania, 57% of the respondents had been engaged in 
agrotouristic activity for between 4 and 8 years, while 31% had been providing such 
services for more than 8 years, and only 11% of farm owners had been engaged in 
such activity for less than 4 years. Overall, the surveyed farms had been engaged in 
agrotouristic activity for 1 to 17 years, with the largest number (24 farms) reporting a 
period of 6 years. It was also found that 50% of the farms had been engaged in such 
activity for less than 7 years, and 50% for more than 7 years. These data indicate 
that those running the surveyed farms had relatively long experience in agrotouristic 
activity, which can be expected to translate into a high standard of service and higher 
incomes.
The incomes of Polish farms are strongly differentiated, as is strongly confirmed 
by the Polish FADN accounting results. The level of income is affected by a number 
of factors, the most important being natural contracts, farm productive potential, 
intensity of production, and CAP subsidies (Czyżewski, Smędzik-Ambroży 2016). 
Income132, as an important economic category, determines the standard of living of 
rural communities, affecting their consumption, development and accumulation. It 
can occur in both financial and natural form (Woś and Tomczak 1984; Zegar 2001). 
Income is obtained by a family or by a farm through labour, which creates economic 
value, and the income results from the reward for that labour (Laskowski 2001). As 
a rule, farmers base their livelihood on many sources, which apart from agriculture-
related income also include income from agrotouristic activity, paid labour, disability 
and old-age pensions, and non-agricultural business activity. 
131 There were four outlier observations in total – farms for which the agricultural land area 
exceeded 100 ha.
132 Agricultural income is the effect of a farmer’s labour on the farm, plus rent from ownership 
of factors of production (Adamowski 1984). Income can be said to be the main goal of the economic 
activity of people and firms (Rojewski, Rychlik, Stańko 1987). 
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The respondents declared that the percentage of their total income accounted 
for by income from the farm ranged from 0 to 90%, with a mean of 55.9% and a 
coefficient of variation of 43% (Table 4.19.). The second largest item was income 
from agrotouristic activity, with a mean of 23.8% and a relatively high coefficient 
of variation of 62%. A significant amount of income (10.9% on average) came from 
paid labour. Additional sources of livelihood in the form of “other” income (average 
2.4%), social welfare payments (old-age or disability pensions – average 1.3%) and 
income from non-agricultural business activity (1.2%) were much lower. A large 
coefficient of variation is noted in the case of these forms of income, which should 
not come as a surprise, in view of the lower average values and consequent greater 
differentiation in these income sources.
Table 4.19.  Descriptive statistics of the contributions of particular income sources to the overall 
income of the surveyed farms engaged in agrotouristic activity (2012; n=150)
Item Mean (%)
Standard deviation 
(%)
Coefficient of variation1
(%)
Running of farm 55.9 23.9 43
Agrotouristic activity 23.8 14.8 62
Paid labour 10.9 19.4 178
Casual labour 2.5 6.8 277
Income from associated services 2.4 5.4 22
Other 2.0 6.9 343
Social welfare (old-age/disability pensions) 1.3 5.7 451
Non-agricultural business activity 1.2 6.8 548
1 coefficient of variation = standard deviation / arithmetic mean (%)
Source: based on the survey results
The breakdown of income sources described above indicates that agrotouristic 
activity is supplementary to agricultural income.
The application of the EU’s CAP instruments to Polish agriculture was a 
significant element in improving the economic situation of farms. The development 
opportunities of farms are dependent to a relatively small extent on the creation of 
production values, and to a greater extent on the institutional factor (chiefly direct 
subsidies) and the abilities of farmers to obtain financial support from EU funds.
Among the surveyed farms, 91.3% took advantage of direct subsidies, while 
8.7% of the respondents did not receive such subsidies. The structure of the amounts 
of direct subsidies is shown in Fig. 4.2. The greatest numbers of surveyed units 
received amounts of subsidy up to 10,000 zloty (PLN) (35%) or in the range 15-
20,000 PLN (24%). The smallest group (5%) was receiving amounts of subsidies 
in excess of 60,000 PLN. This distribution results from the areas of the surveyed 
group of farms. The average level of area payments was approximately 24,000 
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PLN (median 17,000), with a coefficient of variation of 92%, which results from 
the diversified structure of the surveyed farms. It should be noted that the size of 
the coefficient of variation results from the fact that the surveyed farms included 
a few units which receive higher area payments,and thus increase the mean and 
the coefficient of variation. The majority of the surveyed farms (61%) used 90-
100% of their direct subsidies for current expenditure relating to business activity, 
including agrotourism. This shows that among the surveyed units direct payments 
fulfil productive functions in most cases, stimulating economic activity. At the same 
time, 61 of the surveyed farms also received subsidies on account of engagement 
in agricultural activity in less favoured areas (LFAs). The overall goal of the 
subsidisation of those areas is to stop their depopulation, maintain their vitality, and 
counteract the ecological degradation of agricultural land and the degradation of the 
landscape and cultural values of the countryside. An additional benefit of this action 
is the stimulation of the application of good agricultural practice, which will lead 
to an increase in farmers’ ecological awareness. The average amount of subsidies 
in this category was 4800 PLN, this constituting an additional element of income 
support for the surveyed farms.
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Figure 4.2.  Structure of the amounts of direct subsidies received by the surveyed farms engaged 
in agrotouristic activity (2012; n=150)
Source: based on the survey results
The survey shows that in 2004-2006 in West Pomerania the subsidisation of 
agrotourism under the measure Diversification of agricultural and related activity 
to ensure variety of activity or alternative sources of income (SOP 2004-2006) was 
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used by only five of the surveyed farms, 3.3% of the total, while the PROW 2007-
2013 was used by 79 farms, which is 52.6% of the total number. The level of activity 
of those running the surveyed farms in obtaining funds for the development of 
agrotourism was therefore high, and gives a positive picture of the potential of those 
farms for further development. Items of importance for the owners of agrotourism 
farms include not only the natural features of an area and adequate tourism 
infrastructure, serving to attract potential agrotourists, but also the assistance funds 
which facilitate raising the tourist base to appropriate standards. On the other hand, 
interest in this programme was limited, in the opinion of the respondents, by the 
excessive bureaucratic procedures and by the restrictions on the items on which the 
funds could be spent.
The volume and structure of production are determined partly by the farmers 
themselves, guided chiefly by financial and market motives, and also by the 
limitations resulting from their level of qualifications or the productive potential 
of farms (Majewski and Dalton 2003; Zachariasse 1977). The analysis showed the 
average total revenue (from agricultural and agrotouristic activity) of the surveyed 
farms to be 212,200 PLN, of which 23% came from agrotouristic activity and 77% 
from agricultural activity (Table 4.20.). Revenue from the sale of plant products was 
the main source of revenue. Other important components of the farms’ revenue from 
agricultural activity were direct subsidies, revenue from service activity related to 
agricultural production, and livestock production. The main items of revenue from 
agrotouristic activity were room rent, sale of meals, and grants. This revenue structure 
indicates that EU funds are of relatively high importance in the functioning and 
development of this group of farms. Grants made up an average of 15.3% of revenue 
from agrotouristic activity, and 18.5% of revenue from agricultural activity. In the 
case of agrotouristic activity the support was allocated chiefly to the adaptation of 
residential buildings for touristic purposes, the purchase of touristic and recreational 
equipment, and fitting out additional rooms for guests. The funds allocated under the 
CAP to agriculture and other forms of economic activity in rural areas (agrotourism) 
lead to an improvement in efficiency and productivity and are a stimulus for structural 
changes in this sector of the economy (Sadowski and Giżycka 2012).
The total income from agricultural and agrotouristic activity on the surveyed 
farms averaged at 140,800 PLN, of which 27% came from agrotouristic activity and 
73% from agricultural activity (Table 4.21.). This shows that agricultural activity 
remains the main source of income for these farms.
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Table 4.20.  Revenue from agrotouristic and agricultural activity on the surveyed farms 
(‘000 PLN per farm) (2012; n=150)
Revenue from agrotouristic activity Mean(PLN)
Standard 
deviation (PLN)
Coefficient 
of variation (%)
Proportion of 
total revenue (%)
Room rent 25.74 24.01 93 53
PROW grant1 7.50 8.40 112 15
Sale of meals 9.59 11.81 123 20
Sale of associated services 5.97 13.08 219 12
Total revenue from agrotouristic activity 48.81 39.64 81 100
Sale of plant products 87.53 75.81 88 54
CAP grants2 6.82 12.04 176 4
Machine/horse services 25.24 46.22 183 16
Direct subsidies 21.13 21.75 103 13
Sale of animal products 20.00 36.18 190 12
LFA payments 2.29 5.22 228 1
Insurance received 0.39 2.47 628 0
Craft revenue 0.01 0.10 1225 0
Sale of timber 0.01 0.08 1225 0
Total revenue from agricultural activity 163.42 134.37 82 100
1 Funds under the measure Diversification of agricultural and related activity to ensure variety of activity or 
alternative sources of income
2 CAP grants from the second pillar for farms (excluding LFA subsidies) relating to agricultural activity (i.e. 
excluding the measures Diversification towards non-agricultural activity and Creation and development of 
micro-enterprises)
coefficient of variation = standard deviation / arithmetic mean
Source: based on the survey results
Table 4.21.  Average income on the surveyed farms from agrotouristic and agricultural activity 
(‘000 PLN per farm) (2012; n=150)
Income Mean(PLN)
Standard deviation
(PLN)
Coefficient of 
variation1 (%)
Proportion of total 
revenue (%)
Total income from 
agrotouristic activity
38.30 34.09 89 27
Total income from 
agricultural activity
102.17 95.18 93 73
Total income 140.48 101.80 72 100
1 coefficient of variation = standard deviation / arithmetic mean
Source: based on the survey results
It should also be noted that the level of income of the surveyed farms was 
approximately 2% higher than the average income of Polish households as shown 
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by research of the Central Statistical Office (GUS) on budgets, which means that on 
average these were units which obtained incomes slightly in excess of parity133.
An analysis was then made of the influence that CAP instruments have on the 
economic situation of the surveyed farms. It was found that the effect of subsidies 
related to agrotourism on the income from such activity was statistically insignificant 
(p > 0.3). As a rule, the farms that were the greatest beneficiaries of this support 
did not attain the highest incomes. This means that units which already enjoyed a 
sufficient level of development of agrotouristic activity in terms of the creation of 
income were less interested in this type of support (47% of the surveyed farms); 
this is linked to the criteria for granting such assistance, which favoured farms with 
relatively small areas of agricultural land, or not making use of other measures (e.g. 
Modernisation of farms). Other studies have shown (Brelik 2015, p. 249) that the 
levels of income from agrotourism are determined chiefly by environmental values, 
and hence by public goods located in a farm’s vicinity.
It was found, among the group of surveyed farms, that total income (from 
agricultural and agrotouristic activity) was most strongly determined by the level 
of direct subsidies (Table 4.22., coefficient β), and by the support for agricultural 
activity under the PROW (chiefly the measures titled Modernisation of farms and 
Agro-environmental programme). This is also confirmed by the coefficients of 
partial correlation between these variables134. The strength of this effect was quite 
large. In turn, the effect of subsidies intended to support agrotouristic activity and 
of LFA payments proved to be statistically insignificant. This resulted from the 
relatively weaker importance of these forms of support in conditions where income 
from agricultural activity is dominant. On the other hand, the survey shows that 
revenue from direct subsidies is also used to develop agrotouristic activity, chiefly 
in the area of current expenditure. Farmers have a wide discretion in allocating those 
funds, and can use them to develop agrotouristic activity if the farm is active in 
that area. Consequently, such farms’ mechanisms of adaptation to market conditions 
have become more complex, and at the same time the risk associated with their 
economic activity has been diversified. 
133 This also results from the fact that farms additionally obtained income from other sources, 
which increased their total income.
134 The coefficient of correlation between total income levels (from agriculture and from 
agrotouristic activity) was 0.5 and was found to be statistically significant.
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Table 4.22.  Results for the regression model, using income (from both agricultural activity and 
agrotourism) among the surveyed farms as the dependent variable (2012; n=150)
Item Summary of regression:
Dependent variable: total income; linear model
R^2= 0.49867255 corr. R2 = 0.48445049
F(4.141)=35.063 p<0.0000 standard error of estimation: 68115
omit cases1: 17;102;104;109; n=146
β st. err. β b st. err. b t p
Free term 62213.23 9042.933 6.879763 0.000000
Direct subsidies 0.535905 0.066982 3.03 0.379 8.000772 0.000000
LFA 0.054588 0.061530 0.99 1.115 0.887175 0.376495
Support for agricultural 
activity from PROW 0.260914 0.067605 2.05 0.532 3.859379 0.000172
Support for agrotouristic 
activity 0.060098 0.060195 0.73 0.727 0.998404 0.319794
1 Outlying observations were omitted from the analysis. In this case, these were farms with more than 100 ha 
of agricultural land in use
Bold type marks – statistically significant values
Source: based on the survey results
Conclusions
The results of the survey made it possible to verify the proposed research 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis was not found to be correct. It turned out, as an 
initial finding, that support for agrotouristic activity did not have a significant effect 
on the level of income from agrotourism among the group of surveyed farms. This 
resulted from the fact that the farms that were interested in this type of support were 
those which had not yet obtained relatively high levels of income from agrotourism. 
Moreover, this instrument was not of a universal nature, but required the fulfilment of 
specified conditions. It may be expected that a similar situation existed on a national 
scale. To confirm the results from this research, it should be repeated in the coming 
years, taking account of the time shift between obtaining the support and the effects 
in the form of income. 
The second hypothesis, stating that it is direct subsidies which affect the level 
of total income (from both agricultural and agrotouristic activity) to the greatest 
degree, was confirmed. This results from the universal nature of this instrument and 
its flexibility in terms of the use to which the funds are put. It should be remembered, 
however, that the relationships between agriculture and agrotourism are of a 
symbiotic nature. Their common plane includes both the income of households 
engaged in agricultural and agrotouristic activity, and the support available from 
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CAP instruments. Consequently, the preliminary conclusion can be drawn that 
direct subsidies favour the economic activation of farms as regards non-agricultural 
activity.
It can be expected that further changes to the instruments of the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy will favour the creation of public goods at local authority level 
more than the development of agrotouristic activity at farm level. This should cause 
public goods to be valued to an even greater degree, providing opportunities for 
farms seeking additional income in agrotourism. For this reason, direct subsidies 
will continue to be a significant element in the development of this type of activity. 
 Summary: Political Rents and the European Model 
of Agriculture
(Anna Matuszczak135)
To make a summary of a book that contains so many different threads is no 
easy task. One should, on the one hand, refer to its conceptual contribution to the 
paradigm of sustainable agriculture, and on the other hand, consider the conclusions 
drawn from the studies conducted at international, national and regional level. It is 
clear that changing the paradigm of agricultural development from an industrial to a 
sustainable one will be neither easy nor quick. Agriculture must satisfy the demand 
for food products while lowering the pressure on the environment, providing for 
technological and biological progress, meeting the need to ensure a secure supply of 
food, and ensuring global economic, social and environmental rationality. 
The discussion in this book has concentrated chiefly on the last two questions. 
This is because certain dimensions of environmental and social rationality have so 
far been poorly researched. Environmental rationality means not only protecting the 
natural environment and reducing the pressure placed on it by agricultural production. 
The authors have pointed out that the assumption of an intrinsic value of land changes 
the expected productivity of capital in the sectors which utilise that production factor, 
namely in agriculture. This has far-reaching theoretical and practical consequences. 
The statistical data that have been presented demonstrate that utilities are discounted 
in Polish land prices to a much greater degree than would result from the agricultural 
functions of land. A similar situation is found in other EU countries. Where does this 
excess value of land come from? It is undoubtedly a result of the expectations of 
political rents, of speculative motives, and also of non-agricultural amenities provided 
by land. However, it is hard to determine the proportions of these factors. Moreover, 
new utilities of land have the nature of public goods, which further complicates the 
problem of seeking a market equilibrium. Similarly, recognition of the fact of the 
absolute and relative deprivation of farmers in the long term changes the balance of 
intersectoral flows, because it means a drainage of surplus from agriculture to other 
branches of agribusiness. This drainage is understood as a permanent mechanism by 
which economic rent flows out of agriculture as a result of market imperfections, in 
particular the flexible prices of agricultural products. More space should be given to 
studies of this problem in the world literature.
135 Poznan University of Economics and Business, anna.matuszczak@ue.poznan.pl
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The second thread of the theoretical considerations relates to the problem of 
whether the concept of political rent, as found in the literature, fits the processes 
taking place in European agriculture. A review of the literature on rent seeking 
suggests that these theories provide only a partial explanation of the level of 
political rents and lobbying actions in European agriculture. Although there is a vast 
theoretical literature on rent seeking and collective action at global level, there is not 
much empirical work done with regard to these problems relating to the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Particularly problematic is the question of measuring political 
rents in particular EU member states. It has been found that, on a global level, it 
is European agriculture that best meets the criteria of viability and sustainability. 
Viewed against the backdrop of global agriculture, it is economically effective (in 
the institutional conditions guaranteed by the CAP), satisfies a variety of economic 
and social needs, and is developing in a way that reduces the burden on the 
environment. In 2012, based on the results of social consultations, the European 
Commission published a strategy and plan of action relating to the bioeconomy in 
Europe. The strategy creates a cohesive framework for a comprehensive approach to 
the solution of complex social problems (challenges) in Europe and worldwide. The 
measures undertaken with respect to the bioeconomy are focused on three pillars: 
investment in research, innovations and skills; strengthening the impact of the policy 
and engagement of interested parties; and strengthening competitiveness in sectors 
of the bioeconomy. The bioeconomy strategy represents an important step towards 
solving contemporary economic and social problems. The model of the development 
of agriculture in the EU can thus be considered an appropriate path to be followed 
in relatively densely populated countries, in which food producing area per capita 
is small. However, does this model require institutional support and the payment of 
political rents? The question arises as to whether these are in fact political rents, if 
in return society receives a package of specified benefits, and there is a net increase 
in social well-being.
Empirical analyses have shown that up to the mid 1980s the level of support for 
agriculture in the EU (measured by the NRA indicator) was constantly increasing. The 
decline in support in subsequent years was maintained by payments of the decoupled 
type. Based on NRA values it can be concluded that nominal support in 2011 was 
at a level comparable to that recorded prior to the creation of an organisation of 
agricultural markets, that is, before 1962. This means that the CAP is distorting 
world prices to an ever smaller degree, and agricultural producers are losing their 
competitive advantages (although to differing extents). An important observation 
is the fact that, although the CAP applies to all member states, the level of support 
varies between those countries. In 2005-2011 it was the highest in Ireland, Slovenia, 
Poland, Belgium and the UK, and the lowest in Italy and Bulgaria. This observation 
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is confirmed by a second indicator constructed for the purposes of this research 
by the authors of Chapter 2.3 – the Farm Receipts Gap Estimate (FRGE). Despite 
the fact that in principle agricultural policy has a universal application, the amount 
of financial support given to agricultural producers measured as a percentage of 
gross farm receipts is not uniform between countries, with differences as high as 17 
percentage points in 2012136 (cf. Table 2.4.). We should add that, according to the 
OECD, the value of the PSE for the whole of the European Union is 22.6% (of gross 
receipts). The differences between the PSE and the FRGE result partly from the 
methodology used for calculation. Most importantly, however, the FRGE shows how 
little uniformity there is across the EU in terms of support for agricultural producers 
in different countries. The differences are even more marked when we consider the 
contribution of pure political rent137 to the revenue of producers in various countries. 
In the Netherlands this contribution is just 4.3%, while for Ireland it is 25.8% 
(although the highest value, 28.7%, is recorded in Finland; cf. Table 3.12.). These 
data also demonstrate one more thing: that the PSE should not be used as a measure 
of political rents, because it significantly overstates them. The mechanisms shaping 
the structure of transfers in the selected countries also exhibited clear differences. 
This applies in particular to the two main streams of transfers: from taxpayers to 
producers and from consumers to producers. There has also been a gradual change in 
the structure of support, away from consumer transfers towards taxpayer transfers. 
This has resulted both from changes taking place in the global economy and the rise 
in prices of agricultural products, as well as from transformations in agriculture’s 
role in the economy. 
A key part of the book proved to be Part 3, which presents the concept and the 
effects of long-term surplus drainage from agriculture under the various support 
models applied in the EU as regards equivalent payments (for specific public goods) 
and the different models for the taxation of agriculture. The analysis leads to what are 
called pure political rents, being what remains when the value of the aforementioned 
flows (drainage and net subsidies for public goods) is deducted from the sum of CAP 
subsidies. It should be noted that only rents calculated in this way meet the definition 
of political rent found in the public choice theory.
Another important thread in this discussion concerns price fluctuations and 
their consequences. Agriculture is characterised by a high variability of prices in 
particular markets, which leads to adjustments of supply. This reaction is not always 
as described by neo-classical concepts – the spider’s web and King’s effects. Farmers’ 
expectations in different countries may be more or less adaptive, and are sometimes 
136 From 19.99% in the Netherlands to 36.96% in Ireland.
137 After adjusting the support by that part the receipt of which is conditional on the supply of 
specified public goods, and by the value of long-term drainage resulting from market failures.
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rational. This depends on the degree of horizontal and vertical integration of sale 
channels, and on access to information. This price variability leads to unexpected 
flows of economic surplus into and out of agriculture, and in the authors’ view, this 
produces a drainage effect in the long term. In response, there is a fluctuation in 
economic activity and in the economic situation in agriculture. This process is not 
uniform, however, and varies between different EU countries, as the authors observe. 
They propose an economic indicator based on surplus flows as a result of price 
fluctuations, based on an input-output table. The largest fluctuations were recorded 
in such countries as Germany, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia 
and Lithuania. At the other extreme (with the smallest amplitudes of variation) are 
Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta. At the same time, the value of the computed 
indicator determined the changes in farms’ output and receipts, although in some 
countries this was a concurrent response, while in others it was delayed. This partly 
confirms the hypothesis that the outflow of economic rent from agriculture means 
a drop in productive activity, and vice versa (in some cases, however, such as in 
Poland, the response was delayed – recalling the spider’s web theory). It was also 
shown that the relationship between the economic indicator and the production of 
agricultural raw materials differs between countries. In Germany, for example, the 
variation in output as a response to price changes is relatively low. Even in the most 
difficult period for agriculture (2009) production fell there by just 1%, compared 
with 15% in Portugal and as much as 30% in Poland, despite a smaller drop in the 
economic indicator. The authors believe this to be a result of the different agrarian 
structure, scale and technology of production, differences in the functioning of 
market institutions (integrative links, contracting systems), and the reactions of the 
producers themselves to the situation. To sum up, drawing conclusions about the 
general economic situation based on flows of economic rents is an atypical approach, 
but one that can identify the causes of variation in the productive activity on farms 
and help compare the scale of such variation between countries. This approach may 
also be a useful analytical tool for agricultural policy, which becomes particularly 
important in conditions of the intensification of processes of globalisation. 
In generalising the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the structure of CAP 
support in selected EU countries, three different models were identified138. Only 
138 The structure of support is described based on the contribution of the following variables 
to total variable subsidies: X1 – the value of payments for public goods, being the sum of set-aside, 
agri-environmental and less favoured area payments and other subsidies for the development of 
rural areas; X2 – the value of subsidies for plant and animal production (the sum of other payments 
to plant and animal production plus the balance of subsidy and penalties for milk production, 
subsidy for other cattle production and subsidy for sheep and goat production); X3 – the value of 
single farm and area payments; X4 – the value of subsidies for indirect consumption; X5 – the 
value of investment subsidies.
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two of them – model A (dominated by single farm and area payments, and with 
payments for the supply of public goods making up 17% of the total) and model C 
(combining different mechanisms of support for farms, with the highest contribution 
from payments for public goods, 33%) – were in accordance with the development 
priorities of the European agricultural model as defined in the new programming 
period of 2014-2020. These operated throughout most of the area of the EU in 2012, 
particularly in the new member states (cf. Figure 3.3.). Nonetheless, in most regions 
of the “old” EU-15 member states, the model in operation in 2012 was model B, 
oriented exclusively towards direct payments, which are treated as a substitute 
for support for production and produce a relatively weak stimulus for sustainable 
development. Further calculations showed that these countries receive more than 
80% of the pure political rents derived from the CAP.
There is also a large variation between EU countries as regards agricultural 
income. The tax systems applied to agriculture, however, are very similar (with 
certain exceptions, such as the case of Poland). They incorporate taxes on income, 
assets and consumption (VAT). The Polish system is different in that it does not 
include a tax on income from agricultural production. Based on an evaluation of the 
tax systems applied to agriculture in selected EU countries, it is possible to identify 
countries having the most restrictive tax policies towards agriculture (Belgium, 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain) and those where such policies are less restrictive (the UK, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands). 
Taking account of the long-term surplus drainage from agriculture and the net 
equivalent subsidies (in exchange for specific actions relating to public goods), an 
estimate was made of the value of “pure” political rents for individual countries of 
the EU-27. The analysis carried out here points to the conclusion that agricultural 
interventionism in the EU requires a special conceptual approach, since it is not 
sufficient to simply treat all subsidies as political rents. The new approach proposed 
by the authors is necessary, as it provides an indication of how to improve the 
effectiveness of allocation of support for agriculture in individual EU countries. 
Quantification of the political rent in agriculture enables a more rational and socially 
appropriate distribution of assistance from the CAP in accordance with the goals 
set for agricultural policy in the new financial framework after 2014. Although the 
division of payment envelopes between member states has already been decided, 
since 2014 the CAP has gained flexibility in terms of the structure of both pillars 
and transfers between them. These matters remain in the hands of the governments 
of member states. 
Another issue is the aforementioned contribution of political rents to the gross 
receipts from agriculture in a given country (cf. Tables 3.12. and 3.13.). On average 
in the EU-27 this contribution is 13.63%, and although in the EU-12 it is slightly 
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higher, and in the EU-15 somewhat lower than average, there are countries in which 
that value is exceeded almost twofold. Redefinition is required as regards the issue 
of social fairness in the determination of the sizes of national CAP envelopes. The 
calculations of political rents show that historical payments are neither a rational 
nor a just solution, because the structurally low profitability of agriculture in certain 
countries should be compensated for by a higher supply of public goods, and this 
is not happening. Perhaps countries with structurally inefficient agriculture should 
supply more public goods than they do at present, if they wish to maintain their 
current ratio of political rents to gross added value, or else subsidise their agriculture 
to a greater degree out of national funds. 
Part 4 of the book contains case studies. These demonstrate the applicative 
dimension of the paradigm of sustainable development and methods of evaluating 
the effectiveness of agricultural policy in supporting such development in rural 
areas. Naturally, the results of these studies are not representative for agriculture 
as a whole (at national or EU level). Nonetheless, they indicate a direction for 
discussion concerning the development of sustainable agriculture in theory and in 
practice, and provide methodological guidance. They develop a methodology for 
examining regional sustainable development, which enables not only a sustainability 
assessment, but also a comparison of synthetic indicators over the whole of the 
analysed period. Also a set of analytical models is proposed, which make possible 
not only a better management of human and material capital in firms in agricultural 
and food sectors, but also the identification of areas that need to be improved to 
enable these resources to be used more competitively. Among the detailed findings, 
the following are particularly striking:
• The location-specific factor “type of rural area”, based on land functions, is of 
key importance for land value in the SAPS. The area type determines whether 
particular use values, such as area or shape coefficient, and amenities, such 
as the possibility of building, as well as payments under agricultural policy, 
affect the land price. 
• There is a very large variation in land prices in the SAPS, and prices are 
strongly affected by speculation, which has driven the upward trend since the 
introduction of area payments in 2004. However, the impact of speculation is 
relatively small in areas with agrotouristic features.
• Agricultural policy, in particular payments for public goods, has a very large 
significance (marginal effects) for the value of agricultural land compared 
with other parcel-level attributes of properties.
• Payments for public goods are however capitalised in land prices only in 
peripheral areas. Elsewhere they fail to perform their role, and are even 
associated with the decapitalisation of the value of land. In particular, in 
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agrotouristic areas these schemes should be complementary and not substitutive 
with respect to the multifunctional development of the countryside. Therefore, 
in most places at present, single area payment support is not a differentiating 
factor for land value, in view of its general availability and low requirements, 
and the other payments do not compensate for the opportunity costs related 
to alternative ways of deriving rent from land.
• Similarly, support for agrotouristic activity did not have a significant effect 
on the level of income from agrotourism among the analysed farms. This 
was because interest in such support came from those farms that did not yet 
obtain relatively high amounts of income from agrotourism; and moreover 
the instrument was not of a universal nature, but required the fulfilment 
of specified conditions. It can be expected that the situation was similar 
throughout Poland.
• The relationships between agriculture and agrotourism are symbiotic in 
nature. Their common plane includes both the income of farms engaged 
in agricultural and agrotouristic activity, and the support provided by CAP 
instruments. In consequence, the preliminary conclusion can be reached that 
direct subsidies favour the economic activation of farms in non-agricultural 
activity.
• The instruments of the CAP can be expected to evolve to favour the creation 
of public goods at local authority level rather than the development of 
agrotouristic activity itself at farm level. 
A particularly striking aspect of the findings of these case studies is that they 
point towards a common problem: the idea of payments for public goods under 
agricultural policy is set forth as a leitmotif of the European agricultural model, but 
in practice the CAP does not succeed in valuing these goods accurately. Perhaps this 
value is too low compared with the funds allocated indirectly to support production 
and efficiency, perversely given the name “decoupled”? Hence, the idea remains 
more a declaration than reality. This conclusion is confirmed by the variation in 
pure political rents obtained by agriculture (one might say non-equivalent rents) 
between EU countries in 2004-2012: ranging from approximately 9% of value added 
by agriculture in the Netherlands, to over 95% in Ireland. Are such disproportions, 
which it is hard to justify by any objective criteria, acceptable from the point of 
view of social justice and common community ideology? Alluding to the hypothesis 
put forward at the outset: there is something called the European model for the 
development of agriculture, but it is implemented in a minority of EU countries. 
Their common denominator is that pure political rent, after taking account of public 
goods and market corrections, accounts for a similar proportion of agricultural 
income.
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